P. T. Geach

Form and Existence

In this paper I shall discuss what Aquinas meant by his term esse, or actus essendi, ‘act of existing’. Another synonym that he uses—quo aliquid est, ‘that by which a thing is (or: exists)’—suggests a convenient division of the subject: we can first discuss Aquinas’ philosophical use of quo, ‘that by which’, and then consider which sense of est, which sort of existential proposition, may be relevant to Aquinas’ doctrine of esse. But we shall see that, having got thus far, we cannot arrive at the meaning of the whole phrase, quo aliquid est, or the reasons for the way Aquinas uses it, simply by combining our separate considerations about quo and est.

Names and Predicables

If we are concentrating on the logic of predication, we shall easily come to the conclusion that this part of the history of logic is largely a story of error. For Aristotle, the ancestor of all logicians, began the development of this thought by formulating some masterly insights, but later rejected these insights and took a wrong direction. The consequences of his mistake were almost as fatal for his successors as the consequences of the first sin were for the heirs of Adam.

Evans on Quantifiers

Gareth Evanss two articles on the syntax and semantics of pronouns1 unfortunately seem to have been written far more with the desire of showing Peter Geach to have been wrong all along the line than in an endeavour to formulate, clearly and coherently, a comprehensive theory of his own. Some scattered passages of constructive theorizing there are, and in the latter part of this note I shall have something to say about them; but the controversial motive prevails. It would be wearisome for me, and unrewarding for readers, if I were to work through Evanss arguments against me in detail: his misrepresentations of me are frequent and gross, and exposure of them in detail, together with restatement of the arguments misrepresented, would take up many more pages than the articles themselves. I here document just two of the more flagrant examples; with this warning before their eyes, readers may be disposed not to believe Evanss account of my works without checking for themselves. I. On p. 483 of the first article Evans claims to be reproducing an argument from my Reference and Generality p. 132.

Should Traditional Grammar Be Ended or Mended? II.

∗ The transcript, slightly corrected by the speaker, of Professor Geachs impromptu reply to Professor Chomskys statement in the Debate held at Birmingham University earlier this year.

History of Philosophy

In the preface to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus there is a well-known sentence in which he refuses any obligation to assign the sources of his thought; so he has been thought ‘ahistorical’ and even culpably ignorant. Even in that preface, however, he owns his indebtedness to Russell and Frege; and though he read few philosophical works, he read certain works often and intensively: I remember on his book-shelves William James’s Principals of Psychology, a German-language selection from Aquinas’s Summa Theologica, Augustine’s Confessions, and Frege’s Grundlagen. So he is no precedent for anybody who would neglect the great thinkers of the past.

Objects of Thought.

Divided into two parts, the first concentrates on the logical properties of propositions, their relation to facts and sentences, and the parallel objects of commands and questions. The second part examines theories of intentionality and discusses the relationship between different theories of naming and different accounts of belief.