John Lynham

Can Catch Shares Prevent Fisheries Collapse

Recent reports suggest that most of the worlds commercial fisheries could collapse within decades. Although poor fisheries governance is often implicated, evaluation of solutions remains rare. Bioeconomic theory and case studies suggest that rights-based catch shares can provide individual incentives for sustainable harvest that is less prone to collapse. To test whether catch-share fishery reforms achieve these hypothetical benefits, we have compiled a global database of fisheries institutions and catch statistics in 11,135 fisheries from 1950 to 2003. Implementation of catch shares halts, and even reverses, the global trend toward widespread collapse. Institutional change has the potential for greatly altering the future of global fisheries.

Political economy of marine reserves: Understanding the role of opportunity costs

The creation of marine reserves is often controversial. For decisionmakers, trying to find compromises, an understanding of the timing, magnitude, and incidence of the costs of a reserve is critical. Understanding the costs, in turn, requires consideration of not just the direct financial costs but also the opportunity costs associated with reserves. We use a discrete choice model of commercial fishermen’s behavior to examine both the short-run and long-run opportunity costs of marine reserves. Our results can help policymakers recognize the factors influencing commercial fishermen’s responses to reserve proposals. More generally, we highlight the potential drivers behind the political economy of marine reserves.

Principles for managing marine ecosystems prone to tipping points

Abstract As climatic changes and human uses intensify, resource managers and other decision makers are taking actions to either avoid or respond to ecosystem tipping points, or dramatic shifts in structure and function that are often costly and hard to reverse. Evidence indicates that explicitly addressing tipping points leads to improved management outcomes. Drawing on theory and examples from marine systems, we distill a set of seven principles to guide effective management in ecosystems with tipping points, derived from the best available science. These principles are based on observations that tipping points (1) are possible everywhere, (2) are associated with intense and/or multifaceted human use, (3) may be preceded by changes in early‐warning indicators, (4) may redistribute benefits among stakeholders, (5) affect the relative costs of action and inaction, (6) suggest biologically informed management targets, and (7) often require an adaptive response to monitoring. We suggest that early action to preserve system resilience is likely more practical, affordable, and effective than late action to halt or reverse a tipping point. We articulate a conceptual approach to management focused on linking management targets to thresholds, tracking early‐warning signals of ecosystem instability, and stepping up investment in monitoring and mitigation as the likelihood of dramatic ecosystem change increases. This approach can simplify and economize management by allowing decision makers to capitalize on the increasing value of precise information about threshold relationships when a system is closer to tipping or by ensuring that restoration effort is sufficient to tip a system into the desired regime.

Social networks and environmental outcomes

Significance Understanding how social dynamics drive outcomes in environmental systems is critical to advancing global sustainability. We link comprehensive data on fishers’ information-sharing networks and observed fishing behaviors to demonstrate that social networks are tied to actions that can directly impact ecological health. Specifically, we find evidence that the propensity for individuals to share information primarily with others most similar to themselves creates segregated networks that impede the diffusion of sustainable behaviors—behaviors that could have mitigated the incidental catch of over 46,000 sharks in a single commercial fishery between 2008 and 2012. Our results suggest having a better understanding of social structures and bolstering effective communication across segregated networks has the potential to contribute toward more sustainable environmental outcomes. Social networks can profoundly affect human behavior, which is the primary force driving environmental change. However, empirical evidence linking microlevel social interactions to large-scale environmental outcomes has remained scarce. Here, we leverage comprehensive data on information-sharing networks among large-scale commercial tuna fishers to examine how social networks relate to shark bycatch, a global environmental issue. We demonstrate that the tendency for fishers to primarily share information within their ethnic group creates segregated networks that are strongly correlated with shark bycatch. However, some fishers share information across ethnic lines, and examinations of their bycatch rates show that network contacts are more strongly related to fishing behaviors than ethnicity. Our findings indicate that social networks are tied to actions that can directly impact marine ecosystems, and that biases toward within-group ties may impede the diffusion of sustainable behaviors. Importantly, our analysis suggests that enhanced communication channels across segregated fisher groups could have prevented the incidental catch of over 46,000 sharks between 2008 and 2012 in a single commercial fishery.

What Determines Social Capital in a Social–Ecological System? Insights from a Network Perspective

Social capital is an important resource that can be mobilized for purposive action or competitive gain. The distribution of social capital in social–ecological systems can determine who is more productive at extracting ecological resources and who emerges as influential in guiding their management, thereby empowering some while disempowering others. Despite its importance, the factors that contribute to variation in social capital among individuals have not been widely studied. We adopt a network perspective to examine what determines social capital among individuals in social–ecological systems. We begin by identifying network measures of social capital relevant for individuals in this context, and review existing evidence concerning their determinants. Using a complete social network dataset from Hawaii’s longline fishery, we employ social network analysis and other statistical methods to empirically estimate these measures and determine the extent to which individual stakeholder attributes explain variation within them. We find that ethnicity is the strongest predictor of social capital. Measures of human capital (i.e., education, experience), years living in the community, and information-sharing attitudes are also important. Surprisingly, we find that when controlling for other factors, industry leaders and formal fishery representatives are generally not well connected. Our results offer new quantitative insights on the relationship between stakeholder diversity, social networks, and social capital in a coupled social–ecological system, which can aid in identifying barriers and opportunities for action to overcome resource management problems. Our results also have implications for achieving resource governance that is not only ecologically and economically sustainable, but also equitable.

Betting on weight loss ... and losing: personal gambles as commitment mechanisms

Professional bookmakers rarely accept bets from individuals who directly control the outcome of the bet. We analyse a unique exception to this rule and a potential policy innovation in the battle against obesity: a weight loss betting market. If obese individuals have time-inconsistent preferences then commitment mechanisms, such as personal gambles, should help them restrain their short-term impulses and lose weight. Correspondence with the bettors confirms that this is their primary motivation. However, it appears that the bettors in our sample are not particularly skilled at choosing effective commitment mechanisms. Despite payoffs of as high as

Ecomarkets for conservation and sustainable development in the coastal zone

7350, approximately 80% of people who spend money to bet on their own behaviour end up losing their bets. Empirical analysis of the betting market yields further insights. Males are treated very differently compared to females: being male is considered equivalent to having an extra 6 months to lose the same amount of weight. Movements in the market price also confirm the belief that rigidity is preferred to flexibility in setting successful weight loss targets.

Rapid and lasting gains from solving illegal fishing

Because conventional markets value only certain goods or services in the ocean (e.g. fish), other services provided by coastal and marine ecosystems that are not priced, paid for, or stewarded tend to become degraded. In fact, the very capacity of an ecosystem to produce a valued good or service is often reduced because conventional markets value only certain goods and services, rather than the productive capacity. Coastal socio‐ecosystems are particularly susceptible to these market failures due to the lack of clear property rights, strong dependence on resource extraction, and other factors. Conservation strategies aimed at protecting unvalued coastal ecosystem services through regulation or spatial management (e.g. Marine Protected Areas) can be effective but often result in lost revenue and adverse social impacts, which, in turn, create conflict and opposition. Here, we describe ‘ecomarkets’ – markets and financial tools – that could, under the right conditions, generate value for broad portfolios of coastal ecosystem services while maintaining ecosystem structure and function by addressing the unique problems of the coastal zone, including the lack of clear management and exclusion rights. Just as coastal tenure and catch‐share systems generate meaningful conservation and economic outcomes, it is possible to imagine other market mechanisms that do the same with respect to a variety of other coastal ecosystem goods and services. Rather than solely relying on extracting goods, these approaches could allow communities to diversify ecosystem uses and focus on long‐term stewardship and conservation, while meeting development, food security, and human welfare goals. The creation of ecomarkets will be difficult in many cases, because rights and responsibilities must be devolved, new social contracts will be required, accountability systems must be created and enforced, and long‐term patterns of behaviour must change. We argue that efforts to overcome these obstacles are justified, because these deep changes will strongly complement policies and tools such as Marine Protected Areas, coastal spatial management, and regulation, thereby helping to bring coastal conservation to scale.

Disaster in Paradise: A Preliminary Investigation of the Socio-Economic Aftermaths of Two Coastal Disasters in Hawaii

Perhaps the greatest challenge facing global fisheries is that recovery often requires substantial short-term reductions in fishing effort, catches and profits. These costs can be onerous and are borne in the present; thus, many countries are unwilling to undertake such socially and politically unpopular actions. We argue that many nations can recover their fisheries while avoiding these short-term costs by sharply addressing illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. This can spur fishery recovery, often at little or no cost to local economies or food provision. Indonesia recently implemented aggressive policies to curtail the high levels of IUU fishing it experiences from foreign-flagged vessels. We show that Indonesia’s policies have reduced total fishing effort by at least 25%, illustrating with empirical evidence the possibility of achieving fishery reform without short-term losses to the local fishery economy. Compared with using typical management reforms that would require a 15% reduction in catch and 16% reduction in profit, the approach of curtailing IUU has the potential to generate a 14% increase in catch and a 12% increase in profit. Applying this model globally, we find that addressing IUU fishing could facilitate similar rapid, long-lasting fisheries gains in many regions of the world.Analysis of Indonesia’s recent push to aggressively police illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing demonstrates a cost-effective way to improve fisheries recovery while limiting the reduction of legal catch (and the subsequent impact on food supply and profit) that could be applied to other regions.

Identifying Peer Effects Using Gold Rushers

In spite of a long history of coastal disasters worldwide and detailed studies of their short-term impacts, there is still little information about the longer-term economic and socio-economic consequences of these events. The long-term impacts of natural disasters are “hidden” since distinguishing them from othe post disaster developments is difficult. A decade after an event, how many of the observed changes in an economy can confidently be attributed to the event itself? Because the long-term effects of coastal disasters have rarely been studied, they remain unaccounted for in any pre- and post-disaster planning and policy decisions. We focus on the 1960 tsunami and the 1992 Hurricane Iniki on Hawaii and Kauai islands, respectively. The other Hawaiian Islands, which were not hit by the tsunami or hurricane, provide an ideal control group that potentially enables us to distinguish between long-term impacts and other post-disaster developments. We describe the regional macro---economy for the Hilo region in Hawaii and the immediate aftermath of the tsunami. We use Hurricane Iniki to demonstrate how to disentangle long-term consequences on Kauai and speculate what were the long-term impacts of 1960 Hilo tsunami.