James H. Ely

Discrimination of naturally occurring radioactive material in plastic scintillator material

Plastic scintillator material is used in many applications for the detection of gamma rays from radioactive material, primarily due to the sensitivity per unit cost compared to other detection materials. However, the resolution and lack of full-energy peaks in the plastic scintillator material prohibits detailed spectroscopy. Therefore, other materials such as doped sodium iodide are used for spectroscopic applications. The limited spectroscopic information can, however, be exploited in plastic scintillator materials to provide some discrimination. The discrimination between man-made and naturally occurring sources would be useful in reducing alarm screening for radiation detection applications that target man-made sources. The results of applying the limited energy information from plastic scintillator material for radiation portal monitors are discussed.

Neutron Detector Gamma Insensitivity Criteria

. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof, or Battelle Memorial Institute. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof. PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATIONAL LABORATORY

Overview of portal monitoring at border crossings

The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection has the task of interdicting illicit radioactive material at ports of entry. Items of concern include radiation dispersal devices (RDD), nuclear warheads, and special nuclear material (SNM). The preferred survey method screens all vehicles in primary and diverts questionable vehicles to secondary. This requires high detection probability in primary while not overwhelming secondary with alarms, which could include naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) found in acceptable cargo and radionuclides used in medical procedures. Sensitive alarm algorithms must accommodate the baseline depression observed whenever a vehicle enters the portal. Energy-based algorithms can effectively use the crude energy information available from a plastic scintillator to distinguish NORM from SNM. Whenever NORM cargo limits the alarm threshold, energy-based algorithms produce significantly better detection probabilities for small SNM sources than gross-count algorithms. Algorithms can be best evaluated using a large empirical data set to 1) calculate false alarm probabilities, 2) select sigma-level thresholds for operationally acceptable false alarm rates, and 3) determine detection probabilities for marginally detectable pseudo sources of SNM.

Comparison of plastic and NaI(Tl) scintillators for vehicle portal monitor applications

Experimental data and computer simulations are presented for gamma-ray detection by vehicle portal monitors for homeland security applications at international borders. The experiments and simulations use spectral processing of gamma rays from various sources (/sup 241/Am, /sup 57/Co, /sup 133/Ba, /sup 137/Cs, /sup 60/Co) and background to provide data for comparing plastic and NaI(Tl) detectors. The effects of gamma-ray scattering in cargo are also examined. Plastic scintillators are well suited for primary screening of gamma-ray sources because of their large size and low cost. Sodium iodide is preferable to plastic for applications of isotope identification based on gamma-ray spectrometry. Some applications may benefit from integrating features from both types of detectors.

Field tests of a NaI(Tl)-based vehicle portal monitor at border crossings

Radiation portal monitors are commonly used at international border crossings to detect illicit transport of radioactive material. Most monitors use plastic scintillators to detect gamma rays, but next-generation monitors may contain NaI(Tl). In order to directly compare the performance of the two types of detectors, a prototype NaI(Tl) monitor was tested at two international border crossings adjacent to a comparable plastic scintillator monitor. The NaI(Tl) monitor housed four large detectors, each 10.2 cm /spl times/ 10.2 cm /spl times/ 41 cm. The empirical data set from the two field tests contains approximately 3800 passages with known cargo loads for each vehicle. For a small subset of the vehicles, high purity germanium detector spectra were also collected. During the survey period several vehicles containing commercial products with naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) passed through the monitor. Typical NORM cargo included pottery, large granite slabs, rock-based floor tiles, construction stone blocks, abrasive material, and fertilizer. Non-NORM sources included a large source of /sup 60/Co (200,000 GBq) and a shipment of uranium oxide, both items being legally transported. The information obtained during the tests provides a good empirical data set to compare the effectiveness of NaI(Tl) and plastic-scintillator portal monitors. The capability to be sensitive to illicit materials, but not alarm on NORM, is a key figure of merit for portal monitors.

The Majorana Project

Building a Ovββ experiment with the ability to probe neutrino mass in the inverted hierarchy region requires the combination of a large detector mass sensitive to Ovββ, on the order of 1-tonne, and unprecedented background levels, on the order of or less than 1 count per year in the Ovβ β signal region. The MAJORANA Collaboration proposes a design based on using high-purity enriched 76Ge crystals deployed in ultralow background electroformed Cu cryostats and using modern analysis techniques that should be capable of reaching the required sensitivity while also being scalable to a 1-tonne size. To demonstrate feasibility, the collaboration plans to construct a prototype system, the MAJORANA DEMONSTRATOR, consisting of 30 kg of 86% enriched 76Ge detectors and 30 kg of natural or isotope-76-depleted Ge detectors. We plan to deploy and evaluate two different Ge detector technologies, one based on a p-type configuration and the other on n-type.

Boron-Lined Neutron Detector Measurements

Radiation portal monitors used for interdiction of illicit materials at borders include highly sensitive neutron detection systems. The main reason for having neutron detection capability is to detect fission neutrons from plutonium. The currently deployed radiation portal monitors (RPMs) from Ludlum and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) use neutron detectors based upon 3He-filled gas proportional counters, which are the most common large neutron detector. There is a declining supply of 3He in the world, and thus, methods to reduce the use of this gas in RPMs with minimal changes to the current system designs and sensitivity to cargo-borne neutrons are being investigated. Four technologies have been identified as being currently commercially available, potential alternative neutron detectors to replace the use of 3He in RPMs. Reported here are the results of tests of a newly designed boron-lined proportional counter option. This testing measured the neutron detection efficiency and gamma ray rejection capabilities of a system manufactured by Reuter Stokes.

The MAJORANA DEMONSTRATOR: An R&D project towards a tonne-scale germanium neutrinoless double-beta decay search

The MAJORANA collaboration is pursuing the development of the so‐called MAJORANA DEMONSTRATOR. The DEMONSTRATOR is intended to perform research and development towards a tonne‐scale germanium‐based experiment to search for the neutrinoless double‐beta decay of 76Ge. The DEMONSTRATOR can also perform a competitive direct dark matter search for light WIMPs in the 1–10 GeV/c2 mass range. It will consist of approximately 60 kg of germanium detectors in an ultra‐low background shield located deep underground at the Sanford Underground Laboratory in Lead, SD. The DEMONSTRATOR will also perform background and technology studies, and half of the detector mass will be enriched germanium. This talk will review the motivation, design, technology and status of the Demonstrator.

Status Summary of 3He and Neutron Detection Alternatives for Homeland Security

This is a short summary whitepaper on results of our alternatives work: Neutron detection is an important aspect of interdiction of radiological threats for homeland security purposes since plutonium, a material used for nuclear weapons, is a significant source of fission neutrons [Kouzes 2005]. Because of the imminent shortage of 3He, which is used in the most commonly deployed neutron detectors, a replacement technology for neutron detection is required for most detection systems in the very near future [Kouzes 2009a]. For homeland security applications, neutron false alarms from a detector can result in significant impact. This puts a strong requirement on any neutron detection technology not to generate false neutron counts in the presence of a large gamma ray-only source [Kouzes et al. 2008].

Boron-10 lined proportional counter model validation

The decreasing supply of 3He is stimulating a search for alternative neutron detectors; one potential 3He replacement is 10B-lined proportional counters. Simulations are being performed to predict the performance of systems designed with 10B-lined tubes. Boron-10-lined tubes are challenging to model accurately because the neutron capture material is not the same as the signal generating material. Thus, to simulate the efficiency, the neutron capture reaction products that escape the lining and enter the signal generating fill gas must be tracked. The tube lining thickness and composition are typically proprietary vendor information, and therefore add additional variables to the system simulation. The modeling methodologies used to predict the neutron detection efficiency of 10B-lined proportional counters were validated by comparing simulated to measured results. The measurements were made with a 252Cf source positioned at several distances from a moderated 2.54-cm diameter 10B-lined tube. Models were constructed of the experimental configurations using the Monte Carlo transport code MCNPX, which is capable of tracking the reaction products from the (n,10B) reaction. Several different lining thicknesses and compositions were simulated for comparison with the measured data. This paper presents the results of the evaluation of the experimental and simulated data, and a summary of how the different linings affect the performance of a coincidence counter configuration designed with 10B-lined proportional counters.