Johann A R Roduit

Human enhancement and perfection

Both, bioconservatives and bioliberals, should seek a discussion about ideas of human perfection, making explicit their underlying assumptions about what makes for a good human life. This is relevant, because these basic, and often implicit ideas, inform and influence judgements and choices about human enhancement interventions. Both neglect, and polemical but inconsistent use of the complex ideas of perfection are leading to confusion within the ethical debate about human enhancement interventions, that can be avoided by tackling the notion of perfection directly. In the recent debates, bioconservatives have prominently argued against the ‘pursuit of perfection’ by biotechnological means. In the first part of this paper, we show that—paradoxically—bioconservatives themselves explicitly embrace specific conceptions of human perfection and perfectionist assumptions about the good human life in order to argue against the use of enhancement technologies. Yet, we argue that the bioconservative position contains an untenable ambiguity between criticising and endorsing ideas of human perfection. Hence, they stand in need of clarifying their stance on human perfection. In the second part of the paper, we ask whether bioliberals in fact (implicitly) advocate a particular conception of perfection, or whether they are right in holding that they do not, and that discussing perfection is obsolete anyway. We show that bioliberals also rely on a specific idea of human perfection, based on the idea of autonomy. Hence, their denial of the relevance of perfection in the debate is unconvincing and has to be revised.

Ideas of Perfection and the Ethics of Human Enhancement

Whatever ethical stance one takes in the debate regarding the ethics of human enhancement, one or more reference points are required to assess its morality. Some have suggested looking at the bioethical notions of safety, justice, and/or autonomy to find such reference points. Others, arguing that those notions are limited with respect to assessing the morality of human enhancement, have turned to human nature, human authenticity, or human dignity as reference points, thereby introducing some perfectionist assumptions into the debate. In this article, we ask which perfectionist assumptions should be used in this debate. After a critique of views that are problematic, we take a positive approach, suggesting some perfectionist elements that can lend guidance to the practice of human enhancement, based on the work of Martha Nussbaums Capability Approach. We suggest that the central capabilities can be used to define the human aspect of human enhancement and thereby allow a moral evaluation of enhancement interventions. These central capabilities can be maximized harmoniously to postulate what an ideal human would look like. Ultimately, the aim of this article is twofold. First, it seeks to make explicit the perfectionist assumptions found in the debate and eliminate those that are problematic. Second, the paper clarifies an element that is often neglected in the debate about human enhancement, the view of the ideal human towards which human enhancement should strive. Here, we suggest that some central capabilities that are essential for an ideal human being can be maximized harmoniously and can therefore serve as possible reference points to guide human enhancement.

Evaluating human enhancements: the importance of ideals

Is it necessary to have an ideal of perfection in mind to identify and evaluate true biotechnological human “enhancements”, or can one do without? To answer this question we suggest employing the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory, found in the debate in political philosophy about theories of justice: the distinctive views about whether one needs an idea of a perfectly just society or not when it comes to assessing the current situation and recommending steps to increase justice. In this paper we argue that evaluating human enhancements from a non-ideal perspective has some serious shortcomings, which can be avoided when endorsing an ideal approach. Our argument starts from a definition of human enhancement as improvement, which can be understood in two ways. The first approach is backward-looking and assesses improvements with regard to a status quo ante. The second, a forward-looking approach, evaluates improvements with regard to their proximity to a goal or according to an ideal. After outlining the limitations of an exclusively backward-looking view (non-ideal theory), we answer possible objections against a forward-looking view (ideal theory). Ultimately, we argue that the human enhancement debate would lack some important moral insights if a forward-looking view of improvement is not taken into consideration.

Ethics and enhancement in sport: becoming the fastest (human?) being

Abstract When considering the use of enhancement in the world of sport, we should contemplate not only the enhancement of particular traits, but also that of the athlete (as a human) as a whole. In most sports, we are interested in comparing the fastest human performance and not the fastest performance. There can be room for both types of sports, but each will give different expectations, rules, limits, and kinds of participants in the endeavour. This paper argues that the underlying question of what it means to be human needs to be central in the context of enhancement in sport.

We Are Super-Humans: Towards a Democratisation of the Socio-Ethical Debate on Augmented Humanity

Research in human enhancement technologies (e.g., nanotechnology, genetic engineering, robotics et cetera) is exploding bringing unforeseen solutions that will expand human capabilities further. Therefore, new socio-ethical issues need to be continuously addressed. In this scenario, we argue that a revolution in addressing these issues is needed and that we should enable a democratic process to cause broader reflections on the future augmented humanity. We will present the SuperHumains.ch project as an example of educational and collaborative thinking on the future of human enhancement.

Animal enhancement: the legal framework of mixing human-animal materials in Switzerland and our "postanimal" future

In July 2011, after nearly two years’ work, the British Academy of Medical Sciences published a report asking for a stricter regulatory framework when mixing human and animal gametes. The report addresses questions concerning the insertion of human DNA or cells into animals [1]. A few months later, in September, the German Ethics Council published a similar report. It recommended allowing scientists to insert human genes into mice, but special permission should be given to insert it into apes. However, some practices are clearly banned: «introducing animal material into human germlines, producing human sperm or eggs in animals, and implanting animal embryos into humans.» [2] In practice, ethical guidelines are not always followed or come after harm has been done. Indeed, a few days after the British report was made public, scientists admitted to have created more than 150 human-animal embryos secretly during the last three years [3]. Some scientists justify their actions claiming that making animals more ‘humanlike’ helps them find new cures for disease, new medication, and a better understanding of human genes. Others disagree, reminding us that to date, all cures from stem cells have come from adult cells, not embryonic ones. Some commentators fear that scientists have gone too far and humanity is on the verge of destruction or losing its dignity. What would happen if scientists started introducing human stem cells into the brains of primates? Do we have a moral obligation to improve animals? Before enhancing ourselves, should we enhance animals? Our article proceeds in two stages. First, we examine the legal situation in Switzerland concerning mixing human-animal material. From four articles of the Federal Constitution we see that in Switzerland this research is strongly regulated, with clear boundaries on what may be done. In the second part, we introduce the topic of animal enhancement, which has been little discussed compared to human enhancement, yet may soon challenge the legal framework outlined in part one. Distinguishing between «transanimals» and «postanimals», we show that transanimals are already created and we argue that before Homo sapiens becomes some sort of posthuman, postanimals will need to be created first. Our aim is first to outline the current legislation concerning mixing animal and human material in Switzerland and second, to begin a debate about animal enhancement, which will challenge this legislation in the near future.

Medical enhancement and luxury: some ethical considerations regarding two recent events in Geneva

In the following I revisit three key elements presented at this Summer Academy and will apply them to the practice of Botox partying. First, I will argue that the ethics of human enhancement need not be polarised between two camps. Second, people in the field need to be reminded of the larger context in which the debate takes place. Third, both proponents and opponents of enhancement should realise that some of their frameworks have emotional, pre-rational, and faith-like elements that need to be exposed for consideration. Finally, I suggest that in our liberal Swiss society one is of course free to have Botox parties, but that both proponents and opponents of such parties should develop virtues such as solidarity and acceptance. In the last few years, the debate about the ethics of human enhancement has become a battlefield, polarised between the proponents and opponents of enhancing technologies. These two opposing camps have lobbed arguments at each other and turned the middle into a wasteland, burying more moderate voices and positions. These voices who are trying to find an Aristotelian means between two extremes need also to be heard. Unfortunately, a lot of hype in this debate tends to give greater public voice to the extremes. To get the attention of the popular media, it is sexier to argue about living forever, transforming ourselves into cyborgs, and uploading our minds to machines than to try to defend a more skeptical view concerning enhancement. The Summer Academy was a reminder that a lot of excellent scholars such as John Hoberman, Steve Hall, Illina Singh, David Wasserman, Michael McNamee (to name a few) try to avoid these extremes. As Viewpoint