Joachim Otte

Human health benefits from livestock vaccination for brucellosis: case study

OBJECTIVE To estimate the economic benefit, cost-effectiveness, and distribution of benefit of improving human health in Mongolia through the control of brucellosis by mass vaccination of livestock. METHODS Cost-effectiveness and economic benefit for human society and the agricultural sector of mass vaccination against brucellosis was modelled. The intervention consisted of a planned 10-year livestock mass vaccination campaign using Rev-1 livestock vaccine for small ruminants and S19 livestock vaccine for cattle. Cost-effectiveness, expressed as cost per disability-adjusted life year (DALY) averted, was the primary outcome. FINDINGS In a scenario of 52% reduction of brucellosis transmission between animals achieved by mass vaccination, a total of 49,027 DALYs could be averted. Estimated intervention costs were US

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (H5N1): Pathways of Exposure at the Animal‐Human Interface, a Systematic Review

8.3 million, and the overall benefit was US

The Animal-Human Interface and Infectious Disease in Industrial Food Animal Production: Rethinking Biosecurity and Biocontainment:

26.6 million. This results in a net present value of US

Industrial Food Animal Production and Global Health Risks: Exploring the Ecosystems and Economics of Avian Influenza

18.3 million and an average benefit-cost ratio for society of 3.2 (2.27-4.37). If the costs of the intervention were shared between the sectors in proportion to the benefit to each, the public health sector would contribute 11%, which gives a cost-effectiveness of US

Associations between attributes of live poultry trade and HPAI H5N1 outbreaks: a descriptive and network analysis study in northern Vietnam

19.1 per DALY averted (95% confidence interval 5.3-486.8). If private economic gain because of improved human health was included, the health sector should contribute 42% to the intervention costs and the cost-effectiveness would decrease to US

Impacts of avian influenza virus on animal production in developing countries

71.4 per DALY averted. CONCLUSION If the costs of vaccination of livestock against brucellosis were allocated to all sectors in proportion to the benefits, the intervention might be profitable and cost effective for the agricultural and health sectors.

Antimicrobial use in Chinese swine and broiler poultry production

Background The threat posed by highly pathogenic avian influenza A H5N1 viruses to humans remains significant, given the continued occurrence of sporadic human cases (499 human cases in 15 countries) with a high case fatality rate (approximately 60%), the endemicity in poultry populations in several countries, and the potential for reassortment with the newly emerging 2009 H1N1 pandemic strain. Therefore, we review risk factors for H5N1 infection in humans. Methods and Findings Several epidemiologic studies have evaluated the risk factors associated with increased risk of H5N1 infection among humans who were exposed to H5N1 viruses. Our review shows that most H5N1 cases are attributed to exposure to sick poultry. Most cases are sporadic, while occasional limited human-to-human transmission occurs. The most commonly identified factors associated with H5N1 virus infection included exposure through contact with infected blood or bodily fluids of infected poultry via food preparation practices; touching and caring for infected poultry; consuming uncooked poultry products; exposure to H5N1 via swimming or bathing in potentially virus laden ponds; and exposure to H5N1 at live bird markets. Conclusions Research has demonstrated that despite frequent and widespread contact with poultry, transmission of the H5N1 virus from poultry to humans is rare. Available research has identified several risk factors that may be associated with infection including close direct contact with poultry and transmission via the environment. However, several important data gaps remain that limit our understanding of the epidemiology of H5N1 in humans. Although infection in humans with H5N1 remains rare, human cases continue to be reported and H5N1 is now considered endemic among poultry in parts of Asia and in Egypt, providing opportunities for additional human infections and for the acquisition of virus mutations that may lead to more efficient spread among humans and other mammalian species. Collaboration between human and animal health sectors for surveillance, case investigation, virus sharing, and risk assessment is essential to monitor for potential changes in circulating H5N1 viruses and in the epidemiology of H5N1 in order to provide the best possible chance for effective mitigation of the impact of H5N1 in both poultry and humans. Disclaimer The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the institutions or organizations with which they are affiliated.

Evaluating the control of HPAIV H5N1 in Vietnam: virus transmission within infected flocks reported before and after vaccination

Understanding interactions between animals and humans is critical in preventing outbreaks of zoonotic disease. This is particularly important for avian influenza. Food animal production has been transformed since the 1918 influenza pandemic. Poultry and swine production have changed from small-scale methods to industrial-scale operations. There is substantial evidence of pathogen movement between and among these industrial facilities, release to the external environment, and exposure to farm workers, which challenges the assumption that modern poultry production is more biosecure and biocontained as compared with backyard or small holder operations in preventing introduction and release of pathogens. An analysis of data from the Thai government investigation in 2004 indicates that the odds of H5N1 outbreaks and infections were significantly higher in large-scale commercial poultry operations as compared with backyard flocks. These data suggest that successful strategies to prevent or mitigate the emergence of pandemic avian influenza must consider risk factors specific to modern industrialized food animal production.

The ‘Livestock Revolution’: Rhetoric and Reality:

Many emerging infectious diseases in human populations are associated with zoonotic origins. Attention has often focused on wild animal reservoirs, but most zoonotic pathogens of recent concern to human health either originate in, or are transferred to, human populations from domesticated animals raised for human consumption. Thus, the ecological context of emerging infectious disease comprises two overlapping ecosystems: the natural habitats and populations of wild animals, and the anthropogenically controlled habitats and populations of domesticated species. Intensive food animal production systems and their associated value chains dominate in developed countries and are increasingly important in developing countries. These systems are characterized by large numbers of animals being raised in confinement with high throughput and rapid turnover. Although not typically recognized as such, industrial food animal production generates unique ecosystems—environments that may facilitate the evolution of zoonotic pathogens and their transmission to human populations. It is often assumed that confined food animal production reduces risks of emerging zoonotic diseases. This article provides evidence suggesting that these industrial systems may increase animal and public health risks unless there is recognition of the specific biosecurity and biocontainment challenges of the industrial model. Moreover, the economic drivers and constraints faced by the industry and its participants must be fully understood in order to inform preventative policy. In order to more effectively reduce zoonotic disease risk from industrial food animal production, private incentives for the implementation of biosecurity must align with public health interests.

Technical, epidemiological and financial implications of large-scale national vaccination campaigns to control HPAI H5N1

BackgroundThe structure of contact between individuals plays an important role in the incursion and spread of contagious diseases in both human and animal populations. In the case of avian influenza, the movement of live birds is a well known risk factor for the geographic dissemination of the virus among poultry flocks. Live bird markets (LBMs) contribute to the epidemiology of avian influenza due to their demographic characteristics and the presence of HPAI H5N1 virus lineages. The relationship between poultry producers and live poultry traders (LPTs) that operate in LBMs has not been adequately documented in HPAI H5N1-affected SE Asian countries. The aims of this study were to document and study the flow of live poultry in a poultry trade network in northern Vietnam, and explore its potential role in the risk for HPAI H5N1 during 2003 to 2006.ResultsOur results indicate that LPTs trading for less than a year and operating at retail markets are more likely to source poultry from flocks located in communes with a past history of HPAI H5N1 outbreaks during 2003 to 2006 than LPTs trading longer than a year and operating at wholesale markets. The results of the network analysis indicate that LPTs tend to link communes of similar infection status.ConclusionsOur study provides evidence which can be used for informing policies aimed at encouraging more biosecure practices of LPTs operating at authorised LBMs. The results suggest that LPTs play a role in HPAI H5N1 transmission and may contribute to perpetuating HPAI H5N1 virus circulation amongst certain groups of communes. The impact of current disease prevention and control interventions could be enhanced by disseminating information about outbreak risk and the implementation of a formal data recording scheme at LBMs for all incoming and outgoing LPTs.