Nathan D. Richardson

Risks and Risk Governance in Unconventional Shale Gas Development

A broad assessment is provided of the current state of knowledge regarding the risks associated with shale gas development and their governance. For the principal domains of risk, we identify observed and potential hazards and promising mitigation options to address them, characterizing current knowledge and research needs. Important unresolved research questions are identified for each area of risk; however, certain domains exhibit especially acute deficits of knowledge and attention, including integrated studies of public health, ecosystems, air quality, socioeconomic impacts on communities, and climate change. For these, current research and analysis are insufficient to either confirm or preclude important impacts. The rapidly evolving landscape of shale gas governance in the U.S. is also assessed, noting challenges and opportunities associated with the current decentralized (state-focused) system of regulation. We briefly review emerging approaches to shale gas governance in other nations, and consider new governance initiatives and options in the U.S. involving voluntary industry certification, comprehensive development plans, financial instruments, and possible future federal roles. In order to encompass the multiple relevant disciplines, address the complexities of the evolving shale gas system and reduce the many key uncertainties needed for improved management, a coordinated multiagency federal research effort will need to be implemented.

Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Clean Air Act: Structure, Effects, and Implications of a Knowable Pathway

It appears inevitable, absent legislative intervention, that regulation under the Clean Air Act (CAA) will move beyond mobile sources to the industrial and power facilities that emit most U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. We analyze the mechanisms available to the EPA for regulating such sources, and identify one, New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) as the most predictable, likely, and practical, i.e. knowable, pathway. Based on the legal structure of the NSPS and the EPA’s traditional approach, we analyze a hypothetical GHG NSPS for one sector, coal electricity generation. This analysis indicates that efficiency improvements and perhaps biomass cofiring could be implemented through the NSPS, yielding modest but meaningful emissions reductions. Trading could also rein in costs. Though analysis is limited to one sector and does not include modeling of costs, it suggests that CAA regulation, though inferior to comprehensive climate legislation, could be a useful tool for regulating stationary-source GHGs.

Deepwater Drilling: Law, Policy, and Economics of Firm Organization and Safety

Although the causes of the Deepwater Horizon spill are not yet conclusively identified, significant attention has focused on the safety-related policies and practices—often referred to as the safety culture—of BP and other firms involved in drilling the well. This paper defines and characterizes the economic and policy forces that affect safety culture and identifies reasons why those forces may or may not be adequate or effective from the public’s perspective. Two potential justifications for policy intervention are that: a) not all of the social costs of a spill may be internalized by a firm; and b) there may be principal-agency problems within the firm, which could be reduced by external monitoring. The paper discusses five policies that could increase safety culture and monitoring: liability, financial responsibility (a requirement that a firm’s assets exceed a threshold), government oversight, mandatory private insurance, and risk-based drilling fees. We find that although each policy has a positive effect on safety culture, there are important differences and interactions that must be considered. In particular, the latter three provide external monitoring. Furthermore, raising liability caps without mandating insurance or raising financial responsibility requirements could have a small effect on the safety culture of small firms that would declare bankruptcy in the event of a large spill. The paper concludes with policy recommendations for promoting stronger safety culture in offshore drilling; our preferred approach would be to set a liability cap for each well equal to the worst-case social costs of a spill, and to require insurance up to the cap.

Policy Monitor--Greenhouse Gas Regulation under the Clean Air Act: A Guide for Economists

Until recently, most attention to U.S. climate policy has focused on legislative efforts to introduce a price on carbon through cap and trade. In the absence of such legislation, the Clean Air Act is a potentially effective vehicle for achieving reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Decisions regarding existing stationary sources will have the greatest effect on emissions reductions. Although the magnitude of reductions is uncertain, it is plausible that a 10 percent reduction in GHG emissions from 2005 levels could be achieved at moderate costs by 2020. This is comparable to domestic emissions reductions that would have been achieved under the Waxman–Markey legislation. These measures do not include the switching of fuels, which could yield further reductions. The ultimate cost of regulation under the Act hinges on the stringency of standards and the flexibility allowed. A broad-based tradable performance standard is legally plausible and would provide incentives comparable to the proposed legislation, at least in the near term.

Managing Risk through Liability, Regulation, and Innovation: Organizational Design for Spill Containment in Deepwater Drilling Operations

The Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010 led to the deaths of 11 workers, a six-month moratorium on deepwater drilling in the Gulf, and nearly three months of massive engineering and logistics efforts to stop the spill. The series of failures before the well was finally capped and the spill contained revealed an inability of both government and industry to deal effectively with a well in deepwater. Because drilling at this depth and even deeper depths is expected to provide a sizeable share of global oil and gas supply in the future, ensuring that deepwater and ultradeepwater containment capabilities adequately protect the public is a salient challenge for policymakers. In this article we consider long-term readiness for deepwater spill containment. We assess organizational design, including the Marine Well Containment Company (MWCC), an industry consortium developed in the aftermath of the accident to contain future deepwater spills in the Gulf. We focus on two separate but related determinants of readiness: the roles of liability and regulation, and the adequacy of incentives for technological innovation in oil spill containment technology (to keep pace with advances in deepwater drilling capability). We find that without additional provisions in place to ensure innovation in containment technology and readiness, industry might meet near-term minimum regulatory standards but still fail to meet the larger social need for innovation.

Managing the Risks of Shale Gas Development Using Innovative Legal and Regulatory Approaches

Booming production of oil and gas from shale, enabled by hydraulic fracturing technology, has led to tension between hoped-for economic benefits and feared environmental and other costs, with great associated controversy. Study of how policy can best react to these challenges and how it can balance risk and reward has focused on prescriptive regulatory responses and, to a somewhat lesser extent, voluntary industry best practices. While there is undoubtedly room for improved regulation, innovative tools are relatively understudied. The liability system predates environmental regulation yet still plays an important—and in some senses predominant—role. Changes to that system, including burden-shifting rules and increased bond requirements, might improve outcomes. Similarly, new regulation can and should incorporate modern understanding of the benefits of market-based approaches. Information disclosure requirements can benefit the liability system and have independent benefits of their own. Policymakers faced with a need for policy change in reaction to shale development should carefully consider alternatives to regulation and, when regulation is deemed necessary, consider which tool is best suited.

Putting a Carbon Charge on Federal Coal: Legal and Economic Issues

US policy to limit greenhouse gas emissions is currently driven, in part, by the US Environmental Protection Agency’s proposed Clean Power Plan, which seeks a drop in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil-fueled power plants—a “downstream” approach to regulation. Here, we consider an alternative, or possibly complementary, regulatory perspective - What is the legal and economic feasibility of imposing an “upstream” CO2 charge on coal production at its extraction site? Specifically, our focus is on leased coal from federal lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). Such a carbon charge is designed, in principle, to embody the cumulative “lifecycle” externalities from coal mining to combustion (or other “downstream” utilization). Our legal analysis concludes that BLM has the statutory and regulatory authority to impose such a charge and that it would be best to add it to the royalty rate. But a large fee that would dramatically reduce revenues could invite judicial concern. The economic case is weaker than the legal case because production on state, private, and tribal lands (60 percent of total production) would not be subject to the charge and so could ramp up in response to the economic disadvantage the charge would cause for coal on federal lands, among other reasons. Best would be a comprehensive set of charges on royalties for all fossil fuels, irrespective of ownership.

Pits versus Tanks: Risks and Mitigation Options for On-Site Storage of Wastewater from Shale Gas and Tight Oil Development

In this paper, we summarize findings from a research effort aimed at understanding the sources of risk associated with on-site shale gas and tight oil wastewater storage in the United States, the gaps that exist in knowledge regarding these risks, policy and technology options for addressing the risks, and the relative merits of those options. Specifically, we (a) identify the potential risks to human and ecological health associated with on-site storage of shale gas and tight oil wastewater via a literature survey and analysis of data on wastewater spills, (b) provide a detailed description of government regulations or industry actions that may mitigate these risks to human and ecological health, and (c) provide a list of recommendations specific to wastewater storage that may help generate progress toward concrete action to make shale gas and tight oil development more sustainable and more acceptable to a skeptical public, while keeping costs down.

Comparing the Clean Air Act and a Carbon Price

Over the last half decade, a variety of federal legislative proposals for limiting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have been put forward, most of which would set a price on carbon. As of early 2013, the one politically plausible policy appears to be a carbon tax, passed as part of a larger fiscal reform package. Meanwhile, the US Environmental Protection Agency has begun regulating GHG emissions from a variety of sources using its authority under the Clean Air Act. It may be necessary to choose between these two policies, however. The Waxman–Markey cap-and-trade bill that failed in 2009 would have preempted much of this authority, and it appears likely that a carbon tax law would do the same. But how can one make this choice? What are the key questions and issues to consider? The purpose of this paper is to compare these policies. Our aim here is therefore not to determine whether an exchange is wise or unwise. Instead, our intention is to give policymakers and other interested readers an impartial assessment of both policies and, in particular, the features that are important to a comparative evaluation. We don’t give answers, but hope at least to give the right questions to ask.

Comments on EPA’s Proposed Carbon Pollution Standard for New Power Plants

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) proposed greenhouse gas (GHG) performance standards for power plants are an important step forward in regulating GHGs in terms of both their substantive impact and legal precedent. Nevertheless, we have some concerns with the proposal, which we discuss in the following comments submitted to the agency. The majority of our comments are directed to ways that EPA can increase certainty for the industry—reducing costs and, possibly, improving environmental outcomes. We highlight two specific areas of concern. First, the current proposal contributes to the significant uncertainty facing existing sources. Second, EPA’s proposed averaging option for new facilities that will install carbon capture-and-storage (CCS) technology in the future, although intended to create a flexible pathway, unfortunately creates some new regulatory uncertainty. We also comment on EPA’s decision to combine most coal and gas generators into a single source category. We believe this decision is legally valid and practically important, and that EPA should resist pressure to reconsider.