John Baylis

Towards a New Strategic Concept for NATO

To argue that the risks associated with a non-nuclear defence policy are relatively greater than those posed by current defence policies is not to argue for the status quo. Certainly there is room for improvement in both British defence policy and NATO strategy. The kind of changes which will be recommended below will not eradicate the risks of nuclear war completely. Nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented and risks of one kind or another are inevitable in the kind of nuclear world of which we are a part and from which there is no escape. What can be done however, is to shift British and Alliance strategy relatively away from their present nuclear biases towards a more credible conventional response. Nuclear weapons would still have a role in deterring nuclear threats but the emphasis would be very much on improving conventional capabilities.

Towards a Broader Conception of Security

The arguments presented in this section of the book have attempted to suggest that the political and military weaknesses inherent in a non-nuclear defence policy, both for Britain and for the Western Alliance, are far greater than supporters of such a policy would have us believe. It has been argued that a non-nuclear strategy would be likely to create severe problems within the Atlantic Alliance. There are also very real doubts about whether it could cope with nuclear blackmail and whether it would prove militarily-effective against an opponent armed with the vast spectrum of conventional, tactical nuclear, theatre nuclear, strategic nuclear, and chemical forces. Given these weaknesses, it is suggested that there would be grave risks in moving from the present nuclear defence policy (which seems, at least, to have contributed to over forty years of peace) to such a radical, unproven, alternative non-nuclear strategy. Neither does SDI appear to provide a way out of the nuclear dilemma. At the same time it is accepted that nuclear deterrence itself is not without risks and that the NATO strategy of Flexible Response does abound in illogicalities and paradoxes. There may well be greater risks inherent in a non-nuclear posture but that does not absolve us from searching for better, more coherent, realistic, and credible alternative defence policies. It has been suggested that the choice is not simply between the present ‘nuclear-biased’ policies and the ‘nuclear-free’ policies of the unilateralists.

The Military Problems of Non-Nuclear Strategies

While there are doubts about the ability of a non-nuclear defence policy to cope with nuclear blackmail there are even greater problems about the military effectiveness of such a strategy. Indeed in part the two difficulties are related. If the strategy is seen to be militarily suspect (as will be suggested here) then the chances of nuclear blackmail being used (successfully) will be increased.

Nuclear Deterrence and the Preservation of Peace

There can be no doubt that the 1980s have witnessed a great deal of intense debate in Britain and throughout Western Europe about the role of nuclear weapons in Western strategy. The outcome of the 1987 British election has taken some of the steam out of the debate but the role of nuclear weapons remains a lively political issue. Such debates are not new of course. Throughout its history the North Atlantic Alliance has faced periodic waves of criticism of its strategy. What does seem new about the contemporary debate is that coherent alternative strategies have been proposed in recent years and the political consensus on defence in many Western European countries has begun to break down. Such a debate on issues of vital importxadance, after a period of neglect, is to be welcomed. Although some of the debate has often been overly emotional and sometimes ill-informed it has nevertheless produced important critiques of contemxadporary strategy and forced defence planners to think through the justixadfications for their policies. 1 In particular, when such eminent figures as the former American Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, and the former British Chief of the Defence Staff, Lord Carver, produce studies taking issue with many of the conventional wisdoms and orthodoxies of current Western strategic planning, it is clear that a major and important debate is underway not only in the public domain but in the defence establishment itself.2

Criticisms of a Non-Nuclear Defence Policy

The critics of a changed strategy, like the critics of Britain’s established nuclear posture, package their anxieties in different ways. Some of the criticism of a non-nuclear strategy is emotional and ill-informed, and there has been scaremongering both about what is being proposed and what are likely to be the consequences. But the non-nuclear case has also come to be taken seriously. Both types of critical reaction are, in fact, an indication of this. The present chapter will discuss the most frequent criticisms which have been levelled against the denuclearisation of British defence policy.

How Valid are the Criticisms of Nuclear Deterrence

The argument presented so far suggests that nuclear deterrence probably has helped to keep the peace in Europe over the past forty-five years and, without being unduly complacent, there are no overwhelmingly strong reasons to suppose that it will not continue to work for some time to come. This is not to argue that we should not be searching for something better and safer. If a convincing case for the retention of some form of nuclear deterrence is to be made (at least until something demonstrably better is found) it is, however, necessary to go further and confront directly the criticisms which have been levelled against the British nuclear deterrent and NATO strategy by the ‘peace movement’ and supporters of a non-nuclear strategy. These criticisms often take the following form:

A Debate to be Won

The Cold War is over, and we have won it.1 The West is secure, and its societies enjoy considerable material comfort. There are general and particular problems, of course, but there is also a high degree of social satisfaction. The military and ideological threats posed by ‘Stalinism’ and ‘communism’ have faded. Indeed, the systems ostensibly committed to communism present a sorry picture when compared with their Western rivals. Just as it is becoming clearer to many of us that the Cold War is well over, and that we won it, so it is dawning in the East that history was not on their side, in the way they had hoped. At different rates, and everywhere with difficulty, we are seeing the ‘mellowing’ in the Soviet bloc that the ‘father of containment’, George Kennan, looked forward to forty years ago.2 It is not unilinear and it is not guaranteed; but the trend, however unsteady, looks set. Instead of the command economies of the past, we now have glimmers of what might be called socialism with a consumer’s face. It may become consumerism with a socialist face; it is too soon to see where the balance will lie in the different countries. It is also too soon to say whether we both — East and West — can jointly win the next struggle: that of living together, indefinitely, free of the fear of war.

What is Wrong with Britain’s Existing Defence Policy?

In the opinion of its supporters, Britain’s nuclear deterrent has been a success. They argue that it has helped to keep the peace in Europe for a record period of time, that it has given Britain status in the world and that it has been relatively cheap. In short, they assert that it has worked at an acceptable cost: so why change a winner? On first sight these sound plausible arguments: but they are too simple. As will be seen below, the criticisms which can be levelled against the ‘independent nuclear deterrent’ are numerous. Some of them will be quite familiar, and need not be rehearsed at length. Others, made against the particular policy of the present government by pro-nuclear strategists, will be addressed by John Baylis in Part II.

Towards a Stable Peace

In the longer term, both West Germany and the United States, in their different ways, will have a more decisive voice than Britain in shaping the future of European security. In the shorter term, though, Britain could play a key role in accelerating trends towards a more stable peace. Unlike West Germany, Britain is not divided nor on the front line, and so is not caught up with a rather absolutist concept of nuclear deterrence and forward defence. Unlike the United States, Britain lacks the capabilities and responsibilites of a super power. Britain therefore has more choice than these major allies; but unlike its smaller NATO partners, Britain has both significance and nuclear weapons. If Britain cannot renounce nuclear weapons, and therefore by example put more firmly on the international agenda both military confidence-building and a commitment to restructure East-West relations, what hope is there that countries with less geopolitical choice will take radical steps 1 towards a more stable peace?

Towards a Non-Provocative Defence Policy

Given the problems with nuclear strategy, and the implications of the evolving international and technological environment, it is a time to change NATO’s military posture. But it is one thing to criticise existing policy; it is another altogether to replace it with something generally agreed to be better. Slogans are not enough, and in the 1980s anti-nuclear critics have been busy devising a now lengthy menu of non-nuclear alternatives. Their aim is non-provocative defence. Not surprisingly, as with nuclear deterrers, there are differences of opinion among alternative defence thinkers regarding the best mix of ingredients. Non-nuclear strategies are naturally susceptable to those ambiguities and inconsistencies to which any defence policy is heir. The aim in this chapter is to offer a non-nuclear package for Britain that is related to the threat, is militarily convincing, will contribute to arms restraint, offers stability in crises and promises de-escalation in the event of war. It should attract public support and be affordable. It builds on existing trends and could be put in place step by step.