Jonas Nagel

Genomic information and a person’s right not to know: A closer look at variations in hypothetical informational preferences in a German sample

In clinical practice and in research, there is an ongoing debate on how to return incidental and secondary findings of genetic tests to patients and research participants. Previous investigations have found that most of the people most of the time are in favor of full disclosure of results. Yet, the option to reject disclosure, based on the so-called right not to know, can be valuable especially for some vulnerable subgroups of recipients. In the present study we investigated variations in informational preferences in the context of genetic testing in a large and diverse German sample. This survey examined health care professionals, patients, participants of genetic counseling sessions and members of the general population (N = 518). Survey participants were assessed regarding their openness to learning about findings under various hypothetical scenarios, as well as their attitudes about the doctor-patient-relationship in a disclosure situation and about informational transfer to third parties. While the majority of participants wanted to learn about their findings, the extent of support of disclosure varied with features of the hypothetical diagnostic scenarios (e.g., controllability of disease; abstract vs. concrete scenario description) and demographic characteristics of the subjects. For example, subjects with higher levels of education were more selective with regards to the kind of information they want to receive than those with lower levels of education. We discuss implications of these findings for the debate about the right not to know and for the clinical practice of informed consent procedures.

Scale Effects in Moral Relevance Assessment

Research on moral judgment often employs bipolar rating scales to assess whether the difference between two contrasted options is judged to be morally relevant. We give an account of how different numbers of response options provided on such scales (odd vs. even) change the meaning of the test question by communicating different implicit presuppositions. We demonstrate experimentally that these changes can qualitatively affect the moral relevance judgments that subjects express in response to a given judgment problem. Several alternative explanations in terms of trivial measurement distortion are tested and refuted, and we present suggestive evidence as to what kind of factors might be prone to scale effects. The findings underscore that expressed moral judgments are constructed ad hoc and do not necessarily reflect the content of underlying stable moral commitments. We discuss implications for theories and methodology in moral psychology and in judgment and decision-making research more generally.

On having very long arms: how the availability of technological means affects moral cognition

ABSTRACT Modern technological means allow for meaningful interaction across arbitrary distances, while human morality evolved in environments in which individuals needed to be spatially close in order to interact. We investigate how people integrate knowledge about modern technology with their ancestral moral dispositions to help relieve nearby suffering. Our first study establishes that spatial proximity between an agents means of helping and the victims increases peoples judgement of helping obligations, even if the agent is constantly far personally. We then report and meta-analyse 20 experiments elucidating the cognitive mechanisms behind this effect, which include inferences of increased efficaciousness and personal involvement. Implications of our findings for the scientific understanding of ancestral moral dispositions in modern environments are discussed, as well as suggestions for how these insights might be exploited to increase charitable giving. Our meta-analysis provides a practical example for how aggregating across all available data, including failed replication attempts, allows conclusions that could not be supported in single experiments.

Moral Intuitionism and Empirical Data

In this article, it is argued that empirical data can undermine normative arguments generated by intuitionist methodologies that involve a step of inducing an abstract principle from a set of case-based moral intuitions. The use of case-based intuitions in normative theory construction is conceptualized here as an inductive inference procedure in which philosophers draw conclusions from introspectively observable data (their intuitions) to the state of a latent variable (what morality actually requires). We argue that such a procedure can only generate valid output if it can be applied objectively in the sense that its outcome is independent of the person who carries it out. This requirement is only met when fundamental case-based intuitions are intersubjectively shared to a relevant degree. At this point, empirical data comes into play. It is needed to assess the degree to which specific intuitions are actually intersubjectively shared. In contexts in which this requirement is not met, principles resulting from this method cannot be argued to be valid representations of what morality actually requires. We illustrate this argument with a concrete example from the literature in which a specific normative principle is called into question on the basis of psychological data on laypeople’s moral intuitions. Furthermore, we defend the argument against potential objections, and we discuss its relationship to other criticisms of moral intuitionism as well as its implications for intuitionist methodologies in general.