Joshua T. Abbott

Random Walks on Semantic Networks Can Resemble Optimal Foraging

When people are asked to retrieve members of a category from memory, clusters of semantically related items tend to be retrieved together. A recent article by Hills, Jones, and Todd (2012) argued that this pattern reflects a process similar to optimal strategies for foraging for food in patchy spatial environments, with an individual making a strategic decision to switch away from a cluster of related information as it becomes depleted. We demonstrate that similar behavioral phenomena also emerge from a random walk on a semantic network derived from human word-association data. Random walks provide an alternative account of how people search their memories, postulating an undirected rather than a strategic search process. We show that results resembling optimal foraging are produced by random walks when related items are close together in the semantic network. These findings are reminiscent of arguments from the debate on mental imagery, showing how different processes can produce similar results when operating on different representations.

Focal colors across languages are representative members of color categories

Significance The best examples of color terms across languages are often held to reflect universal focal colors in the opponent pairs red vs. green and yellow vs. blue. An opposing view holds that best examples reflect categories that are determined by local linguistic convention. We argue for a synthesis of these two proposals. We show that best examples of color terms across languages can be predicted from color term extensions using a statistical model that indicates which samples are most representative of a distribution. This model accounts for universal tendencies in best example choices across languages, and also accounts for cross-language variation. Our findings suggest that general statistical principles may illuminate fundamental aspects of color naming across languages. Focal colors, or best examples of color terms, have traditionally been viewed as either the underlying source of cross-language color-naming universals or derived from category boundaries that vary widely across languages. Existing data partially support and partially challenge each of these views. Here, we advance a position that synthesizes aspects of these two traditionally opposed positions and accounts for existing data. We do so by linking this debate to more general principles. We show that best examples of named color categories across 112 languages are well-predicted from category extensions by a statistical model of how representative a sample is of a distribution, independently shown to account for patterns of human inference. This model accounts for both universal tendencies and variation in focal colors across languages. We conclude that categorization in the contested semantic domain of color may be governed by principles that apply more broadly in cognition and that these principles clarify the interplay of universal and language-specific forces in color naming.

Biological origins of color categorization

Significance Humans parse the continuum of color into discrete categories (e.g., “red” and “blue”), and the origin of these categories has been debated for many decades. Here, we provide evidence that infants have color categories for red, yellow, green, blue, and purple. We show that infants’ categorical distinctions align strikingly with those that are commonly made in the world’s different color lexicons. We also find that infants’ categorical distinctions relate to the activities of the two neural subsystems responsible for the early stages of color representation. These findings suggest that color categorization is partly organized and constrained by the biological mechanisms of color vision and not arbitrarily constructed by language. The biological basis of the commonality in color lexicons across languages has been hotly debated for decades. Prior evidence that infants categorize color could provide support for the hypothesis that color categorization systems are not purely constructed by communication and culture. Here, we investigate the relationship between infants’ categorization of color and the commonality across color lexicons, and the potential biological origin of infant color categories. We systematically mapped infants’ categorical recognition memory for hue onto a stimulus array used previously to document the color lexicons of 110 nonindustrialized languages. Following familiarization to a given hue, infants’ response to a novel hue indicated that their recognition memory parses the hue continuum into red, yellow, green, blue, and purple categories. Infants’ categorical distinctions aligned with common distinctions in color lexicons and are organized around hues that are commonly central to lexical categories across languages. The boundaries between infants’ categorical distinctions also aligned, relative to the adaptation point, with the cardinal axes that describe the early stages of color representation in retinogeniculate pathways, indicating that infant color categorization may be partly organized by biological mechanisms of color vision. The findings suggest that color categorization in language and thought is partially biologically constrained and have implications for broader debate on how biology, culture, and communication interact in human cognition.

Exploring Human Cognition Using Large Image Databases

Most cognitive psychology experiments evaluate models of human cognition using a relatively small, well-controlled set of stimuli. This approach stands in contrast to current work in neuroscience, perception, and computer vision, which have begun to focus on using large databases of natural images. We argue that natural images provide a powerful tool for characterizing the statistical environment in which people operate, for better evaluating psychological theories, and for bringing the insights of cognitive science closer to real applications. We discuss how some of the challenges of using natural images as stimuli in experiments can be addressed through increased sample sizes, using representations from computer vision, and developing new experimental methods. Finally, we illustrate these points by summarizing recent work using large image databases to explore questions about human cognition in four different domains: modeling subjective randomness, defining a quantitative measure of representativeness, identifying prior knowledge used in word learning, and determining the structure of natural categories.

Evaluating (and Improving) the Correspondence Between Deep Neural Networks and Human Representations

Decades of psychological research have been aimed at modeling how people learn features and categories. The empirical validation of these theories is often based on artificial stimuli with simple representations. Recently, deep neural networks have reached or surpassed human accuracy on tasks such as identifying objects in natural images. These networks learn representations of real-world stimuli that can potentially be leveraged to capture psychological representations. We find that state-of-the-art object classification networks provide surprisingly accurate predictions of human similarity judgments for natural images, but they fail to capture some of the structure represented by people. We show that a simple transformation that corrects these discrepancies can be obtained through convex optimization. We use the resulting representations to predict the difficulty of learning novel categories of natural images. Our results extend the scope of psychological experiments and computational modeling by enabling tractable use of large natural stimulus sets.

Adapting Deep Network Features to Capture Psychological Representations: An Abridged Report

Deep neural networks have become increasingly successful at solving classic perception problems such as object recognition, semantic segmentation, and scene understanding, often reaching or surpassing human-level accuracy. This success is due in part to the ability of DNNs to learn useful representations of high-dimensional inputs, a problem that humans must also solve. We examine the relationship between the representations learned by these networks and human psychological representations recovered from similarity judgments. We find that deep features learned in service of object classification account for a significant amount of the variance in human similarity judgments for a set of animal images. However, these features do not capture some qualitative distinctions that are a key part of human representations. To remedy this, we develop a method for adapting deep features to align with human similarity judgments, resulting in image representations that can potentially be used to extend the scope of psychological experiments.