Kaisa Herne

Deliberation and civic virtue: lessons from a citizen deliberation experiment

This paper focuses on the “side-effects” of democratic deliberation. More precisely, we analyse the potential of deliberative mini-publics to enhance political knowledge, efficacy, trust as well as political and other collective action. The empirical analysis is based on a deliberative experiment on nuclear power. This “citizen deliberation” was held in November 2006. Our initial finding is that the volunteers who were willing to take part in the experiment were more inclined to act politically than those who did not volunteer; they also possessed a higher level of internal political efficacy and had more trust in the parliament and politicians. When it comes to the impact of deliberation, participation in the experiment increased energy related knowledge but reduced slightly internal political efficacy. The sense of external political efficacy was not directly affected, but the participants‟ trust in parliament and politicians did rise. Interpersonal trust increased slightly as well as the participants‟ willingness to take a particular kind of collective action (electricity saving). However, deliberation did not to increase the participants‟ preparedness to act politically.

The Effects of Decoy Gambles on Individual Choice

A number of studies demonstrate that individual choice can be influenced by alternatives which should be irrelevant according to standard choice theory. In these studies it has been observed that introducing a decoy option, which is either asymmetrically dominated by a target option or which makes the target a compromise, increases the likelihood of choosing the target. A common feature of earlier research on decoy effects is the use of hypothetical choice tasks. The aim of this paper is to investigate decoy effects in a properly controlled experiment where subjects are given real incentives. Here, monetary gambles are used as alternatives. The results demonstrate that decoy effects persist despite the use of real incentives.

Decoy alternatives in policy choices: Asymmetric domination and compromise effects

Abstract A decoy is an option which causes preference reversals between two other options in a choice set. Introducing a decoy increases the popularity of a target option and decreases the popularity of a competitor. This phenomenon contradicts standard economic models of individual choice which assume preferences to be independent of irrelevant alternatives. Decoy effects include a set of phenomena in which particular types of decoys have been observed to influence choice. This paper focuses on two effects: the asymmetric domination and compromise effect. Earlier studies on decoy effects have concentrated on consumer choice. The aim of this paper is to investigate the possibility of observing the same effects in a political context. This question is studied by presenting choice problems over various policy issues to a group of respondents. The results show that the outcomes of a political decision making process can be affected by alternatives which should be irrelevant according to the standard approach.

Testing the reference-dependent model: an experiment on asymmetrically dominated reference points

Standard choice theory assumes choice to be independent of the point of reference. Based on a number of studies which challenge this assumption, Tversky and Kahneman have proposed a reference-dependent model which captures the influence of reference points on individual choice. If choice is reference-dependent, switching the reference point so that it is first dominated by x and then by y increases the likelihood of choosing y. Switching the location of an asymmetrically dominated reference point without altering the dominance relationship should also influence reference-dependent choice in a predicted manner. In this paper the reference-dependent model is tested in two experiments which focus on asymmetrically dominated reference points. The results of these experiments give further confirmation to the reference-dependent model. #1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The Role of Information in Choices Over Income Distributions

How people distribute income is investigated, using participants in two experimental treatments—one with and the other without a veil of ignorance. The experiment tests two major hypotheses: (1) the veil of ignorance generates Rawlsian choices, and (2) equal bargaining power and the veto rule generate Rawlsian choices, even though there is no veil of ignorance. Rawlsian choices are defined as those that maximize the income of the lowest income group. Results show that the proportion of Rawlsian choices is bigger in those groups in which there is no veil of ignorance. In group discussions, arguments related to justice are also more common in the no veil of ignorance than in the veil of ignorance treatment.

What drives the polarisation and moderation of opinions? Evidence from a Finnish citizen deliberation experiment on immigration

In the study of deliberation, a largely under-explored area is why some participants polarise their opinion after deliberation and why others moderate them. Opinion polarisation is usually considered a suspicious outcome of deliberation, while moderation is seen as a desirable one. This article takes issue with this view. Results from a Finnish deliberative experiment on immigration show that polarisers and moderators were not different in socioeconomic, cognitive or affective profiles. Moreover, both polarisation and moderation can entail deliberatively desired pathways: in the experiment, both polarisers and moderators learned during deliberation, levels of empathy were fairly high on both sides, and group pressures barely mattered. Finally, the low physical presence of immigrants in some discussion groups was associated with polarisation in the anti-immigrant direction, bolstering longstanding claims regarding the importance of presence for democratic politics.

Empathy in a Citizen Deliberation Experiment

Despite increased scholarly attention, there is still limited knowledge on how empathy works in democratic deliberation. This article examines the role of empathy in citizen deliberation with the help of a deliberative experiment on immigration. First, a random sample of citizens was surveyed regarding their opinions on immigration. Based on their opinions, they were then divided into a permissive or a non-permissive enclave, and randomly assigned into like-minded or mixed-opinion groups for deliberation. After deliberation, they were surveyed anew. The study analyzes: (a) empathy differences between permissive and non-permissive participants; (b) changes in outgroup empathy toward immigrants as a result of deliberation; and (c) differences in prosocial behavior (i.e., donating to charity). The results show that the permissive respondents had more empathy, especially toward immigrants, than the non-permissive respondents. Among participants, outgroup empathy increased during deliberation. Regarding prosocial behavior, the permissive participants donated more often to charity at the end of the experiment.