John Lathrop

Using plural modeling for predicting decisions made by adaptive adversaries

Incorporating an appropriate representation of the likelihood of terrorist decision outcomes into risk assessments associated with weapons of mass destruction attacks has been a significant problem for countries around the world. Developing these likelihoods gets at the heart of the most difficult predictive problems: human decision making, adaptive adversaries, and adversaries about which very little is known. A plural modeling approach is proposed that incorporates estimates of all critical uncertainties: who is the adversary and what skills and resources are available to him, what information is known to the adversary and what perceptions of the important facts are held by this group or individual, what does the adversary know about the countermeasure actions taken by the government in question, what are the adversarys objectives and the priorities of those objectives, what would trigger the adversary to start an attack and what kind of success does the adversary desire, how realistic is the adversary in estimating the success of an attack, how does the adversary make a decision and what type of model best predicts this decision-making process. A computational framework is defined to aggregate the predictions from a suite of models, based on this broad array of uncertainties. A validation approach is described that deals with a significant scarcity of data.

LEG Risk Assessments: Experts Disagree

One of the most challenging problems in decisions concerning the deployment of novel, large-scale technologies is the assessment of the risk to the surrounding populations. In particular cases, such as nuclear reactors or liquefied energy gas (LEG) facilities, the political process involved may tend to focus on one particular form of that risk: the risk to life from catastrophic accidents. This chapter examines several assessments of this type with two main goals in mind: (1) to present and compare the various risk assessment procedures as they have been applied to LEG terminal siting, and in so doing to clarify the limits of knowledge and understanding of LEG risks (2) to quantify and compare the risks estimated in analyses prepared for four LEG sites, namely: Wilhelmshaven (Brotz 1978; DGWE 1979; Krappinger 1978a,b,c; WSB 1978) Eemshaven (TNO 1978) Mossmorran—Braefoot Bay (Aberdour and Dalgety Bay Joint Action Group 1979, henceforth referred to as Aberdour; Cremer and Warner 1977; HSE 1978a) Point Conception (ADL 1978; FERC 1978; SAI 1976)

Evaluating Technological Risk: Prescriptive and Descriptive Perspectives

Decisions concerning the deployment and management of novel or hazardous technologies raise several issues involving the evaluation of their impacts on society. Examples of such decisions include the siting of a liquefied natural gas facility, the regulation of nuclear energy production, and the screening and regulation of toxic chemicals. Each of these kinds of decisions results in uncertain benefits and costs to society. It would seem reasonable, then, that such decisions could be aided by any of several analytic techniques, including cost-benefit analysis, or perhaps decision analysis, which could include in the evaluation attitudes toward uncertainty and value trade-offs between conflicting objectives. However, there are often special aspects involved in such decisions that can make standard technical or economic analyses not very useful for aiding political decision making processes. These aspects include outcomes of the decision having very serious negative consequences with very low probability, inequitable distribution of burden, large scale, novelty, and others to be discussed below. Decisions involving such aspects sometimes come to be known as problems in managing social risk. Even though the word risk is currently in wide use in the media, it is often defined or applied in different ways by different parties for the decision at hand. In spite of this serious problem, to be discussed at some length below, the need to appraise the risks presented by a new or hazardous technology has led to the development of several analytic techniques often referred to collectively as risk assessment.

Risk Analysis in the Policy Process

Technological risks are big business. Tuller (1978) estimates that in the US the total damage in 1974 caused by technological hazards was in the range of

The FRG: Ripples at Wilhelmshaven

98 to 180 billion. According to a study by Clark University Hazard Assessment Group and Decision Research (1982), 17–31% of mortality in the US can be attributed to technology. Not surprisingly, risk analyses of technological hazards are growing in popularity. For instance, the US National Research Council (1981), which produces around 250 reports a year, estimates that half of these reports deal with risk and that one in five is a fully fledged risk analysis.

The UK: Sparks at Mossmorran—Braefoot Bay

This chapter, deals with the siting and approval process for a liquefied natural gas (LNG) import facility at Wilhelmshaven in the Federal Republic of Germany. The major aspects of the political decision-making process are summarized, focusing on the role of technical analyses of public safety risk in this decision. The most remarkable feature of this process was that despite the novelty of the LNG technology in the FRG, it deviated very little from established industrial siting and approval procedures. Public interest in the project and concerns about its acceptability did not rise above a relatively low level. At some point, however, unexpected difficulties related to the question of safety risk seemed to threaten the approval of the terminal, but these were eventually overcome by the federal government in a rather elegant way, leaving little more than ripples on the surface.

Improving the Siting Process

This chapter provides a review of some aspects of the decision and approval process involved in the siting of liquefied energy gas (LEG) facilities at Mossmorran and Braefoot Bay in Fife, Scotland. The terms of reference for this decision process were for the international oil companies Shell and Esso to obtain outline planning permission (i.e., official approval in principle) for the following: (a) An application by Shell for natural gas liquids separation facilities at Mossmorran, and associated jetty facilities at Braefoot Bay. (b) An application by Esso for an ethylene cracker plant at Mossmorran and associated jetty facilities at Braefoot Bay. (c) An application by Esso for industrial development at Mossmorran.

The Netherlands: The Rotterdam — Eemshaven Debate

The descriptive material presented on the four case studies illustrates how different interested parties form strategies and present arguments to defend their positions regarding the siting of technological facilites. This chapter has a prescriptive flavor by focusing on ways to improve both the decision process and the resulting outcomes.

The USA: conflicts in California

Plans to import liquefied natural gas into the Netherlands were first drawn up in the early 1970s and resulted in the initiation of studies and discussions on various aspects of LNG technology. The siting question, however, was not an urgent one until 1977, when a contract was signed with the Algerian company Sonatrach to import 4 billion m3 of LNG per year, for a 20-year period starting in 1983. Following extensive political discussions at various levels, an LNG terminal site at Eemshaven, in the northern province of Groningen, was finally selected and approved by the Dutch cabinet and parliament in 1978 (Tweede Kamer 1978). This decision outcome was significant because Eemshaven only became a serious candidate in late 1977; detailed studies and policy advice to and within the government (including the cabinet) had previously focused on Maasvlakte in the Rotterdam harbor area, as the preferred terminal site (see Figure 4.1).

Comparing Risk Assessments for Liquefied Energy Gas Terminals — Some Results

In the late 1960s, based on projections of decreasing existing natural gas supplies and increasing demand, several US gas companies began to seek additional supplies. In 1974, Western LNG Terminal Company, representing the terminal siting interests of three major utility companies, applied for approval of three LNG import sites on the California coast: Point Conception, on a remote and attractive part of the coast; Oxnard, a port city; and Los Angeles, a large harbor metropolis (see Figure 6.1). Western sought approval for all three sites in order to minimize the volume of tanker traffic at any one site, to separate ownership and control, and to reduce the risk of LNG supply interruption due to possible problems at any one location. The LNG would be shipped from Alaska’s North Slope, Cook Inlet in southern Alaska, and Indonesia to the three sites. After nearly a decade of controversy, the utilities have announced that they will defer pursuing further their application for Point Conception, the one site remaining under active consideration, because California no longer needs to import natural gas.