Joseph Ignagni

Judicial review and coordinate construction of the constitution

Theory: A Congress-centered model of coordinate construction of the Constitution is proposed to predict when legislation, that would reverse a decision of the Supreme Court, is brought to a vote in Congress. Hypotheses: Decision reversal of Supreme Court cases striking down law as unconstitutional are a function of federal power concerns, presidential position, the type of law struck down, public opinion, and interest group pressure. Methods: A two-stage model suggested by Achen (1987) for modeling two interrelated, dichotomous outcomes is used. Results: We find that Congress often does reverse Supreme Court rulings and that public opinion, the position of the president, federal power concerns, and the type of law struck down have the greatest effect on the likelihood that reversal legislation will come to a vote in Congress and will be passed.

Explaining Congressional Attempts to Reverse Supreme Court Decisions

This research examines what factors are likely to cause the Congress to attempt to reverse Supreme Court decisions that hold federal laws unconstitutional during the Warren, Burger, and early years of the Rehnquist courts. First, we outline a general theory of congressional motivation to reverse Supreme Court decisions that looks to both electoral considerations and the need to safeguard congressional power as the primary motivating factors. Using a data set consisting of 65 Court decisions that reversed all or part of some federal statute(s), we test our hypotheses using a probit model to predict when the Congress will take counteraction. We find that the electoral considerations of public opinion and interest group pressure are likely to lead to a congressional response, while the institutional considerations of court unanimity and the age of the legislation struck down are also important. The congress, however, is most likely not to take any decision reversal action.

Congressional Attacks on Supreme Court Rulings Involving Unconstitutional State Laws

In recent years scholars of both the Supreme Court and the Congress have begun to devote increasing attention to congressional attempts to reverse Court decisions declaring federal statutes unconstitutional, while Court decisions involving state laws have not garnered nearly the same amount of attention. We know that the Court strikes down state laws with far greater frequency than federal laws and that many of the most contentious issues facing the Supreme Court, the Congress, and the nation have arisen at the state level. It is our purpose to develop a model of congressional decision reversal action regarding all state laws declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court from 1953 through 1990. Using both probit and regression models we find that the electoral concerns of members of Congress, the nature of the issue the Court addresses and the degree of federal govern mental impact of the Court decision are all significant predictors of both the likelihood of a response and the extent of the congressional response.