Jyoti Khanna

Charity donations in the UK: New evidence based on panel data

Abstract This paper presents a set of panel data estimates for 159 of the most prominent UK charities for the period 1983–1990. In evaluating alternative specifications, we settle on a fixed-effects estimation. Social welfare charities are shown to fund raise short of the point at which net revenues are maximized, whereas health and overseas charities are found to net revenue maximize. Religious charities maximize total revenues. Estimates of price and fund-raising elasticities are presented for charities overall and for four cohorts. For alternative income sources, no evidence of crowding-out is found.

Partners in giving:: The crowding-in effects of UK government grants

Abstract This study examines the determinants of voluntary donations to UK charities, using empirical specifications that combine error-component and simultaneous-equations methods. In a series of tests, we identify the one-way fixed-effects endogenous representation for government grants as the best empirical model. When this endogeneity is taken into account, government grants cause significant crowding-in for the full sample and the two largest cohorts. Price coefficients are negative, and fund-raising coefficients are positive. Religion charities are net revenue maximizers; whereas other charity cohorts fund raise short of net revenue maximization.

Sharing the Financial Burden for U.N. and NATO Peacekeeping, 1976-1996

The article examines how NATO and two larger samples shared the U.N. peacekeeping financial burden from 1976 to 1996. Based on the share of gross domestic product devoted to U.N. peacekeeping, there is evidence that the rich nations are assuming a disproportionate burden of peacekeeping in the post-cold war period. This evidence is stronger for NATO than for the two larger samples. When efforts for peacekeeping not financed through the United Nations are included, the disproportionality is even clearer in the 1990s for NATO and the largest samples (accounting for 97% of U.N. peacekeeping support). Problems with alternative peacekeeping burden-sharing measures also are considered. In light of current developments, future patterns of burden sharing are anticipated, with the richer NATO allies assuming ever greater financial burdens of peacekeeping.

AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH EXPENDITURES IN THE UNITED STATES: A PUBLIC GOODS PERSPECTIVE

This paper presents econometric evidence on two different public good formulations of agricultural research: pure public and joint-product models. A nested test for simultaneous equations is proposed and applied for distinguishing between the two models. The procedure is used for testing for neutrality. Using data from 1951-85, the authors illustrate the technique with two-stage least squares estimates for forty-eight U.S. states. An overwhelming number of sample states abide by the joint-product model. Price and full income elasticities are presented. Copyright 1994 by MIT Press.

Nato burden sharing: 1960–1992

This paper presents an up‐to‐date study of defense burden sharing in NATO for 1960–1992, using a variety of burden‐sharing measures. By analyzing the relationship between GDP and the proportion of GDP allocated to defense, we demonstrate that the exploitation of the large allies by the small ended around 1967 and never returned. A comparison of defense burdens and defense benefits received is supportive of the joint product model as explaining NATO burden‐sharing behavior during the last 25 years. Despite recent profound changes, including the end to the Cold War, the Reagan build‐up of forces, and the modernization of strategic forces, the joint product model remains applicable. Policy conclusions are drawn.

Conscription, peace‐keeping, and foreign assistance: NATO burden sharing in the post‐cold war era

This article examines burden-sharing behavior from the mid-1970s to 1994 using conscription-adjusted data. Except for the Reagan defense build-up in the early 1980s, actual defense burdens are not significantly different than average derived defense burdens. There is little sign of the exploitation hypothesis during this flexible-response era. In the 1990s, peace-keeping missions perform more like a pure public good and display some evidence of the exploitation of the large ally by the small. NATO foreign assistance abides by the joint product model and does not imply exploitation. Dramatic changes in the 1990s appear to reinforce the tendency towards equitable burden sharing, experienced from the start of the flexible-response era.

The ivory trade ban: Is it effective?

Abstract This paper examines the effectiveness of the ivory trade ban when producer and consumer states have different incentives to comply with such a ban. The paper distinguishes between two types of producer states: those with stable elephant population and those with declining elephant population. We compare the independent enforcement level of each of these producer states and a consumer state and show the suboptimality of these levels compared to optimal enforcement level that would result from a cooperative effort. The costliness and imperfectness of enforcing constraints on the private taking of elephants creates intergovernmental externalities. Thus, in the absence of binding international law, regulation would have to be supplemented with incentives.

Cooperative versus Noncooperative Behavior: The Case of Agricultural Research

Voluntary provision of public goods is generally considered suboptimal. This result is based on the underlying assumption of noncooperation resulting in the standard Nash-Cournot outcome. Agents, however, can reach a cooperative equilibrium if the aggregate level of the public good provided has to coincide across agents, given each agents tax-share. The resulting Lindahl equilibrium implies Pareto-optimal provision of the public good. This paper tests these two competing models by taking the case of agricultural research in the United States. Results indicate that, in over 50 percent of the cases, agents follow the noncooperative scheme. Copyright 1993 by MIT Press.

Corruption and the Role of Middlemen

This paper develops a game theoretic model of corruption in tax assessments. Bureaucrats are assumed to be heterogeneous in the level of corruption and the favors they offer to the public. Our first result establishes the optimal amount of bribe public offers to the bureaucrat in the simplified case where no middlemen are present. The second result provides a sufficient condition for the public to prefer a higher tax proposal. The middlemen, who know the type of the bureaucrat, are introduced next to show that it is possible to reduce the incidence of bribe offers made by the public.