Jonathan Rynhold

Peace and Security in the 2006 Election

The issue of peace and security has long been regarded as the primary focus of Israeli politics. In the 2006 election, the Labour party leader, Amir Peretz, sought to challenge the received wisdom by emphasizing socioeconomic issues. Kadima began by focusing on Ariel Sharon’s leadership and ended with Ehud Olmert advancing the Convergence plan for a further unilateral withdrawal from large parts of the West Bank. Meanwhile, the Likud concentrated its fire against Olmert’s plan. Against this background, the key questions are, first, how important an issue was peace and security in the election? Second, how did the main political parties address the issue of peace and security during the election? Third, what were the main trends in public opinion on these issues? Fourth, in what way did these trends affect the public’s response to the election campaign at the ballot box? Although socioeconomic affairs received greater attention and had more impact than previously, the issue of peace and security was more important in determining the most significant aspects of the election results. However, unlike in the past, the importance of peace and security was not connected to events that took place during the campaign, such as the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian elections. In addition, there was a virtual consensus among the parties in favour of the partition of Eretz Yisrael. Significant differences remained, but the shift towards greater consensus was unmistakable. This in turn was a reflection of the shift in public opinion towards centrism. Centrists support compromise not because they believe in peace but because they think that separation from the Palestinians will enhance their personal security and neutralize the impact of demographic trends, thereby ensuring that Israel remains a Jewish and democratic state with a large Jewish majority. Attracting the centrist voter played an important role in determining Kadima’s victory. Kadima, with the assistance of Sharon’s personal standing, succeeded in branding itself as a credible centre-party

Introduction: From Centrism to Neo-Centrism

Among political scientists and sociologists who study the State of Israel, one of the most accepted theses is that Israel is a ‘deeply divided society’. Originally, this thesis posited profound and persistent cleavages within Israeli society between Jews and Arabs, religious and secular, and Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews. Over the last three decades, a new division appeared: the dichotomy known as the Right–Left divide, namely those opposing Israeli withdrawal from territories acquired in 1967 versus those supporting a territorial compromise. The new division reinforced the existing cleavages and resulted in a divided political map following almost every election since 1977. The question posed here is to what extent the Jewish State is truly polarized in light of the success of the centrist Kadima party in the 2006 Knesset elections. Might the ‘deeply divided society’ concept no longer hold true in light of the victory of a centrist party that included on its list members from both opposing camps? If so, what is the essence of this centrism that is emerging in Israeli society? As Israel appears to be slipping back to the pre-1967 borders, is the old consensus that existed before the emergence of the great divide on the Territories returning? Or are we witnessing the emergence of a new centrism? And, how will the consequences of the Second Lebanon War affect these processes? What is the basis for thinking that the Kadima victory is indicative of the existence of a strong centre in Israel? First, it is important to recognize the significance of the unprecedented victory of a new centrist party. The victory of centrism was also evident in the way Kadima’s leadership sought to base the party on inclusivism by courting diverse groups, such the religious, Sephardim and even Arab personalities to make up its list. This contrasted with Shinui, which appealed exclusively to Ashkenazi secular voters. Clearly, Kadima’s centrism went beyond the ideological divide between Left and Right. It was a preconceived political strategy. The Kadima party experiment, even if it ultimately fails and the party disintegrates especially after the disappointing results of the Second

The Peace Process and the Israeli Elections

After Ehud Barak and Labour defeated Binyamin Netanyahu in June 1999, Ariel Sharon was chosen by a demoralized Likud party as a temporary caretaker. Less than two years later, in a special election held in February 2001, Sharon defeated Barak to become prime minister, gaining record support exceeding 60 per cent of the vote. Sharon proceeded to build on this foundation, forming a national unity government (NUG), and after the coalition collapsed, triggering the general elections of 2003, Sharon led the Likud to a sweeping victory. The key to this startling and far-reaching change in Israeli politics is clearly to be found in the catastrophic failure of the Oslo process and the Palestinian campaign of violence that followed. Indeed, foreign policy and issues related to the last phase of the Oslo negotiations dominated Israeli politics after 1999. The prominence of the peace process in Israeli politics is hardly a new phenomenon, but there has been a fundamental change in the way the public relates to the peace process. In the wake of the Six-Day War, Israelis increasingly came to believe that they were able to shape their relations with the Arab states and the Palestinians. As a result, the ideological debate over the future of the territories became a major part of the political discourse. In contrast, in the wake of the collapse of the Oslo process, the ideological divide over the peace process has been replaced by a growing consensus, as the Israeli public no longer believes that Israel has much ability to alter the fundamental positions of the Palestinians, at least in the short term. Overall, the results of the 2001 and 2003 elections – and the general consensus that they reflected – should not be seen as a temporary ripple, but rather as representing a transformation within Israeli politics. The focus on security and existential issues is likely to continue well beyond the second Sharon administration. The trigger for these fundamental changes was provided in July 2000, following the failure of the ‘permanent status’ talks and the beginning of the violence that brought down the government of Ehud Barak. This provided Sharon with the opportunity he grasped. As prime minister

In search of Israeli conservatism

The major political ideologies of the modern era have found expression in Israel, with one apparent exception: conservatism. This article analyses the problematic place of conservatism in Israeli politics and assesses the prospects for its emergence as a major force in the future. It argues that although conservative values have not been entirely absent from Israeli politics, no party can be defined as fundamentally conservative. In the past, the rise of conservatism was constrained by numerous factors, not least of which was the fact that Israeli political culture was grounded in a revolutionary ideology--Zionism. Even as Israel has passed into a less idealistic era characterized by greater ideological plasticity, the development of conservatism remains severely constrained by other factors including the fragmented nature of Israeli political culture and the endemic nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, the main problem for conservatism in Israel is not external, but internal, namely its cultural/intellectual weakness. This in turn is a symptom of the fact that Israeli political discourse is primarily oriented towards nationalism, while conservatism in the West is primarily orientated towards the problematic of modernity. Ethno-nationalism rather than conservatism is the common denominator on the Israeli right. Indeed, even self-avowed Israeli conservatives, who emerged only recently, are better defined as conservative-Zionists rather than as conservatives per se , their nationalism being ontologically and normatively prior to their conservatism.

Europe and Israel: Between Conflict and Cooperation

Frustration over right-wing Israeli policies on Palestine has held back the advance of EU–Israel relations, but has not yet led to EU-wide pressure.

British Policy in the Arab–Israeli Arena 1973–2004

British policy has oscillated between a ‘Diplomatic’ and a ‘Strategic’ orientation. The Diplomatic orientation regards the Arab–Israeli conflict as the most important element in Middle East policy, while the Strategic orientation views the conflict as less important than the need to contain radical anti-Western forces in the region. The Strategic orientation is associated with a mutually reinforcing combination of ideological sympathy for Israel, a pro-US orientation and the Prime Minister, while the Diplomatic orientation is associated with a mutually reinforcing combination of ideological sympathy for the Palestinians, the Foreign Office, a pro-European orientation and, to a deceasing extent, commercial interests. Since 1973, in an attempt to manage its declining power, Britains has sought to ‘bridge’ the widely differing EU and US approaches, in order to achieve maximum influence and relevance. On occasion, this strategy has succeeded, however Blairs ambition to be the pivot at the centre of international involvement in the region is completely unrealistic. For while ‘bridging’ allows Britain the satisfying sense of ’punching above its weight’ in the Middle East, it often produces the appearance, rather than the reality, of substantive influence.

Books at a glance

Agents of Empire. Anglo‐Zionist Intelligence Operations 1915–1919: Brigadier Walter Gribbon, Aaron Aaronsohn and the NILI Ring. Edited by Anthony Verrier. London, Washington, Brasseys, 1995. 342 pages. £25. Regional Security Regimes: Israel and its Neighbours. Edited by Efraim Inbar. Albany, State University of New York Press. 1995. Speaking Stones: Communiques from the Intifada Underground. Edited by Shaul Mishal and Reuben Aharoni. Syracuse, Syracuse University Press. 307pp. £31.50. Israel Under Rabin. Edited by Robert Freedman. Boulder, Westview Press, 1995. 255 pages. Broken Covenant: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis between the US and Israel. By Moshe Arens. New York, Simon & C Schuster, 1995.