John A. Doces

Globalization and Population: International Trade and the Demographic Transition

I study the effect of international trade on birth rates across a large number of countries. A supply-demand model of the birth rate explains that a rise in international trade reduces the demand for children and encourages an earlier onset of the mortality revolution. These two effects caused by the rise of international trade lead to a lower birth rate. A time-series cross-section empirical analysis for a large sample of developed and developing countries exhibits that international trade has a statistically significant and inverse effect on the birth rate. The policy implications relating to trade, economic growth, and conflict are discussed in the conclusion.

The Dynamics of Democracy and Direct Investment: An Empirical Analysis

Why do foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows largely bypass the developing world? The objective of this article is to study this question by focusing on the effect of an increase in the level of democracy on FDI inflows into developing countries. An increase in the level of democracy provides the right macro and micro conditions for larger FDI inflows. The econometric results indicate that a one standard deviation increase in the level of democracy is associated with increased FDI inflows. My empirical findings support a direct relationship between enhanced levels of democracy and FDI inflows, and the results call into question the idea that developing countries receive less capital inflows if they choose to democratize. Moreover, a reanalysis of Li and Resnicks influential 2003 paper essentially overturns their findings in support of a direct association between an increase in the level of democracy and greater FDI inflows.

Trade and Democracy: A Factor-Based Approach

We study the relationship between trade openness and democracy using a data set with capital-labor ratios, trade flows, and regime type for 142 countries between 1960 and 2007. We are among the first to test a prediction that emerges from the model of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006): Relative factor endowments determine whether trade promotes democracy or not. The statistical results from two-stage least squares estimation indicate that trade is positively associated with democracy among labor-abundant countries but that trade has a negative effect on democracy in capital-abundant countries. The results are not robust, however, and thus we conclude that the evidence in support of their argument is relatively weak.

Book Review: The New Global Rulers: The Privatization of Regulation in the World Economy

Gandhi, J., & Przeworski, A. (2006). Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion under Dictatorship. Economics and Politics ,1, 1-26. Geddes, B. (2005). Why Parties and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes? Paper presented at the American Political Science Association, Washington D.C. Lust-Oskar, E. (2005). Structuring conflict in the Arab world: Incumbents, opponents, and institutions. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Mayer, A. E. (2007). Islam and human rights: Tradition and politics. Boulder, CO: Westview.

Which Immigrants Should Be Naturalized? Which Should Be Deported? Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Côte d’Ivoire:

Experimental studies on immigration attitudes have been conducted overwhelmingly in Western countries and have focused on immigrant admission and naturalization, neglecting deportation as a possible outcome. In a survey experiment in Côte d’Ivoire, where immigrants represent more than one-tenth of the population, we randomized attributes of hypothetical immigrants to determine which factors influenced respondents’ support for naturalization or deportation compared with staying in the country without citizenship. Support for naturalization was shaped by several expected economic and social attributes, while deportation preferences were influenced primarily by the immigrant’s legal status and level of savings. Cultural proximity produced mixed results, with respondents less likely to support the naturalization of immigrants from neighboring African countries but also less likely to deport immigrants with whom they shared a religious faith. Finally, respondents were more likely to support the naturalization of immigrants who planned to vote if granted citizenship, especially when they were of the same religion as the respondent, indicating a degree of electoral calculation in a context where voting patterns are associated with religious identities. Together, these findings suggest that citizen preferences for naturalization and deportation are influenced by somewhat different factors, a possibility that warrants further testing in other contexts.