Jochim Hansen

The Truth About the Truth: A Meta-Analytic Review of the Truth Effect:

Repetition has been shown to increase subjective truth ratings of trivia statements. This truth effect can be measured in two ways: (a) as the increase in subjective truth from the first to the second encounter (within-items criterion) and (b) as the difference in truth ratings between repeated and other new statements (between-items criterion). Qualitative differences are assumed between the processes underlying both criteria. A meta-analysis of the truth effect was conducted that compared the two criteria. In all, 51 studies of the repetition-induced truth effect were included in the analysis. Results indicate that the between-items effect is larger than the within-items effect. Moderator analyses reveal that several moderators affect both effects differentially. This lends support to the notion that different psychological comparison processes may underlie the two effects. The results are discussed within the processing fluency account of the truth effect.

Truth From Language and Truth From Fit: The Impact of Linguistic Concreteness and Level of Construal on Subjective Truth

In four experiments, the impact of concreteness of language on judgments of truth was examined. In Experiments 1 and 2, it was found that statements of the very same content were judged as more probably true when they were written in concrete language than when they were written in abstract language. Findings of Experiment 2 also showed that this linguistic concreteness effect on judgments of truth could most likely be attributed to greater perceived vividness of concrete compared to abstract statements. Two further experiments demonstrated an additional fit effect: The truth advantage of concrete statements occurred especially when participants were primed with a concrete (vs. abstract) mind-set (Experiment 3) or when the statements were presented in a spatially proximal (vs. distant) location (Experiment 4). Implications for communication strategies are discussed.

Money and Thinking: Reminders of Money Trigger Abstract Construal and Shape Consumer Judgments

The idea of money reminds consumers of personal strength and resources. Such cues have been found to increase the level of mental construal. Consequently, it was hypothesized and found in five experiments that reminders of money trigger abstract (vs. concrete) mental construals. Participants were primed with money or money-unrelated concepts. Money primes caused a preference for abstract over concrete action identifications (experiment 1), instigated the formation of broader categories (experiment 2), and facilitated the identification of global (vs. local) aspects of visual patterns (experiment 3). This effect extended to consumer judgments: money primes caused a focus on central (vs. peripheral) aspects of products (experiment 4) and increased the influence of quality of parent brands in evaluations of brand extensions. Priming with a little money (experiment 3) or expenditures (experiment 5) did not trigger abstract construals, indicating that the association between money and resources drives the effect.

What happens why?: Psychological distance and focusing on causes versus consequences of events

When do people focus more on the causes versus the consequences of events, and how does differential focus affect downstream judgments and choices? Building on construal level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010), we propose a bidirectional relationship between psychological distance and causal focus, such that distance (vs. proximity) leads to a greater focus on causes (vs. consequences), and likewise, focusing on causes (vs. consequences) leads to greater estimates of psychological distance from events. This should be the case because causes are features of events that are more high-level relative to consequences (as shown in Experiments 1 and 2). We demonstrate that temporal (Experiment 3) and social (Experiment 4) distances lead to a greater tendency to focus on the causes (vs. consequences) of events and that, conversely, thinking about causes (vs. consequences) leads to greater perceptions of temporal (Experiment 5) and spatial (Experiment 6) distances from events. Additionally, we explored some downstream effects of this distance-dependent focus on causes versus consequences for predictive judgments, experiences, and behavioral choice (Experiments 7, 8, and 9). Broader implications of the results for moral decision making, power and leadership, and self-regulation are discussed.

Relative Processing Fluency

The subjective ease, or fluency, that is experienced during the cognitive processing of information has a large impact on the outcome of the processing. Research on judgment in a variety of domains shows that such fluency effects depend less on the (absolute) level of experienced fluency than on the relative fluency—that is, the change in fluency or the deviation from the expected level of fluency. Changes in an internal state are often more noticeable and perhaps more relevant as a diagnostic cue regarding the environment than the absolute level of that state. Relative experience is therefore particularly informative and accounts for ease-of-retrieval effects as well as classic fluency effects such as the truth effect and the mere-exposure effect.

When Time Flies: How Abstract and Concrete Mental Construal Affect the Perception of Time.

Time is experienced as passing more quickly the more changes happen in a situation. The present research tested the idea that time perception depends on the level of construal of the situation. Building on previous research showing that concrete rather than abstract mental construal causes people to perceive more variations in a given situation, we found in 3 studies that participants in a concrete mind-set experienced time as passing more quickly than participants in an abstract mind-set. In 2 further studies we demonstrated that the level on which actual changes happen in a given situation moderated this effect: Changes in high-level aspects mainly affected time estimation of participants primed with an abstract mind-set, whereas changes in low-level aspects affected time estimation of participants primed with a concrete mind-set.

Psychological distance reduces literal imitation: Evidence from an imitation-learning paradigm.

The present experiments tested the hypothesis that observers engage in more literal imitation of a model when the model is psychologically near to (vs. distant from) the observer. Participants learned to fold a dog out of towels by watching a model performing this task. Temporal (Experiment 1) and spatial (Experiment 2) distance from the model were manipulated. As predicted, participants copied more of the models specific movements when the model was near (vs. distant). Experiment 3 replicated this finding with a paper-folding task, suggesting that distance from a model also affects imitation of less complex tasks. Perceived task difficulty, motivation, and the quality of the end product were not affected by distance. We interpret the findings as reflecting different levels of construal of the models performance: When the model is psychologically distant, social learners focus more on the models goal and devise their own means for achieving the goal, and as a result show less literal imitation of the model. (PsycINFO Database Record

The cold heart : Reminders of money cause feelings of physical coldness

Mere reminders of money have been shown to cause socially “cold” behavior. Recent research suggests that the metaphor of “social coldness” is bodily grounded and thus linked to actual sensations of physical coldness. We therefore hypothesized that reminding individuals of money causes them to feel physically colder. This hypothesis was put to test in two studies, drawing on predictions from psychophysiological thermal perception. In Study 1, individuals who had been reminded of money perceived the air in the room as colder compared to a control group (an assimilation effect). Contrarily, in Study 2, they perceived water (a medium that was only momentarily experienced) as warmer compared to individuals not reminded of money (a contrast effect). Together these findings demonstrate that reminders of money cause sensations of actual physical coldness and add to the literature of both the psychological effects of money and human thermal perception.

Influencing support of charitable objectives in the near and distant future: delay discounting and the moderating influence of construal level

Abstract Two studies investigated the delay discounting effect in charitable giving situations, and whether construal level moderates this effect. In both studies, construal level was manipulated by inducing a concrete vs. an abstract mindset. Participants were asked how much time (Experiment 1) or how much money (Experiment 2) they would be willing to volunteer or donate, respectively, to a self-chosen charitable organization in either the near or distant future. Participants committed themselves to contributing more time and money in the distant than in the near future. Additionally, an abstract (vs. concrete) mindset reduced this delay discounting effect, particularly for monetary donations. Delay discounting of costs associated with altruistic behavior and the role of construal level in increasing donations and volunteering are discussed.

The effect of psychological distance on automatic goal contagion

ABSTRACT We investigated how psychological distance influences goal contagion (the extent to which people automatically adopt another person’s goals). On the basis of construal-level theory, we predicted people would be more prone to goal contagion when primed with psychological distance (vs. closeness) because they would construe the other person’s behavior in terms of its underlying goal. Alternatively, we predicted people primed with psychological closeness (vs. distance) would be more prone to goal contagion because closeness may increase the personal relevance of another’s goals – a process not mediated by construal level. In two preregistered studies, participants read about a student whose behavior implied either an academic or a social goal. We manipulated (a) participants’ level of mental construal with a mind-set task (Study 1) and (b) their social distance from another person who showed academic or social behaviors (Study 2). We measured performance on an anagram task as an indicator of academic goal contagion. For Study 1, we predicted that participants reading about academic (vs. social) behaviors would show a better anagram performance, especially when primed with an abstract mind-set. For Study 2, we predicted that construal level and relevance effects might cancel each other out, because distance triggers both high-level construal and less relevance. In contrast to the construal-level hypothesis, the mind-set manipulation did not affect goal contagion in Study 1. In accordance with the relevance hypothesis, psychological proximity increased goal contagion in Study 2. We discuss how the findings relate to previous findings on goal contagion and imitation.