Ricard Gil

Social Security and Democracy

Many political economic theories use and emphasize the process of voting in their explanation of the growth of Social Security, government spending, and other public policies. But is there an empirical connection between democracy and Social Security program size or design? Using some new international data sets to produce both country-panel econometric estimates as well as case studies of South American and southern European countries, we find that Social Security policy varies according to economic and demographic factors, but that very different political histories can result in the same Social Security policy. We find little partial effect of democracy on the size of Social Security budgets, on how those budgets are allocated, or how economic and demographic factors affect Social Security. If there is any observed difference, democracies spend a little less of their GDP on Social Security, grow their budgets a bit more slowly, and cap their payroll tax more often, than do economically and demographically similar nondemocracies. Democracies and nondemocracies are equally likely to have benefit formulas inducing retirement and, conditional on GDP per capita, equally likely to induce retirement with a retirement test vs. an earnings test.

The Organizational Dimensions of Creativity: Motion Picture Production

Internal or contractual production of highly creative products requires managers to assess both unobservable effort and uncertain output, leading to lack of cost control. Similarly, in procuring creative products in the marketplace, managers face the unavoidable winners curse risk. Since this risk is, to a large extent, independent of the creative nature of the product, the higher the creative content, the higher the relative hazards associated with internal or contractual production. Thus, internal/contractual production of creative goods will tend to be less prevalent the higher the creative content associated with its production. The evolution of the U.S. film industry in the mid-20th century provides examples and implications for managing highly creative activities and ventures.

Empirical Analysis of Metering Price Discrimination: Evidence from Concession Sales at Movie Theaters

Prices for goods such as blades for razors, ink for printers, and concessions at movies are often set well above cost. Theory has shown that this could yield a profitable price discrimination strategy often termed “metering.” The idea is that a customers intensity of demand for aftermarket goods (e.g., the concessions) provides a meter of how much the customer is willing to pay for the primary good (e.g., admission). If this correlation in tastes for the two goods is positive, a high price on the aftermarket good allows firms to extract a greater total price (admissions plus concessions) from higher-type customers. This paper develops a simple aggregate model of discrete-continuous demand to motivate how this correlation can be tested using simple regression techniques and readily available firm data. Model simulations illustrate that the regressions can be used to predict whether aftermarket prices should be above, below, or equal to their marginal cost. We then apply the approach to box office and concession data from a chain of Spanish theaters and find that high-priced concessions do extract more surplus from customers with a greater willingness to pay for the admission ticket.

An empirical investigation of the Paramount antitrust case

Production patterns in the US movie industry changed drastically between 1940 and 1960. During these decades, a major event took place: the Paramount antitrust case was resolved by the US Supreme Court in 1948. As a result, the five largest studios (MGM, Paramount, 20th Century Fox, Warner Brothers and RKO) were forced to vertically disintegrate and separate production and distribution from exhibition. The Supreme Court also banned these and three other studios (Columbia, Universal and United Artists) from using block booking as contractual practice. In this article, I examine how this antitrust ruling affected the movie industry.

Price Discrimination and Competition in Two-Sided Markets: Evidence from the Spanish Local TV Industry

In this paper, we empirically test the relation between price discrimination and product market competition in a two-sided market setting using a new data set of Spanish local TV stations that provides information on subscription and advertising prices per station for 1996, 1999 and 2002. During these years, changes in regulation in this sector had a deep impact on the degree of local market competition. We use differences in market structure across markets and across years to study the relation between competition and price discrimination in this setting. Our findings suggest that stations in more competitive markets are less likely to use price discrimination. We also find evidence that stations price discriminating in a market are also more likely to price discriminate on the other market. Finally, cable subscription fees and advertising prices are higher in more competitive markets which suggests that tougher competition may increase market segmentation through station differentiation, driving stations to charge higher uniform prices to more loyal customers. This may indicate that less price discrimination may be associated with lower consumer surplus in all markets.

Does Vertical Integration Decrease Prices? Evidence from the Paramount Antitrust Case of 1948

I empirically examine the impact of the 1948 Paramount antitrust case on ticket prices using a unique dataset collected from Variety magazine issues between 1945 and 1955. With information on prices, revenues, and theater ownership for an unbalanced panel of 393 theaters in 26 cities, I find that vertically integrated theaters charged lower prices and sold more admission tickets than nonintegrated theaters. I also find that the rate at which prices increased in theaters was slower while integrated than after vertical divestiture. These findings together with institutional details are consistent with the prediction that vertical integration lowers prices through the elimination of double marginalization. (JEL G34, K21, L11, L22, L42, L82)

On the Determinants and Consequences of Informal Contracting

As documented by Macauley (1963) and others, informal contracts are pervasive in modern economies. Yet, systematic empirical evidence on them is still limited. In this paper, we provide a framework to investigate the determinants and consequences of informal contracts. First, we present a model that organizes key predictions from the theoretical literature. Next, we discuss selected empirical works that shed light on the model’s empirical relevance. Finally, we discuss strategies for testing theoretical predictions for which conclusive evidence is still missing, as well as unexplored research opportunities offered by available studies and data.

The Economics of IPR Protection Policies

In this paper, I model competition between legal and pirate products. In this framework, the government affects competition through police spending and taxes on the legal products. Therefore, the government can choose the optimal combination of spending and taxes that fit better its goals. I show that governments focusing on eradicating piracy will use lower level of taxes and police spending than governments focused on maximizing consumption, consumer surplus, and welfare or government size. This result highlights the importance of demand side policies in the fight against piracy and challenges the traditional solo approach of supply side policies.

Underneath the Red Carpet: Government Intervention in the Spanish Movie Industry

Despite its glamour and elevated social status, the movie industry receives much assistance from governments around the world. Governments mainly use both direct (subsidies and tax credits) and indirect (screen quotas or censorship) tools to help their own domestic motion picture industries. This article presents evidence of an indirect government intervention in the Spanish movie industry. In 1999, the Spanish government mandated that operating TV networks invest 3% of their receipts on the production of movies in the Spanish language. Using a new dataset of Spanish movies produced between 2000 and 2008, this article studies the empirical relation between TV network participation on movie production and box office success. Private TV network participation (as opposed to public networks) through production (and not distribution) was found to be associated with higher box office revenues and gross profitability rates, even after controlling for movie production budgets.

The Adoption of New Technologies: Understanding Hollywood's (Slow and Uneven) Conversion to Color

Hollywood converted to sound in three years. In comparison, Hollywoods conversion to color required more than three decades, and included a three-year period in which the share of color movies declined from 58 to 31percent. We investigate this puzzling adoption profile using detailed data on 7,022 movies between 1940 and 1959. These data indicate differences in studio size and complementarity between genre and color impeded the rapid diffusion of color. These data also indicate that disadoption followed weak returns to a wave of color releases that were encouraged by the introductionof a low-cost color process.