Justin Sytsma

How to study folk intuitions about phenomenal consciousness

The assumption that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is pretheoretical is often found in the philosophical debates on consciousness. Unfortunately, this assumption has not received the kind of empirical attention that it deserves. We suspect that this is in part due to difficulties that arise in attempting to test folk intuitions about consciousness. In this article we elucidate and defend a key methodological principle for this work. We draw this principle out by considering recent experimental work on the topic by Joshua Knobe and Jesse Prinz (2008). We charge that their studies do not establish that the folk have a concept of phenomenal consciousness in part because they compare group agents to individuals. The problem is that group agents and individuals differ in some significant ways in terms of functional organization and behavior. We propose that future experiments should establish that ordinary people are disposed to ascribe different mental states to entities that are given behaviorally and functionally equivalent descriptions.

Two Types of Typicality: Rethinking the Role of Statistical Typicality in Ordinary Causal Attributions

Recent work on the role of norms in the use of causal language by ordinary people has led to a consensus among several researchers: The consensus position is that causal attributions are sensitive to both statistical norms and prescriptive norms. But what is a statistical norm? We argue that there are at least two types that should be distinguished--agent-level statistical norms and population-level statistical norms. We then suggest an alternative account of ordinary causal attributions about agents (the responsibility view), noting that this view motivates divergent predictions about the effect of information about each of the two types of statistical norms noted. Further, these predictions run counter to those made by the consensus position. With this set-up in place, we present the results of a series of new experimental studies testing our predictions. The results are in line with the responsibility view, while indicating that the consensus position is seriously mistaken.

Deep trouble for the deep self

Chandra Sripadas (2010) Deep Self Concordance Account aims to explain various asymmetries in peoples judgments of intentional action. On this account, people distinguish between an agents active and deep self; attitude attributions to the agents deep self are then presumed to play a causal role in peoples intentionality ascriptions. Two judgments are supposed to play a role in these attributions—a judgment that specifies the attitude at issue and one that indicates that the attitude is robust (Sripada & Konrath, 2011). In this article, we show that the Deep Self Concordance Account, as it is currently articulated, is unacceptable.

Phenomenological Obviousness and the New Science of Consciousness

Is phenomenal consciousness a problem for the brain sciences? An increasing number of researchers hold not only that it is but that its very existence is a deep mystery. That this problematic phenomenon exists is generally taken for granted: It is asserted that phenomenal consciousness is just phenomenologically obvious. In contrast, I hold that there is no such phenomenon and, thus, that it does not pose a problem for the brain sciences. For this denial to be plausible, however, I need to show that phenomenal consciousness is not phenomenologically obvious. That is the goal of this article.

On the relevance of folk intuitions: A commentary on Talbot

In previous work, we presented evidence suggesting that ordinary people do not conceive of subjective experiences as having phenomenal qualities. We then argued that these findings undermine a common justification given for the reality of the hard problem of consciousness. In a thought-provoking article, Talbot has challenged our argument. In this article, we respond to his criticism.

Attributions of consciousness.

UNLABELLED Many philosophers and brain scientists hold that explaining consciousness is one of the major outstanding problems facing modern science today. One type of consciousness in particular-phenomenal consciousness-is thought to be especially problematic. The reasons given for believing that this phenomenon exists in the first place, however, often hinge on the claim that its existence is simply obvious in ordinary perceptual experience. Such claims motivate the study of peoples intuitions about consciousness. In recent years a number of researchers in experimental philosophy of mind have begun to shed light on this area, investigating how people understand and attribute those mental states that have been thought to be phenomenally conscious. In this article, we discuss the philosophical concept of phenomenal consciousness and detail the work that has been done on the question of whether lay people have this concept. WIREs Cogn Sci 2014, 5:635-648. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1320 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website. CONFLICT OF INTEREST The author has declared no conflicts of interest for this article.

Intuition, by Elijah Chudnoff

Talk of intuitions is commonplace in recent philosophy, as are debates about the role of intuitions in philosophy, how frequently they are appealed to, and what evidential value they have. Given this interest in intuitions, it is perhaps surprising to find basic disagreement in the literature about just what intuitions amount to. Following one thread, it appears that many philosophers take intuitions to be judgments that are not arrived at through conscious reasoning. To illustrate, when Kuntz and Kuntz [2011] asked professional philosophers to rank-order seven definitions of ‘intuition’ with regard to consistency with philosophical usage, the top-ranked was ‘judgment that is not made on the basis of some kind of observable and explicit reasoning process’. While this definition was the top-ranked one, only 32.3% of participants actually ranked it first. And a comparable percentage of participants (23.3%) selected the next most highly ranked definition—‘an intellectual happening whereby it seems that something is the case without arising from reasoning, or sensorial perceiving, or remembering’. Clearly, philosophers are somewhat divided on this issue. In Intuition, Elijah Chudnoff offers a detailed account of intuitions that accords with the second definition given above. His basic claim is that intuition is a form of intellectual perception—‘intuitions are experiences that purport to, and sometimes do, reveal how matters stand in abstract reality by making us intuitively aware of that reality’ [1]. This rough idea is then fleshed out in terms of five key theses [3]: