Joanne Linnerooth

The political processing of uncertainty

This paper is motivated by the apparent gap in the recent “risk” literature between understanding individual perceptions and evaluations of technological risks and the ways in which these risks are handled by public institutions. The paper contrasts the accepted (prescriptive) model of individual decision making under uncertainty with the political processing of uncertainties, where “risk” decisions are not made single-handedly by a regulatory body, but are negotiated sequentially by public officials, industrial representatives, and public interest groups. It is shown that in this setting neither the regulatory agencies nor the other actors in the processcan easily operate with an open recognition of the scientific uncertainties underlying their policy decisions. Institutional reforms that allow policy makers to address more openly these uncertainties are suggested.

Methods for evaluating mortality risk

Abstract An important aspect of decisions related to the long-range planning of large-scale systems, eg world energy supplies, is their possible environmental side-effects. These decisions, which potentially affect the publics health and safety, increasingly require a formal consideration of mortality risk. Several methods have been proposed for the evaluation of public programmes which probabilistically alter human mortality. This article reviews the relevant literature and the practical applications of these proposed methods. Particular emphasis is placed upon the explicit identification of the social objectives implied by their use.

LEG Risk Assessments: Experts Disagree

One of the most challenging problems in decisions concerning the deployment of novel, large-scale technologies is the assessment of the risk to the surrounding populations. In particular cases, such as nuclear reactors or liquefied energy gas (LEG) facilities, the political process involved may tend to focus on one particular form of that risk: the risk to life from catastrophic accidents. This chapter examines several assessments of this type with two main goals in mind: (1) to present and compare the various risk assessment procedures as they have been applied to LEG terminal siting, and in so doing to clarify the limits of knowledge and understanding of LEG risks (2) to quantify and compare the risks estimated in analyses prepared for four LEG sites, namely: Wilhelmshaven (Brotz 1978; DGWE 1979; Krappinger 1978a,b,c; WSB 1978) Eemshaven (TNO 1978) Mossmorran—Braefoot Bay (Aberdour and Dalgety Bay Joint Action Group 1979, henceforth referred to as Aberdour; Cremer and Warner 1977; HSE 1978a) Point Conception (ADL 1978; FERC 1978; SAI 1976)

Risk Analysis in the Policy Process

Technological risks are big business. Tuller (1978) estimates that in the US the total damage in 1974 caused by technological hazards was in the range of

Siting an LNG Terminal in California: A Descriptive Framework

98 to 180 billion. According to a study by Clark University Hazard Assessment Group and Decision Research (1982), 17–31% of mortality in the US can be attributed to technology. Not surprisingly, risk analyses of technological hazards are growing in popularity. For instance, the US National Research Council (1981), which produces around 250 reports a year, estimates that half of these reports deal with risk and that one in five is a fully fledged risk analysis.

The FRG: Ripples at Wilhelmshaven

Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is, as the name suggests, a gas that is liquefied for purposes of transportation. To liquefy natural gas, its temperature is reduced to −160°, at which point the volume of the gas is reduced to approximately one- six hundredth of its original volume. Presently, there are 16 receiving plants in the world, primarily in Japan, in Western Europe, and in the US. A typical tank has a volume of 80 000m3; there are usually from two to four of these tanks at a receiving terminal. The early ships had a capacity of something around 27 000m3 present ships as high as 130 000m3. It was estimated that in 1981 there would be at least 57 LNG carriers operating in the world with a combined capacity of over 5.21 million m3.

The UK: Sparks at Mossmorran—Braefoot Bay

This chapter, deals with the siting and approval process for a liquefied natural gas (LNG) import facility at Wilhelmshaven in the Federal Republic of Germany. The major aspects of the political decision-making process are summarized, focusing on the role of technical analyses of public safety risk in this decision. The most remarkable feature of this process was that despite the novelty of the LNG technology in the FRG, it deviated very little from established industrial siting and approval procedures. Public interest in the project and concerns about its acceptability did not rise above a relatively low level. At some point, however, unexpected difficulties related to the question of safety risk seemed to threaten the approval of the terminal, but these were eventually overcome by the federal government in a rather elegant way, leaving little more than ripples on the surface.

Improving the Siting Process

This chapter provides a review of some aspects of the decision and approval process involved in the siting of liquefied energy gas (LEG) facilities at Mossmorran and Braefoot Bay in Fife, Scotland. The terms of reference for this decision process were for the international oil companies Shell and Esso to obtain outline planning permission (i.e., official approval in principle) for the following: (a) An application by Shell for natural gas liquids separation facilities at Mossmorran, and associated jetty facilities at Braefoot Bay. (b) An application by Esso for an ethylene cracker plant at Mossmorran and associated jetty facilities at Braefoot Bay. (c) An application by Esso for industrial development at Mossmorran.

The Netherlands: The Rotterdam — Eemshaven Debate

The descriptive material presented on the four case studies illustrates how different interested parties form strategies and present arguments to defend their positions regarding the siting of technological facilites. This chapter has a prescriptive flavor by focusing on ways to improve both the decision process and the resulting outcomes.

The USA: conflicts in California

Plans to import liquefied natural gas into the Netherlands were first drawn up in the early 1970s and resulted in the initiation of studies and discussions on various aspects of LNG technology. The siting question, however, was not an urgent one until 1977, when a contract was signed with the Algerian company Sonatrach to import 4 billion m3 of LNG per year, for a 20-year period starting in 1983. Following extensive political discussions at various levels, an LNG terminal site at Eemshaven, in the northern province of Groningen, was finally selected and approved by the Dutch cabinet and parliament in 1978 (Tweede Kamer 1978). This decision outcome was significant because Eemshaven only became a serious candidate in late 1977; detailed studies and policy advice to and within the government (including the cabinet) had previously focused on Maasvlakte in the Rotterdam harbor area, as the preferred terminal site (see Figure 4.1).