John Wilson Lewis

When Cultures Collide: The Anatomy of a Merger

An extended case study of a recent merger between two mutual savings banks is studied from the perspective of organizational culture. Data on organizational culture and organizational climate are analyzed from pre- and post-merger interviews, observations, archival information, and survey questionnaires. Results suggest that even within the same industry, there are major difficulties in trying to merge two different though viable organizational cultures.

China's Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, Goals

I Cont inued sales of ballistic missiles to countries in the Middle East and South Asia have intensified international interest in China’s advanced weapons.’ Proposals for halting these sales can succeed when the dynamics and motivations of China’s defense system are taken fully into account. We have noted in an earlier article in this journal that the technologies, strategies, and goals relating to Beijing’s missile programs must be better understood by the concerned international community in order to overcome its confrontational stance with China and to build a cooperative regime.2 This article focuses on those programs and their purposes. It describes the technological and strategic background of China’s current programs for the modernization of its ballistic missile forces. We seek to lay the groundwork for a more factual discussion of those weapons and their potential missions, and to make the case for encouraging China to shift from military to peaceful rocket technologies. One fundamental fact must be understood at the outset. There is no evidence that any overarching strategic doctrine informed Chairman Mao Zedong’s decision to proceed with the strategic missile program in the mid1950s. Westerners may find it hard to accept the fact that the program proceeded without such strategic guidance and without a reconsideration of Mao’s doctrine of People’s War. Nevertheless, until the early 1980s, there were no scenarios, no detailed linkage of the weapons to foreign policy

Social Change and Political Reform in China: Meeting the Challenge of Success

This article discusses how two decades of economic reforms have intensified popular unrest and redefined the composition, interests and political attitudes of Chinas ever more complex social strata. It then analyses some of the fundamental domestic and international issues facing Beijing in the course of those reforms and the social problems that have accompanied economic growth. The Communist Party has responded to the challenges generated by these problems and been forced to undertake more active political reforms or face an even greater loss of its authority. The article explains how the Party under the slogan the “three represents” cast its lot with the emerging beneficiaries of its economic reforms in the belief that only continued rapid development can mitigate the most pressing social problems and ensure stability.

China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age

1. Technology and self-reliance in the great leap era Part I. The Submarine: 2. Nuclear propulsion 3. Designing 4. Military industry 5. Building and deployment Part II. The Missile: 6. Solid propulsion and the end of an era 7. Guidance and flight control 8. success Part III. Strategy: 9. Strategic uncertainty 10. Rationale and reason in the nuclear era Appendix Notes References cited Index.

Beijing's Defense Establishment: Solving the Arms-Export Enigma

I T h e international traffic in modern arms is receiving renewed attention. The decline in U.S.-Soviet competition creates opportunities for cooperation among all nations to curb weapon sales. At the same time, the growing possibilities for regional conflicts increase the potential arms market. Although the United States and the Soviet Union are the world’s leading arms suppliers, other countries, particularly the People’s Republic of China (PRC), follow close behind. U.S. ignorance of how and why China exports weapons has hampered efforts to bring the PRC into an arms-export control regime. The success of any such efforts in the future will depend on understanding the how and why, and incorporating that understanding in U.S. policies.’ For many Americans, especially those who followed the Tiananmen drama in 1989, the People’s Republic of China seems to fit the stereotype of an authoritarian dictatorship controlled by a few old men at the top. These Americans imagine a rigidly unified hierarchy dominating all party and state affairs, including military operations. This view affects approaches to China’s arms sales: If Washington can convince senior officials within China’s hierarchy to curtail the sales of sensitive weapons to other countries, such sales will stop. This picture, though partially correct, is misleading. It leaves several questions unanswered: Where is the locus of China‘s decisionmaking on arms sales? Why did the political-military system create arms-exporting companies? How does the system coordinate the arms-sales policy? The answers to these questions, at least to a first approximation, must be found in an analysis of how China’s military high command operates and how it relates to the weapon-export corporations. We begin with this analysis. We then trace the development of the complex web of national, institutional, and personal incentives underlying China’s arms-sales policy. Our

Party leadership and revolutionary power in China

Preface Stuart R. Schram Introduction John Wilson Lewis Acknowledgements Part I. The Changing Role of the Communist Party in the Revolutionary Struggle: 1. The influence of the past: how the early years helped to shape the future of the Chinese Communist Party C. Martin Wilbur 2. Transfer of legitimacy in the Chinese Communist Party: origins of the Maoist myth William F. Dorrill 3. The roles of the monolithic party under the totalitarian leader Leonard Schapiro and John Wilson Lewis Part II. The Power Elite in Theory and Practice: 4. The reign of virtue: some broad perspectives on leader and Party in the Cultural Revolution Benjamin I. Schwartz 5. The Party in Chinese Communist ideology Stuart R. Schram 6. Factionalism in the Central Committee Philip Bridgham Part III. The Communist Party and Chinese Society After the Take-Over: 7. Keeping the revolution going: problems of village leadership after land reform Thomas P. Bernstein 8. Party policies towards the intellectuals: the unique blooming and contending of 1961-2 Merle Goldman 9. Getting ahead and along in Communist China: the ladder of success on the eve of the Cultural Revolution Michel Oksenberg Part IV. The New View of Power in the Cultural Revolution Donald W. Klein 11. Army-Party relations in the light of the Cultural Revolution John Gittings Contributors Index.

China's Search for a Modern Air Force

For more than fortyeight years, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has sought to build a combat-ready air force.1 First in the Korean War (1950–53) and then again in 1979, Beijing’s leaders gave precedence to this quest, but it was the Gulf War in 1991 coupled with growing concern over Taiwan that most alerted them to the global revolution in air warfare and prompted an accelerated buildup. This study brieoy reviews the history of China’s recurrent efforts to create a modern air force and addresses two principal questions. Why did those efforts, which repeatedly enjoyed a high priority, fail? What have the Chinese learned from these failures and how do they deane and justify their current air force programs? The answers to the arst question highlight changing defense concerns in China’s national planning. Those to the second provide a more nuanced understanding of current security goals, interservice relations, and the evolution of national defense strategies. With respect to the arst question, newly available Chinese military writings and interviews with People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ofacers on the history of the air force suggest that the reasons for the recurrent failure varied markedly from period to period. That variation itself has prevented the military and political leaderships from forming a consensus about the lessons of the past and the policies that could work. In seeking to answer the second question, the article examines emerging air force and national defense policies and doctrines and sets forth Beijing’s rationale for the air force programs in light of new security challenges, particularly those in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. In the 1990s, the air force has fashioned both a more realistic R&D (research and development) and procurement policy and a more comprehensive strategy for the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) in future warfare. We conclude that this strategy is recasting time-

The Study of Chinese Political Culture

These seven recent works typify a cross section of scholarly publication on the Chinese Peoples Republic, its history, present operation, and prospects. Taken together, they provide the basis for some remarks on the study of Chinese “political culture.” Rather than attempt a full review of the individual works, this brief article will examine some of their assumptions and indirectly comment on the literature they represent. Each book reflects a prodigious scholarly effort and has received in various other journals a complete appraisal of its intellectual value. In general it may be fairly said that these volumes do not constitute significant breakthroughs of knowledge. They do, however, bring together and analyze important bodies of data on Communist China.

Next steps in the creation of an accidental nuclear war prevention center

In early 1983, members of Stanford Universitys Center for International Security and Arms Control met to discuss ideas on the establishment of a joint U.S.‐U.S.S.R. center to support cooperative efforts to prevent accidental nuclear war. William Perry (former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering) began the discussion by outlining several measures he felt could help to reduce the risk of nuclear war by accident or miscalculation. Calling attention to the earlier proposals of Senators Gary Hart, Sam Nunn, and Henry Jackson, he endorsed the concept of a joint accidental nuclear war prevention center as a mechanism to support efforts of the two superpowers to prevent or reduce the likelihood of the outbreak of nuclear war. Most notable in this regard was his personal experience of an erroneous warning of a large‐scale Soviet missile attack on the U.S., which resulted from a NORAD computer malfunction. Information exchanges and consultation to clarify circumstances surrounding an accident ‐...

China’s security agenda transcends the South China Sea

ABSTRACT In 2013, China’s president, Xi Jinping, launched a massive reclamation and construction campaign on seven reefs in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Beijing insisted that its actions were responsible and in accord with international law, but foreign critics questioned Xi’s real intentions. Recently available internal documents involving China’s leader reveal his views about war, the importance of oceans in protecting and rejuvenating the nation, and the motives underlying his moves in the South China Sea. Central to those motives is China’s rivalry with the United States and the grand strategy needed to determine its outcome. To this end, Xi created five externally oriented and proactive military theater commands, one of which would protect newly built assets in the South China Sea and the sea lanes – sometimes referred to as the Maritime Silk Road – that pass through this sea to Eurasia and beyond. Simultaneously, China’s actions in the Spratlys complicated and worsened the US-China rivalry, and security communities in both countries recognized that these actions could erupt into armed crises – despite decades of engagement to prevent them. A permanent problem-solving mechanism may allow the two countries to move toward a positive shared future.