Juan P. Mendoza

Only the Carrot, Not the Stick: Incorporating Trust into the Enforcement of Regulation

New enforcement strategies allow agents to gain the regulator’s trust and consequently face a lower audit probability. Prior research suggests that, in order to prevent lower compliance, a reduction in the audit probability (the “carrot”) must be compensated with the introduction of a higher penalty for non-compliance (the “stick”). However, such carrot-and-stick strategies reflect neither the concept of trust nor the strategies observed in practice. In response to this, we define trust-based regulation as a strategy that incorporates rules that allow trust to develop, and using a generic (non-cooperative) game of tax compliance, we examine whether trust-based regulation is feasible (i.e., whether, in equilibrium, a reduction in the audit probability, without ever increasing the penalty for non-compliance, does not lead to reduced compliance). The model shows that trust-based regulation is feasible when the agent sufficiently values the future. In line with the concept of trust, this strategy is feasible when the regulator is uncertain about the agent’s intentions. Moreover, the model shows that (i) introducing higher penalties makes trust-based regulation less feasible, and (ii) combining trust and forgiveness can lead to a lower audit probability for both trusted and distrusted agents. Policy recommendations often point toward increasing deterrence. This model shows that the opposite can be optimal.

The Tone from Above: The Effect of Communicating a Supportive Regulatory Strategy on Reporting Quality

As part of their regulatory strategy, authorities may request firms to periodically submit mandatory self-assessments. The effectiveness of such strategies depends on the quality of the information that firms provide. We conduct a field experiment to assess how official communications reflecting a supportive regulatory strategy influence firms’ reporting quality. In collaboration with the Authority for the Financial Markets in the Netherlands, we manipulate the content of official letters that instruct financial intermediaries to submit a mandatory self-assessment. As part of the Registered Report Process, we submitted our hypotheses, experimental procedure, and planned statistical analyses before data collection. We expected an overall positive effect of a high support letter on reporting quality, which is weakened by firm size, enhanced by long-term orientation and reversed by (becomes negative for) short-term orientation. The planned analyses reveal a negative effect except for long-term oriented firms, providing no support for the average expected effect nor for moderation by firm size, but supporting the moderating influence of time horizon.