John E. Schweppe

Discrimination of naturally occurring radioactive material in plastic scintillator material

Plastic scintillator material is used in many applications for the detection of gamma rays from radioactive material, primarily due to the sensitivity per unit cost compared to other detection materials. However, the resolution and lack of full-energy peaks in the plastic scintillator material prohibits detailed spectroscopy. Therefore, other materials such as doped sodium iodide are used for spectroscopic applications. The limited spectroscopic information can, however, be exploited in plastic scintillator materials to provide some discrimination. The discrimination between man-made and naturally occurring sources would be useful in reducing alarm screening for radiation detection applications that target man-made sources. The results of applying the limited energy information from plastic scintillator material for radiation portal monitors are discussed.

Overview of portal monitoring at border crossings

The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection has the task of interdicting illicit radioactive material at ports of entry. Items of concern include radiation dispersal devices (RDD), nuclear warheads, and special nuclear material (SNM). The preferred survey method screens all vehicles in primary and diverts questionable vehicles to secondary. This requires high detection probability in primary while not overwhelming secondary with alarms, which could include naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) found in acceptable cargo and radionuclides used in medical procedures. Sensitive alarm algorithms must accommodate the baseline depression observed whenever a vehicle enters the portal. Energy-based algorithms can effectively use the crude energy information available from a plastic scintillator to distinguish NORM from SNM. Whenever NORM cargo limits the alarm threshold, energy-based algorithms produce significantly better detection probabilities for small SNM sources than gross-count algorithms. Algorithms can be best evaluated using a large empirical data set to 1) calculate false alarm probabilities, 2) select sigma-level thresholds for operationally acceptable false alarm rates, and 3) determine detection probabilities for marginally detectable pseudo sources of SNM.

Comparison of plastic and NaI(Tl) scintillators for vehicle portal monitor applications

Experimental data and computer simulations are presented for gamma-ray detection by vehicle portal monitors for homeland security applications at international borders. The experiments and simulations use spectral processing of gamma rays from various sources (/sup 241/Am, /sup 57/Co, /sup 133/Ba, /sup 137/Cs, /sup 60/Co) and background to provide data for comparing plastic and NaI(Tl) detectors. The effects of gamma-ray scattering in cargo are also examined. Plastic scintillators are well suited for primary screening of gamma-ray sources because of their large size and low cost. Sodium iodide is preferable to plastic for applications of isotope identification based on gamma-ray spectrometry. Some applications may benefit from integrating features from both types of detectors.

Optimal Background Attenuation for Fielded Radiation Detection Systems

Radiation detectors are often placed in positions difficult to shield from the effects of terrestrial background. This is particularly true in the case of Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM) systems, as their wide viewing angle and outdoor installations make them susceptible to terrestrial background from the surrounding area. A low background is desired in most cases, especially when the background noise is of comparable strength to the signal of interest. The problem of shielding a generalized RPM from terrestrial background is considered. Various detector and shielding scenarios are modeled with the Monte-Carlo N Particle (MCNP) computer code. Amounts of nominal-density shielding needed to attenuate the terrestrial background to varying degrees are given, along with optimal shielding geometry to be used in areas where natural shielding is limited, and where radiation detection must occur in the presence of natural background. Common shielding solutions such as steel plating are evaluated based on the signal to noise ratio and the benefits are weighed against the incremental cost.

Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials in Cargo at US Borders

Abstract In the USA and other countries large numbers of vehicles pass through border crossings each day. The illicit movement of radioactive sources is a concern that has resulted in the installation of radiation detection and identification instruments at border crossing points. This activity is judged to be necessary because of the possibility of an act of terrorism involving a radioactive source that may include any number of dangerous radionuclides. The problem of detecting, identifying and interdicting illicit radioactive sources is complicated by the fact that many materials present in cargo are somewhat radioactive. Some cargo contains naturally occurring radioactive material that may trigger radiation portal monitor alarms. Such nuisance alarms can be an operational limiting factor for screening of cargo at border crossings. Information about the nature of the radioactive materials in cargo that can interfere with the detection of radionuclides of concern is necessary to help anticipate and recognise likely sources of these nuisance alarms.

Accurate modeling of the terrestrial gamma-ray background for homeland security applications

The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has developed computer models to simulate the use of radiation portal monitors to screen vehicles and cargo for the presence of illicit radioactive material. The gamma radiation emitted by the vehicles or cargo containers must often be measured in the presence of a relatively large gamma-ray background that is mainly due to the presence of potassium, uranium, and thorium (and progeny isotopes) in the soil and surrounding building materials. This large background is often a significant limit to the detection sensitivity for items of interest and must be modeled accurately for analyzing homeland security situations. Calculations of the expected gamma-ray emission from a disk of soil and asphalt were made using the Monte Carlo transport code MCNP and were compared to measurements made with a thallium-drifted sodium iodide detector. Analysis revealed that the energy spectrum of the measured background could not be reproduced unless the model included gamma rays coming from the ground out to distances of at least 300 m. The contribution from beyond about 50 m was primarily due to gamma rays that scattered in the air before entering the detectors rather than passing directly from the ground to the detectors. These skyshine gamma rays contribute tens of percent to the total gamma-ray spectrum, primarily at energies below a few hundred keV. The techniques that are being developed to efficiently calculate the contributions from a large soil disk and a large air volume in a Monte Carlo simulation are described and the implications of skyshine in portal monitoring applications are discussed.

Spectroscopic radiation portal monitor prototype

A spectroscopic radiation portal monitor (SPM) prototype consisting of four 10.16-cmtimes10.16-cmtimes40.64-cm sodium iodide (NaI) crystals has been constructed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). The prototype was put through a variety of tests, including measurements of the absolute detection efficiency of unshielded sources and the detection efficiency and isotopic identification capability of the detector for shielded isotopic sources. The monitors response to various types of cargo and source configurations was also studied. The results of these tests are presented in this report

Estimating radiological background using imaging spectroscopy

Optical imaging spectroscopy is investigated as a method to estimate radiological background by spectral identification of soils, sediments, rocks, minerals and building materials derived from natural materials and assigning tabulated radiological emission values to these materials. Radiological airborne surveys are undertaken by local, state and federal agencies to identify the presence of radiological materials out of regulatory compliance. Detection performance in such surveys is determined by (among other factors) the uncertainty in the radiation background; increased knowledge of the expected radiation background will improve the ability to detect low-activity radiological materials. Radiological background due to naturally occurring radiological materials (NORM) can be estimated by reference to previous survey results, use of global 40K, 238U, and 232Th (KUT) values, reference to existing USGS radiation background maps, or by a moving average of the data as it is acquired. Each of these methods has its drawbacks: previous survey results may not include recent changes, the global average provides only a zero-order estimate, the USGS background radiation map resolutions are coarse and are accurate only to 1 km - 25 km sampling intervals depending on locale, and a moving average may essentially low pass filter the data to obscure small changes in radiation counts. Imaging spectroscopy from airborne or spaceborne platforms can offer higher resolution identification of materials and background, as well as provide imaging context information. AVIRlS hyperspectral image data is analyzed using commercial exploitation software to determine the usefulness of imaging spectroscopy to identify qualitative radiological background emissions when compared to airborne radiological survey data.

Characteristics of multiprocessing MCNP5 on small personal computer clusters

The feasibility and efficiency of performing MCNP5 calculations with a small, heterogeneous computing cluster built from Microsoft® WindowsTM personal computers (PC) are explored. The performance increases that may be expected with such clusters are estimated for cases that typify general radiation-shielding calculations. Our results show that the speed increase from additional slave PCs is nearly linear up to 10 processors. Guidance is given as to the specific advantages of changing various parameters present in the system. Implementing load balancing, and reducing the overhead from the MCNP rendezvous mechanism add to heterogeneous cluster efficiency. Hyper-threading technology and matching the total number of slave processes to the total number of logical processors also yield modest speed increases in the range below 7 processors. Because of the ease of acquisition of heterogeneous desktop computers, and the peak in efficiency at the level of a few physical processors, a strong case is made for the use of small clusters as a tool for producing MCNP5 calculations rapidly, and detailed instructions for constructing such clusters are provided.

The Effect of the Three-Dimensional Geometry of Cargo on the Detection of Radioactive Sources in Cargo Containers

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has developed computer models to simulate the screening of vehicles and cargo with radiation portal monitors for the presence of illegitimate radioactive material. In addition, selected measurements have been conducted to validate the models. An important consideration in the modeling of realistic scenarios is the influence of the three-dimensional geometry of the cargo on the measured signature. This is particularly important for scenarios where the source and detector move with respect to each other. Two cases of the influence of the three-dimensional geometry of the cargo on the measured radiation signature are analyzed. In the first, measurements show that spectral data collected from moving sources so as to maximize the gross-counting signal-to-noise ratio has minimal spectral distortion, so that the spectral data can be summed over this time interval. In the second, modeling demonstrates that the ability to detect radioactive sources at all locations in a container full of cargo scales approximately linearly with the vertical height of the detector, suggesting that detectors should be approximately the same height as the container they scan.