Julian R. Franks
London Business School
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Featured researches published by Julian R. Franks.
Journal of Financial Economics | 1997
Michael J. Brennan; Julian R. Franks
In this paper we examine how separation of ownership and control evolves as a result of an initial public offering (IPO) and how the underpricing of the issue can be used by insiders to retain control. Using data from a sample of 69 IPOs in the United Kingdom, we argue that IPO underpricing is used to ensure over-subscription and rationing in the share allocation process so as to allow owners to discriminate between applicants for shares and reduce the block size of new shareholdings. We find that of the pre-IPO shareholders in a firm, directors sell only a small fraction of their shares at the time of the offering and in the seven subsequent years; in contrast, holdings of non-directors are virtually eliminated during the same period. As a result, in less than seven years almost two-thirds of the offering companys shares have been sold to outside shareholders, thereby substantially advancing the process of separation of ownership and control. Additional evidence in the paper suggests that rationing in the IPO discriminates against applicants who apply for large blocks, and that the greater the underpricing, the smaller the size of new blocks assembled after the IPO.
Journal of Financial Economics | 1996
Julian R. Franks; Colin Mayer
This paper examines the disciplining function of hostile takeovers in the U.K. in 1985 and 1986. We report evidence of high board turnover and significant levels of post-takeover restructuring. Large gains are anticipated in hostile bids as reflected in high bid premiums. However, there is little evidence of poor performance prior to bids, suggesting that the high board turnover does not derive from past managerial failure. Hostile takeovers do not therefore perform a disciplining function. Instead, rejection of bids appears to derive from opposition to post-takeover redeployment of assets and renegotiation over the terms of bids.
Journal of Financial Economics | 1991
Julian R. Franks; Robert S. Harris; Sheridan Titman
Abstract This paper investigates share-price performance following corporate takeovers. We use multifactor benchmarks from the portfolio evaluation literature that overcome some of the known mean-variance inefficiencies of more traditional single-factor benchmarks. Studying 399 U.S. takeovers consummated in the 1975–1984 period, we conclude that previous findings of poor performance afer takeover are likely due to benchmark errors rather than mispricing at the time of the takeover.
Journal of Financial Economics | 1989
Julian R. Franks; Robert S. Harris
Abstract This paper examines the effects of over 1,800 U.K. takeovers on shareholder wealth in the period 1955–1985. It shows that around the merger announcement date targets gain 25 to 30 percent and bidders earn zero or modest gains. The U.K. data allow independent tests of many issues addressed in studies of U.S. takeovers. Target gains are higher in the U.K. after 1968, suggesting that increases in U.S. target gains at the same time may not be attributable to the Williams Act. Postmerger share-price performance suggests that acquisitions follow favorable developments in bidders equity prices.
Review of Financial Studies | 2009
Julian R. Franks; Colin Mayer; Stefano Rossi
This paper is the first study of long-run evolution of investor protection, equity financing and corporate ownership in the U.K. over the 20th century. Formal investor protection only emerged in the second half of the century. We assess its influence on ownership by comparing cross-sections of firms at different times in the century and the evolution of firms incorporating at different stages of the century. Investor protection had little impact on dispersion of ownership: even in the absence of investor protection, there was a high rate of dispersion of ownership, primarily associated with mergers. Ownership dispersion in the UK relied more on informal relations of trust than on formal systems of regulation. Preliminary evidence for this comes from the geographical proximity of shareholders to their boards of directors, the absence of price discrimination in takeovers and retention of directors of target boards in merged firms.
Financial Management | 1996
Julian R. Franks; Kjell G. Nyborg; Walter N. Torous
The bankruptcy codes of the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany differ concerning who is permitted to control the debtor in bankruptcy and as to the ability of the debtor to arrange new financing while in bankruptcy. This study compares the efficiency of these three bankruptcy codes against a set of benchmarks.
Journal of Banking and Finance | 1998
Julian R. Franks; Colin Mayer
This paper examines the three cases of hostile takeovers in Germany in the post Second World War period. It describes the important role played by banks in affecting the outcome of the bids: bank representatives were chairmen of the supervisory board in all three cases and banks voted a large number of proxies in important decisions affecting the bids. The paper reports that low returns were earned by shareholders of two of the target firms and offers an explanation in terms of bank control and the regulatory regime operating in Germany.
Journal of Banking and Finance | 1997
Julian R. Franks; Stephen M. Schaefer; Michael D Staunton
Abstract This paper attempts to estimate both the direct and indirect costs of regulation for major sectors of the UK financial services industry. We also compare UK direct costs with those for the US and France and this provides a benchmark for assessing the effect of regulation on the competitive position of the UK financial services industry. We believe that this is the first attempt to compare regulatory costs in the UK with those of its major competitors. For indirect costs, in the absence of an international benchmark we compare our results with the predictions made at the time of the introduction of the Financial Services Act, by Lomax (Lomax, D., 1987. London Markets After the Financial Services Act, Butterworths, London) and Goodhart (Goodhart, C., 1988. The costs of regulation. In: Seldon, A. (Ed.), Financial Regulation or Over-regulation. Institute of Economic Affairs, London, p. 31). They estimated that indirect costs would be £4 for every £1 of direct costs and that annual aggregate costs would be £100 million. Our results suggest that, so far as direct costs are concerned, the costs of regulation for the securities and derivatives trading and broking sector are substantially lower for the UK than for the US and France. In contrast, for the investment management and unit trust industry UK costs are significantly higher than those for the other two countries. For the life insurance industry, UK costs are similar to those in France but markedly lower than those for the US. We also find for the securities industry around £4.1 of indirect costs per £1 of direct costs. For the investment management industry the corresponding figure is £3.2. However there is substantial variation across firms and, although our sample is too small to be definitive, the ratio appears to be related to firm size. Although these results are broadly in line with the predictions of Lomax and Goodhart it should be borne in mind that both numerator and denominator are substantially higher in real terms than those used by Lomax and Goodhart.
The Economic Journal | 1991
Julian R. Franks; Eduardo S. Schwartz
The purpose of this paper is to examine the time series properties of volatilities, and to consider various financial and real variables that may be correlated with innovations in expected volatility. The measure used in this study is the Black-Scholes volatility implied in weekly call option prices written on the spot price of the FTSE Index, a U.K. market equity index. First the authors determine if capital structure can explain the relation between changes in the volatility of equity and structure can explain the relation between changes in the volatility of equity and changes in the level of the index. Second, they analyze whether innovations in the volatilities of prices of real variables could also explain changes in equity volatility, including the volume of transactions in equities, oil prices, exchange rates, nominal and real interest rates, and inflation. Copyright 1991 by Royal Economic Society.
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance | 2007
Viral V. Acharya; Julian R. Franks; Henri Servaes
The private equity or leveraged buyout (LBO) market in Europe and the U.S. has grown enormously over the last two decades, from
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Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies
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