Joshua Linn
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Featured researches published by Joshua Linn.
Quarterly Journal of Economics | 2004
Daron Acemoglu; Joshua Linn
This paper investigates the effect of (potential) market size on entry of new drugs and pharmaceutical innovation. Focusing on exogenous changes driven by U.S. demographic trends, we find that a 1 percent increase in the potential market size for a drug category leads to a 4 to 6 percent increase in the number of new drugs in that category. This response comes from both the entry of generic drugs and new non-generic drugs, and is generally robust to controlling for a variety of non-profit factors, pre-existing trends
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management | 2013
Shanjun Li; Joshua Linn; Elisheba Spiller
“Cash-for-Clunkers” was a
Journal of Urban Economics | 2013
Joshua Linn
3 billion program that attempted to stimulate the U.S. economy and improve the environment by encouraging consumers to retire older vehicles and purchase fuel-efficient new vehicles. We investigate the effects of this program on new vehicle sales and the environment. Using Canada as the control group in a difference-in-differences framework, we find that, of the 0.68 million transactions that occurred under the program, the program increased new vehicle sales only by about 0.37 million during July and August of 2009, implying that approximately 45 percent of the spending went to consumers who would have purchased a new vehicle anyway. Our results cannot reject the hypothesis that there is little or no gain in sales beyond 2009. The program will reduce CO2 emissions by only 9–28.2 million tons based on upper and lower bounds of the estimate of the program effect on sales, implying a cost per ton ranging from
The Energy Journal | 2016
Joshua Linn
92 to
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy | 2015
Thomas H. Klier; Joshua Linn
288 even after accounting for reduced criteria pollutants.
Archive | 2009
Thomas H. Klier; Joshua Linn
Brownfields are properties for which redevelopment is hampered by known or suspected contamination and by concerns about associated liability. Because failing to redevelop brownfields may negatively affect welfare and the environment, a number of states have created voluntary programs to reduce liability risks and encourage redevelopment of brownfields. For clean or remediated properties, the state certifies that owners of such sites are not subject to federal or state liability under certain conditions. Certification could increase nearby property values because of decreased contamination risk and amenities associated with redeveloping the brownfield. This paper focuses on the Site Remediation Program in Illinois, and estimates the effect of brownfields certification on nearby property values. Employing several strategies to account for unobserved and time-varying variables that may be correlated with certification, I find that certification of a brownfield 0.25 miles away raises property values by about one percent. In aggregate, the program has increased nearby property values by about two percent.
Vanderbilt Law Review | 2011
Mark A. Cohen; Madeline Gottlieb; Joshua Linn; Nathan D. Richardson
The United States and many other countries are dramatically tightening fuel economy standards for passenger vehicles. Higher fuel economy reduces per-mile driving costs and may increase miles traveled, known as the rebound effect. The magnitude of the elasticity of miles traveled to fuel economy is an important parameter in welfare analysis of fuel economy standards, but all previous estimates impose at least one of three behavioral assumptions: (a) fuel economy is uncorrelated with other vehicle attributes; (b) fuel economy is uncorrelated with attributes of other vehicles owned by the household; and (c) the effect of gasoline prices on vehicle miles traveled is inversely proportional to the effect of fuel economy. Relaxing these assumptions yields a large effect; a one percent fuel economy increase raises driving 0.2 to 0.4 percent.
Journal of Public Economics | 2016
Thomas H. Klier; Joshua Linn
France, Germany, and Sweden link vehicle taxes to the carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions rates of passenger vehicles. Based on new vehicle registration data from 2005–2010, a vehicle’s tax is negatively correlated with its registrations. The effect is somewhat stronger in France than in Germany and Sweden. Taking advantage of the theoretical equivalence between an emissions rate standard and a CO2-based emissions rate tax, we estimate the effect on manufacturers’ profits of reducing emissions rates. For France, a decrease of 5 grams of CO2 per kilometer reduces profits by 24 euros per vehicle. We find considerable heterogeneity across manufactures and countries.
Archive | 2014
Joshua Linn; Lucija Muehlenbachs; Yshuang Wang
This paper uses a unique data set of monthly new vehicle sales by detailed model from 1978- 2007, and implements a new identification strategy to estimate the effect of the price of gasoline on consumer demand for fuel economy. We control for unobserved vehicle and consumer characteristics by using within model-year changes in the price of gasoline and vehicle sales. We find a significant demand response, as nearly half of the decline in market share of U.S. manufacturers from 2002-2007 was due to the increase in the price of gasoline. On the other hand, an increase in the gasoline tax would only modestly affect average fuel economy.
Economic Inquiry | 2009
Joshua Linn
Although the causes of the Deepwater Horizon spill are not yet conclusively identified, significant attention has focused on the safety-related policies and practices—often referred to as the safety culture—of BP and other firms involved in drilling the well. This paper defines and characterizes the economic and policy forces that affect safety culture and identifies reasons why those forces may or may not be adequate or effective from the public’s perspective. Two potential justifications for policy intervention are that: a) not all of the social costs of a spill may be internalized by a firm; and b) there may be principal-agency problems within the firm, which could be reduced by external monitoring. The paper discusses five policies that could increase safety culture and monitoring: liability, financial responsibility (a requirement that a firm’s assets exceed a threshold), government oversight, mandatory private insurance, and risk-based drilling fees. We find that although each policy has a positive effect on safety culture, there are important differences and interactions that must be considered. In particular, the latter three provide external monitoring. Furthermore, raising liability caps without mandating insurance or raising financial responsibility requirements could have a small effect on the safety culture of small firms that would declare bankruptcy in the event of a large spill. The paper concludes with policy recommendations for promoting stronger safety culture in offshore drilling; our preferred approach would be to set a liability cap for each well equal to the worst-case social costs of a spill, and to require insurance up to the cap.