Justin D. Lowrey
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
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Publication
Featured researches published by Justin D. Lowrey.
Journal of Environmental Radioactivity | 2014
Paul W. Eslinger; Judah I. Friese; Justin D. Lowrey; Justin I. McIntyre; Harry S. Miley; Brian T. Schrom
The International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive-Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty monitors the atmosphere for radioactive xenon leaking from underground nuclear explosions. Emissions from medical isotope production represent a challenging background signal when determining whether measured radioxenon in the atmosphere is associated with a nuclear explosion prohibited by the treaty. The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) operates a reactor and medical isotope production facility in Lucas Heights, Australia. This study uses two years of release data from the ANSTO medical isotope production facility and (133)Xe data from three IMS sampling locations to estimate the annual releases of (133)Xe from medical isotope production facilities in Argentina, South Africa, and Indonesia. Atmospheric dilution factors derived from a global atmospheric transport model were used in an optimization scheme to estimate annual release values by facility. The annual releases of about 6.8 × 10(14) Bq from the ANSTO medical isotope production facility are in good agreement with the sampled concentrations at these three IMS sampling locations. Annual release estimates for the facility in South Africa vary from 2.2 × 10(16) to 2.4 × 10(16) Bq, estimates for the facility in Indonesia vary from 9.2 × 10(13) to 3.7 × 10(14) Bq and estimates for the facility in Argentina range from 4.5 × 10(12) to 9.5 × 10(12) Bq.
Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry | 2016
Khris B. Olsen; Randy R. Kirkham; Vincent T. Woods; Derek A. Haas; James C. Hayes; Ted W. Bowyer; Donaldo P. Mendoza; Justin D. Lowrey; Craig D. Lukins; Reynold Suarez; Paul H. Humble; Mark D. Ellefson; Mike D. Ripplinger; L. Zhong; Alexandre V. Mitroshkov; Amanda M. Prinke; Emily K. Mace; Justin I. McIntyre; Timothy L. Stewart; Rob D. Mackley; Brian D. Milbrath; Dudley Emer; S. R. Biegalski
A Noble Gas Migration Experiment injected 127Xe, 37Ar, and sulfur hexafluoride into a former underground nuclear explosion shot cavity. These tracer gases were allowed to migrate from the cavity to near-surface and surface sampling locations and were detected in soil gas samples collected using various on-site inspection sampling approaches. Based on this experiment we came to the following conclusions: (1) SF6 was enriched in all of the samples relative to both 37Ar and 127Xe. (2) There were no significant differences in the 127Xe to 37Ar ratio in the samples relative to the ratio injected into the cavity. (3) The migratory behavior of the chemical and radiotracers did not fit typical diffusion modeling scenarios.
Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry | 2015
Christine Johnson; Justin D. Lowrey; S. R. Biegalski; Derek A. Haas
An examination of proposed sampling sites near Chalk River Laboratories in Ontario, Canada is performed by considering the regional transport of radioxenon using atmospheric dispersion modeling. The local geography is considered, as are the local meteorological conditions during the summer months. In particular the impacts of predicted conditions on the imprinting of atmospheric radioxenon into the subsurface are considered and weighed against site proximity, geography, and geology.
Journal of Environmental Radioactivity | 2017
Christine Johnson; S. R. Biegalski; Derek A. Haas; Justin D. Lowrey; Theodore W. Bowyer; James C. Hayes; Reynold Suarez; Michael D. Ripplinger
In order to better understand potential backgrounds of Comprehensive-Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty on-site inspection relevant gases, a sampling campaign was performed near Canadian Nuclear Laboratories in the Ottawa River Valley, a major source of environmental radioxenon. First of their kind measurements of atmospheric radioxenon imprinted into the shallow subsurface from an atmospheric pressure driven force were made using current on-site inspection techniques. Both atmospheric and subsurface gas samples were measured and analyzed to determine radioxenon concentrations. These measurements indicate that under specific sampling conditions, on the order of ten percent of the atmospheric radioxenon concentration may be measured via subsurface sampling.
Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry | 2016
Justin D. Lowrey; S. R. Biegalski; Theodore W. Bowyer; Derek A. Haas; James C. Hayes
Radioactive noble gases radioxenon and radioargon constitute the primary smoking gun of an underground nuclear explosion. The aim of subsurface sampling of soil gas as part of an on-site inspection (OSI) is to search for evidence of a suspected underground nuclear event. It has been hypothesized that atmospheric gas can disturb soil gas concentrations and therefore potentially add to problems in civilian source discrimination verifying treaty compliance under the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. This work describes a study of intrusion of atmospheric air into the subsurface and its potential impact on an OSI using results of simulations from the underground transport of environmental xenon (UTEX) model.
Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry | 2016
Christine Johnson; Justin D. Lowrey; S. R. Biegalski; Derek A. Haas
Concentrations of the radioxenon isotopes 133Xe and 135Xe were measured as they were released from the stack at the Chalk River medical isotope production facility and were then measured at various sites in the Ottawa River Valley. Dispersion modeling was then used to model the local transport of these radioxenon isotopes between the production facility and the sampling locations. The ratio of 135Xe/133Xe was also examined using an ORIGEN-ARP model was used to understand what factors played a role in the 135Xe/133Xe ratio at the time of release by considering irradiation time, flux, and decay time prior to fractionation.
Journal of Environmental Radioactivity | 2017
Derek A. Haas; Paul W. Eslinger; Theodore W. Bowyer; Ian M. Cameron; James C. Hayes; Justin D. Lowrey; Harry S. Miley
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty bans all nuclear tests and mandates development of verification measures to detect treaty violations. One verification measure is detection of radioactive xenon isotopes produced in the fission of actinides. The International Monitoring System (IMS) currently deploys automated radioxenon systems that can detect four radioxenon isotopes. Radioxenon systems with lower detection limits are currently in development. Historically, the sensitivity of radioxenon systems was measured by the minimum detectable concentration for each isotope. In this paper we analyze the response of radioxenon systems using rigorous metrics in conjunction with hypothetical representative releases indicative of an underground nuclear explosion instead of using only minimum detectable concentrations. Our analyses incorporate the impact of potential spectral interferences on detection limits and the importance of measuring isotopic ratios of the relevant radioxenon isotopes in order to improve discrimination from background sources particularly for low-level releases. To provide a sufficient data set for analysis, hypothetical representative releases are simulated every day from the same location for an entire year. The performance of three types of samplers are evaluated assuming they are located at 15 IMS radionuclide stations in the region of the release point. The performance of two IMS-deployed samplers and a next-generation system is compared with proposed metrics for detection and discrimination using representative releases from the nuclear test site used by the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea.
Journal of Environmental Radioactivity | 2017
Justin I. McIntyre; T.R. Alexander; Henning Back; B.J. Bellgraph; Theodore W. Bowyer; V. Chipman; Matthew W. Cooper; Anthony R. Day; S. Drellack; M.P. Foxe; Bradley G. Fritz; James C. Hayes; Paul H. Humble; Martin E. Keillor; Randy R. Kirkham; E.J. Krogstad; Justin D. Lowrey; Emily K. Mace; M.F. Mayer; Brian D. Milbrath; A. Misner; S.M. Morley; Mark E. Panisko; Khris B. Olsen; Mike D. Ripplinger; Allen Seifert; Reynold Suarez
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory reports on the detection of 39Ar at the location of an underground nuclear explosion on the Nevada Nuclear Security Site. The presence of 39Ar was not anticipated at the outset of the experimental campaign but results from this work demonstrated that it is present, along with 37Ar and 85Kr in the subsurface at the site of an underground nuclear explosion. Our analysis showed that by using state-of-the-art technology optimized for radioargon measurements, it was difficult to distinguish 39Ar from the fission product 85Kr. Proportional counters are currently used for high-sensitivity measurement of 37Ar and 39Ar. Physical and chemical separation processes are used to separate argon from air or soil gas, yielding pure argon with contaminant gases reduced to the parts-per-million level or below. However, even with purification at these levels, the beta decay signature of 85Kr can be mistaken for that of 39Ar, and the presence of either isotope increases the measurement background level for the measurement of 37Ar. Measured values for the 39Ar measured at the site ranged from 36,000 milli- Becquerel/standard-cubic-meter-of-air (mBq/SCM) for shallow bore holes to 997,000 mBq/SCM from the rubble chimney from the underground nuclear explosion.
Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry | 2016
Justin D. Lowrey; Paul W. Eslinger; Derek A. Haas; Harry S. Miley
A considerable amount of radioactivity could leak from an underground nuclear test at levels easily detectable by one or more of the radiological methods available for on-site inspection, even if the event does not immediately result in gas or particulate debris reaching stations of the International Monitoring System, of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. This work presents a feasibility study showing that winds or human activity can resuspend surface debris in quantities that could be detected using high-volume aerosol samplers outside an established restricted area and subsequent measurement in a Base of Operations laboratory.
Journal of Environmental Radioactivity | 2018
Matthew J. Paul; S. R. Biegalski; Derek A. Haas; H. Jiang; H. Daigle; Justin D. Lowrey
The detection of radioactive noble gases is a primary technology for verifying compliance with the pending Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. A fundamental challenge in applying this technology for detecting underground nuclear explosions is estimating the timing and magnitude of the radionuclide signatures. While the primary mechanism for transport is advective transport, either through barometric pumping or thermally driven advection, diffusive transport in the surrounding matrix also plays a secondary role. From the study of primordial noble gas signatures, it is known that xenon has a strong physical adsorption affinity in shale formations. Given the unselective nature of physical adsorption, isotherm measurements reported here show that non-trivial amounts of xenon adsorb on a variety of media, in addition to shale. A dual-porosity model is then discussed demonstrating that sorption amplifies the diffusive uptake of an adsorbing matrix from a fracture. This effect may reduce the radioxenon signature down to approximately one-tenth, similar to primordial xenon isotopic signatures.