John F. Wippel

Thomas Aquinas's Derivation of the Aristotelian Categories (Predicaments)

According to T h o m a s Aquinas, metaphysics is the science which studies being as be ing or which has as its subject being in general (ens commune)? For T h o m a s one of the mos t f u n d a m e n t a l distinctions within the realm of finite being obtains be tween that which exists in itself or in its own right, and that which exists only in someth ing else, that is to say, between substance and accident.

Godfrey of Fontaines on Intension and Remission of Accidental Forms

Godfrey of Fontaines functioned as a Master in the Theology Faculty at Paris from 1285 until ca. 1303 or 1304. * For him as for many of his contemporaries, the apparent change in intensity of certain accidental forms—qualities such as whiteness or heat or even charity in the soul—posed interesting philosophical questions.2 The issue was frequently raised as to how such qualities could undergo some variation in degree whether by increasing (intension or intensification) or by decreasing (remission) and still retain their identity. Godfrey and his associates would not allow for intension and remission of substantial forms since this would, in their opinion, entail loss of essential identity on the part of the changing substance. Aristotles remark that forms may be likened to numbers served as a controlling principle here.3 But thirteenth-century Masters devoted considerable attention to this problem with respect to various kinds of qualities. Often such reflections would occur within a theological discussion concerning the possibility of intension or remission of charity within the human soul. Attempted resolution of this admittedly theological problem would frequently lead to examination of the broader philosophical issues involved in intension and remission of qualities as such. Godfrey himself devoted two extended treatments to this topic, one in his Quodlibet 2, q. 10 of 1286, and another in his Disputed Question 18 which, though more difficult to date precisely, seems to

Divine Knowledge, Divine Power and Human Freedom in Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent

In this chapter I shall limit myself to two thinkers from the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent. Since Thomas devoted considerably more attention to this topic than did Henry, and since Aquinas’s position was to become the focal point for centuries of subsequent controversy, the greater part of my remarks will be devoted to him. In discussing Thomas’s position I shall try to cover the points suggested in my title by reducing them to two major concerns: (1) Thomas’s explanation of God’s knowledge of future contingents; (2) his views concerning the causal character of God’s knowledge and God’s will. In each case I shall attempt to show how Thomas reconciles his explanation with man’s freedom. Henry lectured as Master in theology at the University of Paris from 1276 until ca. 1292, and on the present topic may serve as an interesting link between Aquinas and Duns Scotus (though Scotus’s position will not be examined here).1 Henry had developed a radically different kind of metaphysics from that of Aquinas.2 Of greatest interest to us will be Henry’s explanation of God’s knowledge of future contingents.

Did Thomas Aquinas Defend the Possibility of an Eternally Created World? (The De aeternitate mundi Revisited)

As is WELL KNOWN, Thomas Aquinas repeatedly found wanting all argumentation offered in support of eternity of the world. So great was his respect for Aristotle, however, that at times he seized upon a passage from the latters Topics in order to suggest that the Stagirite himself may not have really intended to demonstrate the eternity of the world, but only to show that argumentation presented by others against its eternity was not demonstrative. ~ But later in his career, while commenting on the Physics, Thomas appears to reject this more benign reading of Aristotle. 2 As is equally well known, Thomas also dismissed as inconclusive argumentation offered by his Christian contemporaries in support of creation in time. In sum, then, it appears that in Thomass eyes one cannot demonstrate either eternity or noneternity of the world. 3

Aquinas on Creation and Preambles of Faith

As he goes on to explain in the same context, while we recognize that the world exists, in acknowledging the Christian distinction we also recognize that the world might not have existed and that this would not have resulted in any loss in God’s greatness and his goodness. As Sokolowski nicely phrases this: “When God does create, there may be ‘more’ but there is no ‘greater’ or ‘better’.” Moreover, he points out that according to this distinction, God is not to be viewed as a part of the world but as totally distinct from the world. Nor, as we shall see below, are God and the world to be viewed as parts of some

Metaphysical Composition of Angels in Bonaventure, Aquinas, and Godfrey of Fontaines

This chapter considers three very different views concerning the metaphysical structure of angels and their distinction from divine simplicity. These positions could hardly be more diverse. For Bonaventure, in order to protect the uniqueness of divine simplicity it is imperative to hold that angels, like all other created beings, are composed of matter and form as diverse natures. For Thomas Aquinas, purely spiritual beings cannot be composed of matter and form but must be composed of two really distinct principles essence and esse which are related to one another as potency and act. For Godfrey, in agreement with Aquinas and against Bonaventure on this point, there can be no genuine matter in pure spirits; but unlike Aquinas and unlike Bonaventure, Godfrey holds that there is no need to posit two really distinct principles of being or two distinct natures in angels in order to avoid making them as simple as God himself.Keywords:angels; Bonaventure; Godfrey of Fontaines; metaphysical structure; Thomas Aquinas

Norman Kretzmann on Aquinas's attribution of will and of freedom to create to God

The purpose of this paper is to discuss Norman Kretzmanns account of Aquinass discussion of will in God. According to Kretzmann, Aquinass reasoning seems to leave no place for choice on Gods part, since, on Aquinass account, God is not free not to will Himself. And so this leads to the problem about Gods willing things other than Himself. On this, Kretzmann finds serious problems with Thomass position. Kretzmann argues that Aquinas should have drawn necessitarian conclusions from his account of divine will. Moreover, in light of one reading of De veritate , q. 24, a. 3, but one not accepted by the Leonine edition, Kretzmann also maintains that Aquinas practically conceded this necessitarian view of Gods creative activity in that text. My purpose will be, after presenting Kretzmanns presentation and defence of Aquinass attribution of will to God, to examine critically his claim that Thomas should have concluded that God is not free not to create, and to determine whether a stronger argument can be made in support of Aquinass position in light of his texts.

Commentary on Boethius's De Trinitate

I N RECENT DECADES considerable progress has been made in investigating and identifying earlier philosophical sources for the thought of Thomas Aquinas. Among these sources A vicenna stands out as one whose work must be considered by anyone interested in the historical origins of Thomistic metaphysics. In addition to groundbreaking studies by Etienne Gilson illustrating the general influence of Arabic philosophy on Latin scholasticism, 1 a number of more recent efforts have been directed to particular examples of the Avicennian influence on Thomas himself. Some of these have investigated the A vicennian influence on particular doctrines while others have concentrated on A vicenna as a source for particular Thomistic works.2