Joakim Kreutz

Introducing the UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset

This article extends the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) by presenting new global data on non-state conflict, or armed conflict between two groups, neither of which is the state. The dataset includes conflicts between rebel groups and other organized militias, and thus serves as a complement to existing datasets on armed conflict which have either ignored this kind of violence or aggregated it into civil war. The dataset also includes cases of fighting between supporters of different political parties as well as cases of communal conflict, that is, conflict between two social groups, usually identified along ethnic or religious lines. This thus extends UCDP’s conflict data collection to facilitate the study of topics like rebel fractionalization, paramilitary involvement in conflict violence, and communal or ethnic conflict. In the article, we present a background to the data collection and provide descriptive statistics for the period 1989–2008 and then illustrate how the data can be used with the case of Somalia. These data move beyond state-centric conceptions of collective violence to facilitate research into the causes and consequences of group violence which occurs without state participation.

Estimating War Deaths An Arena of Contestation

In a much-cited recent article, Obermeyer, Murray, and Gakidou (2008a) examine estimates of wartime fatalities from injuries for thirteen countries. Their analysis poses a major challenge to the battle-death estimating methodology widely used by conflict researchers, engages with the controversy over whether war deaths have been increasing or decreasing in recent decades, and takes the debate over different approaches to battle-death estimation to a new level. In making their assessments, the authors compare war death reports extracted from World Health Organization (WHO) sibling survey data with the battle-death estimates for the same countries from the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). The analysis that leads to these conclusions is not compelling, however. Thus, while the authors argue that the PRIO estimates are too low by a factor of three, their comparison fails to compare like with like. Their assertion that there is “no evidence” to support the PRIO finding that war deaths have recently declined also fails. They ignore war-trend data for the periods after 1994 and before 1955, base their time trends on extrapolations from a biased convenience sample of only thirteen countries, and rely on an estimated constant that is statistically insignificant.

From Tremors to Talks : Do Natural Disasters Produce Ripe Moments for Resolving Separatist Conflicts?

This article suggests that natural disasters can produce a ripe moment for conflict resolution because governments faced with the demand for effective disaster relief have incentives to offer concessions to separatist challengers. An analysis of the prevalence of new negotiations, ceasefires, and peace agreements during 12-month periods before and after natural disasters for separatist dyads 1990–2004 reveal some support for this proposition. Natural disasters increase the likelihood that parties will initiate talks or agree to ceasefires but have less effect on the signing of peace agreements. In line with the proposed mechanism, these results are particularly strong in democracies and following more severe disasters where the need to provide relief is most acute.

Human Rights, Geostrategy, and EU Foreign Policy, 1989–2008

Is foreign policy influenced by humanitarian concern, or are concepts such as human security merely rhetoric for traditional power politics? In this paper, I systematically explore whether military ...

Heritage under attack: motives for targeting cultural property during armed conflict

Abstract Although attacks on cultural property have caused international outcry, our understanding of this phenomenon is still limited. In particular, little research has been directed towards exploring the motivations for such attacks. Therefore, we ask: What are the motives for attacking sites, buildings or objects representing cultural heritage? By combining insights from peace and conflict research with findings from heritage studies we present a typology of motivations for attacking cultural property. We identify four, not mutually exclusive, broad groups of motives: (i) attacks related to conflict goals, in which cultural property is targeted because it is connected to the issue the warring parties are fighting over (ii), military-strategic attacks, in which the main motivation is to win tactical advantages in the conflict (iii), signalling attacks, in which cultural property is targeted as a low-risk target that signals the commitment of the aggressor, and (iv) economic incentives where cultural property provides funding for warring parties. Our typology offers a theoretical structure for research about why, when, and by whom, cultural property is targeted. This is not only likely to provide academic benefits, but also to contribute to the development of more effective tools for the protection of cultural property during armed conflict.

A Responsibility to Talk: Mediation and Violence Against Civilians

Does the killing of civilians in civil wars motivate third party action? While there is some evidence that cases with humanitarian atrocities are more likely to attract peacekeeping missions (Mullenbach 2005; Melander 2009; Hultman 2013), this study addresses the topic of mediation selection: do mediators primarily focus on civil wars where civilians are killed? There is an intuitive logic that suggests that this may be the case. A conflict in which civilians are deliberately targeted typically draws more attention. Thus, to solve it would render more prestige while inaction would render greater domestic audience costs. Political leaders’ concern for domestic opinion has been utilized by several recent campaigns drawing attention to humanitarian atrocities in, for example, Sudan (Save Darfur), Burma (Support the monks’ protest), and Uganda (Kony 2012). That mediation can be used for the purpose of protecting civilians is also evident in practitioners’ experience. Mediators commonly pursue several objectives beyond the ultimate aim of solving conflict. As recounted by Jan Eliasson, drawing on mediation experience from Burma, Iran-Iraq, Nagorno-Karabakh and Darfur:

The war that wasn’t there Managing unclear cases in conflict data

When collecting data, some observations will always be hard to confidently classify in accordance with stated definitions of war, civil conflict, or political violence. This research note draws on the experiences of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program in the last decade in managing such unclear cases. After explaining the difference between unclear and non-cases, I describe the data generating process and how this uncertainty is distributed over time in the data. This exercise reveals that the 1980s may have been more conflict-filled than the 1990s, challenging arguments about the stability of the bipolar global order as well as the sudden ‘rise’ of warfare in the immediate post-Cold War era. The final section suggests different ways that researchers may use existing information regarding unclear cases as a way to conceptualize the nature of civil strife without having to engage in additional data collection.

Rising Powers and the Responsibility to Protect: Will the Norm Survive in the Age of BRICS?

What is the view of the BRICS countries regarding the international communitys Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) against civilian atrocities? This article revisits the debate on international humanitarian action in Libya and Syria in 2011–2012; a time with BRICS states as members of the United Nation Security Council. While BRICS countries from the outset had different views on RtoP, the experiences of the Libyan intervention led to a unanimous reluctance to initiate any humanitarian action in Syria. We find, however, that all BRICS except Russia in general are positive to the RtoP concept and are willing to participate in further developments to specify how and when it applies. On the basis of our analysis, we expect that RtoP will continue to be an important feature of international relations but that it primarily will be used against non-state actors and that the behaviour of the interveners may be subjected to UNSC scrutiny.

Communication Technology and Reports on Political Violence Cross-National Evidence Using African Events Data

The spread of Internet and mobile phone access around the world has implications for both the processes of contentious politics and subsequent reporting of protest, terrorism, and war. In this paper, we explore whether political violent events that occur close to modern communication networks are systematically better reported than others. Our analysis approximates information availability by the level of detail provided about the date of each political violent event in Africa from 2008 to 2010 and finds that although access to communication technology improves reporting, the size of the effect is very small. Additional investigation finds that the effect can be attributed to the ability of journalists to access more diverse primary sources in remote areas due to increased local access to modern communication technology.

Women, peace and intervention: how the international community responds to sexual violence in civil conflict

ABSTRACT To end sexual violence in civil conflict is often mentioned as motivation and aim for contemporary interventions by the international community. But what types of measures are used for this end? This study identifies two competing logics that motivate different types of measures depending on whether women’s security is viewed as part of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, or as a separate policy field: More Women, More Peace. According to the first, women are viewed as victims and interventions are likely to be punitive in nature, to provide protection and punish perpetrators. The second sees the problem as women’s exclusion from power and lack of agency, and will more likely be followed by measures that promote participation such as mediation and peacekeeping. Following a global analysis of civil conflicts 1989–2009, we find that both the United Nations and regional organizations deploy peacekeepers to conflicts with high prevalence of sexual violence. We also find different patterns of intervention for sexual violence than for other forms of civilian abuse, suggesting limited linkages between the Responsibility to Protect and Women, Peace and Security agendas.