Justin Marion

The effects of low income housing tax credit developments on neighborhoods

This paper evaluates the impacts of new housing developments funded with the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), the largest federal project based housing program in the U.S., on the neighborhoods in which they are built. A discontinuity in the formula determining the magnitude of tax credits as a function of neighborhood characteristics generates pseudo-random assignment in the number of low income housing units built in similar sets of census tracts. Tracts where projects are awarded 30 percent higher tax credits receive approximately six more low income housing units on a base of seven units per tract. These additional new low income developments cause homeowner turnover to rise, raise property values in declining areas and reduce incomes in gentrifying areas in neighborhoods near the 30th percentile of the income distribution. LIHTC units significantly crowd out nearby new rental construction in gentrifying areas but do not displace new construction in stable or declining areas.

How Costly Is Affirmative Action? Government Contracting and California's Proposition 209

This paper investigates the effect of disadvantaged business enterprise subcontractor goals on the winning bids for highway construction contracts using Californias Proposition 209, which prohibited the consideration of race or gender in awarding state-funded contracts. After Proposition 209, prices on state-funded contracts fell by 5.6 relative to federally funded projects, for which preferences still applied. Most of the price decline after Proposition 209 resulted from the mix of subcontractors employed, which seems to arise from the higher costs of firms located in high-minority areas. Finally, short-run barriers to entry and expansion may increase the cost of affirmative action.

Measuring Illegal Activity and the Effects of Regulatory Innovation: Tax Evasion and the Dyeing of Untaxed Diesel

This article examines tax evasion in the diesel fuel market. Diesel fuel used for on‐road purposes is taxed, while other uses are untaxed, creating an incentive for firms and individuals to evade on‐road diesel taxes by purchasing untaxed diesel fuel and then using it for on‐road use. We examine the effects of a federal regulatory innovation in October 1993, the addition of red dye to untaxed diesel fuel at the point of distribution, which significantly lowered the cost of regulatory enforcement. We find that sales of diesel fuel rose 26 percent following the regulatory change, while sales of heating oil, which is an untaxed perfect substitute, fell by a similar amount. The effect on sales was higher in states with higher tax rates and in states likely to have higher audit costs. We also find evidence that heating oil sales were less responsive to demand factors, such as temperature, prior to the dye program, indicating that a significant fraction of predye sales was illegitimate. Furthermore, we find a pattern of price and tax elasticities consistent with innovation in new evasion techniques subsequent to the regulatory change. Finally, we estimate that the elasticity of tax revenues with respect to the tax rate was 0.60 prior to the dye program yet would have been 0.85 in the absence of evasion.

Measuring Illegal Activity and the Effects of Regulatory Innovation: A Study of Diesel Fuel Tax Evasion

This paper examines tax evasion in the context of the diesel fuel market and the response of evaders to regulatory innovation. Diesel fuel used for on-road purposes is taxed, while other uses are untaxed, creating an incentive for firms and individuals to evade on-road diesel taxes by purchasing untaxed diesel fuel and then using or reselling it for on-road use. We examine the effects of a federal regulatory innovation in October 1993, the addition of red dye to untaxed diesel fuel at the point of distribution, which significantly lowered the cost of regulatory enforcement. We propose a model of the evasion decision that predicts that evasion increases as taxes rise and monitoring costs fall. Testing the predictions of the model, we find that sales of diesel fuel rose 26 percent following the regulatory change while sales of heating oil, which is an untaxed perfect substitute, fell by a similar amount. The effect on sales was higher in states with higher tax rates and in states likely to have higher audit costs. Heating oil sales are also found to be much less responsive to demand factors such as temperature and season prior to the dye program, indicating that a significant fraction of sales prior to dyeing was illegitimate. In addition, we find evidence that tax evaders found new methods of evading fuel dye regulations. We find that sales of kerosene and jet fuel, two undyed alternatives to untaxed diesel fuel, rose following the introduction of fuel dye. Furthermore, we find a pattern of price and tax elasticities consistent with innovation in new evasion techniques subsequent to the regulatory change. Finally, we examine the extent to which tax increases are incorporated into tax revenues, using the estimated tax and price elasticities to describe how this is affected by evasion. We estimate that the elasticity of tax revenues with respect to the tax rate was 0.60 prior to the dye program, yet would have been 0.85 in the absence of evasion.

Residential Segregation, Discrimination, and African-American Theater Entry During Jim Crow

We examine the role of residential segregation and racial discrimination in determining the entry of movie theaters serving African-American customers in the 1950s. These theaters provided an alternative to the segregated theaters of the Jim Crow era. Consistent with preference externalities in racial and ethnic enclaves, we find that a greater degree of residential segregation leads to more African-American theater entry. Using estimates from a Bresnahan and Reiss model of theater entry, we find that this effect is due to higher variable profits in residentially segregated cities rather than lower fixed costs of entry. The effect of racial bias among whites is found to be complex. Using several measures of racial discrimination, we conclude that bias leading to a taste for segregation leads to greater entry, while more generally racial bias results in fewer theaters.