Judith G. Kelley

New Wine in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through the New European Neighbourhood Policy

The EUs newly launched European neighbourhood policy (ENP) is a fascinating case study in organizational management theory of how the Commission strategically adapted enlargement policies to expand its foreign policy domain. From the use of action plans, regular reports and negotiations to the larger conceptualization and use of socialization and conditionality, the development of the policy shows significant mechanical borrowing from the enlargement strategies. Given the lack of the membership carrot, the question is whether such adaptation from enlargement can promote political reforms in the ENP countries, which are generally poor, often autocratic and, in some cases, embroiled in domestic conflicts. This article traces the development of the policy and assesses prospects for human rights and democracy reforms.

Ethnic Politics in Europe: The Power of Norms and Incentives

List of Figures and Tables ix Preface xi CHAPTER 1 Introduction 1 Part I. Theory and Data CHAPTER 2 Theoretical Framework 31 CHAPTER 3 Quantifying and Exploring the Data 54 Part II.Case Studies CHAPTER 4 Latvia: Overcoming Opposition 73 CHAPTER 5 Estonia: Reluctant Cooperation 94 CHAPTER 6 Slovakia: The Meciar Hurdle and Beyond 116 CHAPTER 7 Romania: The Long Road 140 Part III. Evaluation CHAPTER 8 Alternative Explanations: Russia, Hungary, and Democratic Development 163 CHAPTER 9 Conclusion 174 APPENDIX I Methods 197 APPENDIX II Outcome Classification Scheme 198 APPENDIX III Predicated Probabilities 199 APPENDIX IV Interviews 200 Notes 203 References 243 Index 259

International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and Socialization by International Institutions

International relations scholars increasingly debate when and how international institutions influence domestic policy. This examination of ethnic politics in four Baltic and East European countries during the 1990s shows how European institutions shaped domestic policy, and why these institutions sometimes failed. Comparing traditional rational choice mechanisms such as membership conditionality with more socialization-based efforts, I argue that conditionality motivated most behavior changes, but that socialization-based efforts often guided them. Furthermore, using new case studies, statistics, and counterfactual analysis, I find that domestic opposition posed far greater obstacles to socialization-based methods than it did to conditionality: when used alone, socialization-based methods rarely changed behavior; when they did, the domestic opposition was usually low and the effect was only moderate. In contrast, incentive-based methods such as membership conditionality were crucial in changing policy: As domestic opposition grew, membership conditionality was not only increasingly necessary to change behavior, but it was also surprisingly effective.

Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International Criminal Court and Bilateral Non-Surrender Agreements

What do countries do when they have committed to a treaty, but then find that commitment challenged? After the creation of the International Criminal Court, the United States tried to get countries, regardless of whether they were parties to the Court or not, to sign agreements not to surrender Americans to the Court. Why did some states sign and others not? Given United States power and threats of military sanctions, some states did sign. However, such factors tell only part of the story. When refusing to sign, many states emphasized the moral value of the court. Further, states with a high domestic rule of law emphasized the importance of keeping their commitment. This article therefore advances two classic arguments that typically are difficult to substantiate; namely, state preferences are indeed partly normative, and international commitments do not just screen states; they also constrain.

The More the Merrier? The Effects of Having Multiple International Election Monitoring Organizations

cies agree, their consensus can bolster their individual legitimacy as well as the legitimacy of the international norms they stress, and thus magnify their influence on domestic politics. Unfortunately the election monitoring example also suggests that complex regimes can engender damaging inter-organizational politics and that the different biases, capabilities, and standards of organizations sometime can lead organizations to outright contradict each other or work at cross-purposes.

Election observers and their biases

Why do election monitors sometimes issue contradictory statements or endorse flawed elections? The answers are not always straightforward; in some cases, the monitors’ good intentions may undermine their credibility.

Do International Election Monitors Increase or Decrease Opposition Boycotts

Election boycotts are over twice as common when international observers are present. Do international observers increase election boycotts as this correlation and past research suggest? This article argues not. Observers tend to go to elections with many problems, and it is primarily these, rather than monitors, that drive boycotts. Furthermore, opposition parties have reasons to hope that observers can improve the quality of the election or that they will increase attention to election fraud, and therefore opposition parties may actually abandon boycott plans. Whether they do, however, depends on their expectations about how the observers will behave. This makes it important to account for the varying reputation of observer organizations. Thus, using matching to address the selection problem, this article shows that international observers can actually deter boycotts, but only if the observers are reputable.

Between a Rock and a Hard Place: International NGOs and the Dual Pressures of Donors and Host Governments

The Journal of Politics, volume 79, number 2. Published online February 15, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/691218 q 2017 by the Southern Political Science Association. All rights reserved. 0022-3816/2017/7902-0027

From the Trenches: A Global Survey of Anti-TIP NGOs and Their Views of U.S. Efforts

10.00 732 The nonprofit world labors under multiple constraints. Situated between the private sector and the government, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are expected to combine the “efficiency and expertise from the business world with public interest, accountability, and broader planning from government” (Etzioni 1973, 315). If NGOs behave too much like private sector businesses and engage in resourcemaximizing behavior, they can drift from their deeper missions. At the same time, if NGOs disregard market forces and only serve the public interest and advance their ideals, they put their financial survival at risk. NGOs that work internationally face additional constraints on their activities. Although they work outside their home countries, international NGOs (INGOs) are beholden to (and shaped by) the laws, regulations, and norms of those countries (Stroup 2012; Stroup and Murdie 2012). In addition, in order to engage in advocacy or provide services in sovereign states, INGOs must also adhere to the legal regulatory environment of the states they target—or risk losing access to the country. However, if the regulatory environment is too restrictive, INGOs may be unable to effectively pursue their missions. This conflict between INGO ideals and the institutional environments in which they operate gives rise to a strategy Mitchell and Schmitz (2014, 489) have termed principled instrumentalism: international NGOs “pursue their principled objectives within the economic constraints and political opportunity structures imposed by their external environments.” Two such economic and political opportunity structures have changed dramatically over the last few decades. First, nondemocratic governments have tightened the regulation of

Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms: The Rise of International Election Monitoring

ABSTRACT Amid the academic and policy critiques of the United States’ 15-year push to eliminate human trafficking, the perspective of the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working with anti-trafficking advocacy and services has been largely ignored. This article presents the results of a global survey of nearly 500 anti-trafficking NGOs working in 133 countries and is the first NGO-focused survey of its kind. Based on the results of the survey, we provide an overview of the anti-trafficking NGO sector as a whole, detail the relationship between anti-trafficking NGOs and the United States and account for some of the variation in NGO opinions of U.S. efforts. Notably, we find that NGOs are remarkably satisfied with U.S.-led efforts—despite their acknowledged flaws—and that NGOs believe that American anti-TIP policies are important and, on balance, helpful. These results also provide a warning for the future of the United States’ anti-trafficking advocacy, suggesting that the United States avoid politicizing its annual Trafficking in Persons Report.