Julie Ann Elston

Financial Factors and Investment in Belgium, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom: A Comparison Using Company Panel Data

We construct company panel data sets for manufacturing firms in Belgium, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, covering the period 19781989. These data sets are used to estimate empirical investment equations, and to investigate the role played by financial factors in each country. A robust finding is that cash flow and profits terms appear to be both statistically and quantitatively more significant in the United Kingdom than in the three continental European countries. This is consistent with the suggestion that financial constraints on investment may be relatively severe in the more market-oriented U.K. financial system.

Does firm size matter? Evidence on the impact of liquidity constraints on firm investment behavior in Germany

This paper examines the link between liquidity constraints and investment behaviour on the one hand, and firm size on the other for a large sample of German firms over the time period 1968-85. The results indicate that smaller firms tend to have investment functions which are more sensitive to liquidity constraints than do the larger enterprises. These results support the hypothesis that smaller firms tend to be disadvantaged relative to their larger counterparts in terms of access to finance. Such liquidity constraints are found to exist in Germany only since the mid-1970s, however. Apparently the German model of finance was able to avoid imposing financial constraints on even smaller enterprises prior to the mid-1970s. Since then, however, the evidence suggests that it has not succeeded in avoiding such liquidity constraints, particularly with respect to the finance of smaller enterprises.

Executive compensation and agency costs in Germany

Abstract With the growth of international mergers like DaimlerChrysler, interest in executive compensation practices abroad, particularly in Germany, has increased. Using unique data sources for Germany, we find that similar to US firms, German firms also have agency problems caused by the separation of ownership from control, with ownership dispersion leading to higher compensation. In addition, there is evidence that bank influence has a negative impact on compensation.

Financing the German Mittelstand

This paper describes how the German Mittelstand, or small- and medium-sized enterprises, are financed in Germany. The role of the German Mittelstand, both in a static and in a dynamic framework, is described and contrasted with that of the same size group in other leading industrialised countries. We find that in general, the Mittelstand has played a mmore important role in Germany than in other industrialised nations, such as the United States or the United Kingdom. The traditional success of the German Mittelstand is partly attributable to a system of finance that is richly layered by complementary institutions designed to meet the financial needs of both large and smaller enterprises. However, we find evidence that even under the German system of finance liquidity constraints exist and are greater for smaller firms. The German system of finance moreover seems particularly deficient in the channeling of funds to new firm startups in the newer industries.

Finance, control and profitability: the influence of German banks

Abstract Bank intermediated finance has been cited frequently as the preferred means for channeling funds from savers to firms. Germany is the prototypical economy where powerful universal banks allegedly exert substantial influence over firms. Despite frequent assertions about the advantages of a bank relation, empirical support is mixed. With a unique dataset and a focus on the fragility/sturdiness of inferences, this paper evaluates German bank influence in terms of three hypotheses: (1) do bank influenced firms enjoy lower finance costs? (No); (2) is bank influence a solution to control problems? (Yes); (3) do bank influenced firms have higher profitability? (No).

Shareholder protection and the cost of capital. Empirical evidence from German and Italian firms

We investigate implications for the cost of capital in a model with agency conflicts between inside and outside shareholders, where the severity of agency costs depends on a parameter representing investor protection. Using firm-level data for Italy and Germany we find significant differences in shareholder protection and its implications for the firm’s ownership structure and the cost of capital. Results indicate that concentrated inside ownership increases the cost of capital for Italian firms while having no significant impact on the cost of capital for German firms. Evidence also suggests bank influence in Germany may serve to reduce investor risk for outside shareholders. In contrast, the magnitude of capital stock distortions is found to be quite important in Italy. Overall, slow growth in continental Europe may be more closely linked to institutional differences in shareholder protection between countries rather than inside ownership of firms.

Dividend policy and investment: Theory and evidence from US panel data

This paper examines the importance of dividend policy and liquidity constraints in the context of the firms investment behaviour. While early financial literature has argued that dividend policy should be independent of firm investment decisions, recent studies indicate that linkages are probable in a world of imperfect capital markets. This study develops an alternative Q specification which incorporates the actual dividend payment of the firm in order to test the hypothesis of independence. Empirical results suggest that after controlling for the firms dividend payment, liquidity constraints remain an important determinant of firm investment behavior.

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION: FIRM-LEVEL EVIDENCE FROM ITALY

This study investigates the impact of investor protection on firm ownership and capital growth in a model where investor protection is allowed to vary between firms. Using panel data for Italy, we construct firm-level variables to capture the degree of investor protection, which is observable to all shareholders. Empirical evidence indicates that the stronger the investor protection the lower the fraction of equity that is owned by insiders. Results show that higher insider equity ownership is linked to larger risk premiums and higher costs of capital. Implications suggest that the magnitude of capital stock distortions is particularly important when shareholder protection is weak and ownership concentration is high.

Dividends, Executive Compensation, and Agency Costs: Empirical Evidence from Germany

While researchers have found that dividend payout ratios are negatively related to executive compensation in North America, a relevant question remains as to whether such relationships hold in other institutional environments. Evidence from this study suggests that, as in North America, there is a negative relationship between dividend payout ratios and executive compensations in Germany. This study shows, that the role of dividends in resolving agency issues, is relevant not only in market based systems like that in North America but also in bank based systems like Germany. Agency issues also appear to be partially mitigated by the influence of banks. Bank influence is also found to be positively related to dividend payout ratio and thus consistent with the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis of Jensen (1986) and Easterbrook (1984).

Market linkages between the U.S. and Japan: an application to the fisheries industry

Abstract Recent trends in globalization of Pacific Basin commodity markets raises important questions concerning the nature of market integration and price linkages. This paper examines this issue by testing for price linkages between the United States and Japan for two species whose exports from the U.S. to Japan have risen considerably over the past decade. Empirical results indicate segmentation of price linkages for sablefish but probable price linkages for some thornyhead markets. Findings suggest that markets for these species may be less sensitive to price changes in Japan than would be expected based on commodity flows.