Shmuel Sandler

Separation of Religion and State in the Twenty-First Century: Comparing the Middle East and Western Democracies

While religion has often been ignored as an important political factor, it is becoming increasingly clear that it plays a substantive role in world politics, both international ly and locally.1 Fundamentalist movements, such as the religious right in the U.S. and the numerous Islamic movements in Islamic states, have had a significant impact on domestic politics. Many localized disputes with religious elements have had international implications due to the spread of conflict across borders and increasing international involvement in solving local disputes. They include conflicts in Israel, Chechnia, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Sri Lanka. In addition, the interna tional network of Al-Quaeda has demonstrated the potential international impact of religious movements, though it is likely an extreme example. This article reexamines the relationship between religion and politics using the recently compiled Religion and State (RAS) dataset, which is the most detailed data on the separation of religion and state. The focus here is on domestic politics, specif ically the extent or lack of separation of religion and state in western democracies and the Middle East.2 The correlation between religion and democracy is examined implicitly through the comparison of the Middle East, the worlds most autocratic region, with western democracies, the most democratic states in the world.3 Theoretically, this study also asks whether the predictions of eighteenth and nine teenth century philosophers like Voltaire and Nietzsche that religions influence on public life would decline in modern times have come true.4 While many western democracies like the U.S. have official separation of religion and state, others like Denmark and the U.K. have established religions. Some countries like Austria and Belgium give different official statuses to different religions, officially recognizing some but not others. Some European countries restrict minority religions. For instance, France and Germany restrict proselytizing. Also, every western democracy other than the U.S. provides funds for religious education, and for most of them this funding includes religious education in public schools. Is the U.S. model of separa tion of religion and state the norm for western democracies or the exception? In order to answer these issues, this study examines five aspects of the separation of religion and state: the structural relationship between religion and the state (the existence of an official religion or the legal position of religion within the state); the

The Question of Religion and World Politics

ABSTRACT In this essay we introduce this special volume on the role of religion in world conflict. We develop a common definition of religion which focuses on five ways religion can influence society and politics: (1) as a basis for identify; (2) as a belief system that influences behavior; (3) through formal religious doctrines; (4) as a source of legitimacy; and (5) through its religious institutions. We discuss why the issue of religion has in the past received little attention from social scientists. Finally, we develop a set of common questions which the other authors in this volume address. These questions are designed to create a better understanding of the role religion plays in world conflict as well as how international relations theory can help us understand this role.

Regime Types and Discrimination against Ethnoreligious Minorities: A Cross-Sectional Analysis of the Autocracy–Democracy Continuum

Although many assume that the relationship between the autocracy-democracy continuum and discrimination is linear, with autocracies discriminating the most and democracies discriminating the least, the assumption is not universal. This study uses the Minorities at Risk dataset to test this relationship with regard to government treatment of religiously differentiated ethnic minorities (ethnoreligious minorities) as well as ethnic minorities that are not religiously differentiated. The results show that the pattern of treatment of ethnoreligious minorities differs from that of other ethnic minorities. The extent to which a state is democratic has no clear influence on the level of discrimination against non-religiously differentiated ethnic minorities, but it has a clear influence on the level of discrimination against ethnoreligious minorities. Autocracies discriminate more than democracies against ethnoreligious minorities, but semi-democracies, those governments that are situated between democracies and autocracies, discriminate even less. This result is consistent on all 11 measures used here and is statistically significant for seven of them, and it remains strong when controlling for other factors, including separatism. This phenomenon increases in strength from the beginning to the end of the 1990s. Also, democracies discriminate against ethnoreligious minorities more than they do against other minorities. The nature of liberal democracy may provide an explanation for this phenomenon.

Religious zionism and the state: Political accommodation and religious radicalism in Israel

In its earlier years Israel was spared the impact of religious radicalism. In the last two decades, however, religious doctrines have begun to claim a role in foreign policy, culminating in the 4 November 1995 assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. The primary aim of this study is to explore the systemic political processes and contextual factors that in the past have subdued national religious radicalism in Israel. The general argument of this essay is that the tradition of political accommodation with the religious parties fostered their participation in government coalitions, and by doing so, mobilized a large portion of the religious sector to support the state. Equally important in suppressing religious radicalism in Israel were the two main doctrines of religious Zionism, the instrumental and the redemptionist, which applauded cooperation with secular Zionism and the state, hence enabling political accommodation and avoiding a comprehensive violent confrontation. The absence of a religious p...

Religion, State, and the International System in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Why do conflicts between states and national movements continue to be “nationalist”, concerned almost exclusively with self-determination and control over territory, rather than crusades on behalf of faith? Our basic claim is that the nature of the present international system bolsters the dominant position of nationalists in a given conflict with an opposing political entity, as well as within their own constituency. For this reason, the Palestinian leadership has never entered a power-sharing arrangement with the Islamists, and in Israel, the consociational arrangement with the national religious camp floundered when this internal arrangement threatened Israel’s relationship with its key ally, the USA, and jeopardized its standing in the international community. Religion expresses, however, important primordial values, particularly in Palestinian society, and is often a crucial dimension of collective identity. It is only natural, then, that nationalists use religious groups and their symbols as a means in the struggle to achieve their national or state-centered goals.

The changing Israeli strategic equation: Toward a security regime

Israel is situated in the Middle East, which is not a zone of peace but rather of turmoil. In contrast to the West where peace has become the norm, the Middle East exists in a different socio-political time zone. It is war-prone and the use of force still evokes remarkable popular support. The Middle East, similar to other Third World regions, displays a greater propensity for intra- and inter-state conflict as compared to the environments of the developed states. Therefore, the Middle East is not about to be transformed into what Karl Deutsch called a ‘security community’, where recourse to arms is not acceptable for the resolution of inter-state conflict.

Towards a conceptual framework of world Jewish politics: state, nation and diaspora in a Jewish foreign policy

Contemporary world Jewry is organized into a number of contrasting frameworks, which together present a challenge to contemporary political science. Since 1948 one could speak of a Jewish ttate, a Jewish nation, a Jewish diaspora, a Jewish people, Jewish communities, and both Jewish national and international or transnational organizations, all existing concurrently. The purpose of this essay is to articulate a conceptual framework that would encompass these structures. Its departure point is that limiting the analysis to the Jewish dimension of Israeli foreign policy would not be accurate. A combination of international Jewish and Israeli politics and foreign policy seems to be the right way to pursue the building of an appropriate conceptual framework of world Jewish politics. The theoretical framework presented here draws from many fields of study. Starting with comparative diaspora studies, Jewish political studies, comparative politics, and international politics, this essay demarcates what constitutes both the core and scope of world Jewish politics. At the core it posits both the Jewish state and the Jewish diaspora, defining their interests in terms of survival and identity. The scope of world Jewish politics encompasses unique interests and power, a distinct structure of interdependence, and a normative value system.

Israel at the Polls 2003: A New Turning Point in the Political History of the Jewish State?

The political history of the State of Israel has been traditionally divided into two periods: the pre-1977 years and from 1977 to the present. While the pre-1977 period had one dominant party (the Labour camp was the pivotal force of the political system, the Mapai party (the Workers’ Party of the Land of Israel) and its heir, the Alignment, in particular), the post-1977 years marked the normalization of Israel as a Western democracy. Indeed, in the years since 1977, three prime ministers – Menachem Begin, Yitzhak Shamir, and Binyamin Netanyahu – were from the Likud, while the three others – Shimon Peres, Yitzhak Rabin, and Ehud Barak were from Labour. The decisive victories of Ariel Sharon in 2001 and the Likud under Sharon in 2003 – and especially the decisive and unprecedented defeat of Labour and Meretz, which together pulled 25 members of Knesset (MKs) – poses the question of whether Israel is now entering a new era in its electoral history. Since 1969, the Israeli political system did not experience an election in which the leading party won twice as many seats as the second largest party (38 MKs for Likud versus 19 MKs for Labour). In other words, was Israel returning to the days of one major party and a number of middle-sized parties like Labour and Shinui (15 MKs)? What was the message that the Israeli electorate sent to the Israeli political elite? Does the defeat of the Labour camp indicate that the Israeli political system is entering a historical crossroads? It would be very pretentious to answer the above questions conclusively. When considering the Israeli political system, like most democratic systems, the best we can do is to analyze the current election and not try to forecast the future. However, we shall try to provide a historical context for the main outcome of the election; hence this chapter will be divided into three parts. In the first part, we put the 2003 decision of the electorate in a historical perspective. For this purpose, we observe the Israeli political map, starting even before the birth of the state. In the second part, we try to use our historical review as a basis for explaining the events of 2003.

Introduction: From Centrism to Neo-Centrism

Among political scientists and sociologists who study the State of Israel, one of the most accepted theses is that Israel is a ‘deeply divided society’. Originally, this thesis posited profound and persistent cleavages within Israeli society between Jews and Arabs, religious and secular, and Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews. Over the last three decades, a new division appeared: the dichotomy known as the Right–Left divide, namely those opposing Israeli withdrawal from territories acquired in 1967 versus those supporting a territorial compromise. The new division reinforced the existing cleavages and resulted in a divided political map following almost every election since 1977. The question posed here is to what extent the Jewish State is truly polarized in light of the success of the centrist Kadima party in the 2006 Knesset elections. Might the ‘deeply divided society’ concept no longer hold true in light of the victory of a centrist party that included on its list members from both opposing camps? If so, what is the essence of this centrism that is emerging in Israeli society? As Israel appears to be slipping back to the pre-1967 borders, is the old consensus that existed before the emergence of the great divide on the Territories returning? Or are we witnessing the emergence of a new centrism? And, how will the consequences of the Second Lebanon War affect these processes? What is the basis for thinking that the Kadima victory is indicative of the existence of a strong centre in Israel? First, it is important to recognize the significance of the unprecedented victory of a new centrist party. The victory of centrism was also evident in the way Kadima’s leadership sought to base the party on inclusivism by courting diverse groups, such the religious, Sephardim and even Arab personalities to make up its list. This contrasted with Shinui, which appealed exclusively to Ashkenazi secular voters. Clearly, Kadima’s centrism went beyond the ideological divide between Left and Right. It was a preconceived political strategy. The Kadima party experiment, even if it ultimately fails and the party disintegrates especially after the disappointing results of the Second

Ethnonationalism and the foreign policy of nation‐states

The study of the impact of the nation‐state on foreign policy has been inadequate, partly because of the evolution of international relations theory and partly because of the origins of both the modern state and the nation. As a departure point for the study of the foreign policy of nation‐states an integration of ethnic nationalism into foreign policy is suggested and a pre‐theoretical framework was spelled out in this essay. The proposed framework includes two main elements: (1) the interplay between the national and the statist definitions composing the modern polity, and (2) the compound impact of these determinants on foreign policy accompanied by identification of processes of change that transform the internal distribution between the statist and the national settings. Since the ‘reason of state’ and ‘reason of nation’ are not identical, the discipline is urged to re‐examine some of its basic concepts like national interest, national security, and national territory, as well as the basic postulates...