Maija Setälä

Deliberation and civic virtue: lessons from a citizen deliberation experiment

This paper focuses on the “side-effects” of democratic deliberation. More precisely, we analyse the potential of deliberative mini-publics to enhance political knowledge, efficacy, trust as well as political and other collective action. The empirical analysis is based on a deliberative experiment on nuclear power. This “citizen deliberation” was held in November 2006. Our initial finding is that the volunteers who were willing to take part in the experiment were more inclined to act politically than those who did not volunteer; they also possessed a higher level of internal political efficacy and had more trust in the parliament and politicians. When it comes to the impact of deliberation, participation in the experiment increased energy related knowledge but reduced slightly internal political efficacy. The sense of external political efficacy was not directly affected, but the participants‟ trust in parliament and politicians did rise. Interpersonal trust increased slightly as well as the participants‟ willingness to take a particular kind of collective action (electricity saving). However, deliberation did not to increase the participants‟ preparedness to act politically.

Referendums in Western Europe - A Wave of Direct Democracy?

The aim of this article is to analyze the explanations for the increased number of referendums in Western European states. Bogdanor has explained this by the unfreezing of political alignments and institutions. After classifying referendums in 18 Western European states, it will be observed that especially the number of referendums introduced by citizens has increased wherever they are constitutionally provided, that is, in Italy and in Switzerland. Referendums in these two countries contribute most of the overall increase in the number of referendums in Western Europe. Moreover, the number of referendums concerning European integration have increased, also in states that do not have the referendum as an integral part of their political system. When it comes to the unfreezing of institutions, it must be pointed out that after the 1970s there have been no constitutional reforms which would have significantly increased the use of referendums.

In Honest Officials We Trust Institutional Confidence in Europe

This article analyzes trust in public institutions. In both theoretical literature and empirical research, a link between social trust and institutional trust has been established. Our aim is to cast additional light on this relationship. In particular, we test whether institutional trust is dependent on citizens’ perceptions of how well institutions live up to normative expectations held by the public. The focus on such normative expectations, such as incorruptibility and honesty, is different from much of the previous empirical work which often predominantly focuses on policy outputs, such as economic performance, as a determinant of political support. Two main hypotheses derived from the theoretical discussion are tested in the analysis: Generalized social trust is positively associated with institutional trust (Hypothesis 1) and Institutional trust depends on people’s perceptions of the extent to which institutions live up to such normative expectations as incorruptibility and honesty (Hypothesis 2). Using data from the European Social Survey, the analyses are first carried out at a country level and later at an individual level. Even though the hypotheses are verified to a large extent, the most powerful determinant of institutional trust proves to be satisfaction with policy outputs. Institutional trust is associated with social trust as well as with the perception that public officials act honestly, and the pattern is similar regarding trust in both parliament and the legal system. Furthermore, the analysis suggests that the societies’ average levels of social trust and corruption do not affect the causal mechanisms of institutional trust at the individual level.

What drives the polarisation and moderation of opinions? Evidence from a Finnish citizen deliberation experiment on immigration

In the study of deliberation, a largely under-explored area is why some participants polarise their opinion after deliberation and why others moderate them. Opinion polarisation is usually considered a suspicious outcome of deliberation, while moderation is seen as a desirable one. This article takes issue with this view. Results from a Finnish deliberative experiment on immigration show that polarisers and moderators were not different in socioeconomic, cognitive or affective profiles. Moreover, both polarisation and moderation can entail deliberatively desired pathways: in the experiment, both polarisers and moderators learned during deliberation, levels of empathy were fairly high on both sides, and group pressures barely mattered. Finally, the low physical presence of immigrants in some discussion groups was associated with polarisation in the anti-immigrant direction, bolstering longstanding claims regarding the importance of presence for democratic politics.

Connecting deliberative mini‐publics to representative decision making

Despite some prominent critics, deliberative democrats tend to be optimistic about the potential of deliberative mini-publics. However, the problem with current practices is that mini-publics are typically used by officials on an ad hoc basis and that their policy impacts remain vague. Mini-publics seem especially hard to integrate into representative decision making. There are a number of reasons for this, especially prevailing ideas of representation and accountability as well as the contestatory character of representative politics. This article argues that deliberative mini-publics should be regarded as one possible way of improving the epistemic quality of representative decision making and explores different institutional designs through which deliberative mini-publics could be better integrated into representative institutions. The article considers arrangements which institutionalise the use of mini-publics; involve representatives in deliberations; motivate public interactions between mini-publics and representatives; and provide opportunities to ex post scrutiny or suspensive veto powers for mini-publics. The article analyses prospects and problems of these measures, and considers their applicability in different contexts of representative politics.

Empathy in a Citizen Deliberation Experiment

Despite increased scholarly attention, there is still limited knowledge on how empathy works in democratic deliberation. This article examines the role of empathy in citizen deliberation with the help of a deliberative experiment on immigration. First, a random sample of citizens was surveyed regarding their opinions on immigration. Based on their opinions, they were then divided into a permissive or a non-permissive enclave, and randomly assigned into like-minded or mixed-opinion groups for deliberation. After deliberation, they were surveyed anew. The study analyzes: (a) empathy differences between permissive and non-permissive participants; (b) changes in outgroup empathy toward immigrants as a result of deliberation; and (c) differences in prosocial behavior (i.e., donating to charity). The results show that the permissive respondents had more empathy, especially toward immigrants, than the non-permissive respondents. Among participants, outgroup empathy increased during deliberation. Regarding prosocial behavior, the permissive participants donated more often to charity at the end of the experiment.

Referendums and Theories of Democracy

The analysis of the referendum as a majoritarian instrument gives an important but very limited idea of the institution. Furthermore, as the discussion in Chapter 2 has shown, the idea of democracy as the fulfilment of the will of the majority is incoherent and even misleading. In this chapter, I will discuss different theories of democracy and summarise the arguments for and against referendums based upon these theories. The relationship between different theories of democracy will be examined by placing the theories in two ‘families’, as shown in Table 3.1.

Referendums and the Will of the Majority

In this chapter, three different issues related to majority rule are discussed. First, arguments for and against simple majority rule are discussed. Second, problems related to the definition of ‘the will of the majority’ in representative and in direct democracy are dealt with. Third, the meaning of the notion of ‘the will of the majority’ is questioned, as well as theories according to which democracy is about majority rule. The first four sections of this chapter mainly deal with choices between two alternatives, and from section 2.5 onwards, choices between more than two alternatives are considered.

Referendums in Three Countries

In this chapter, referendums in three West European democracies — Sweden, Denmark and Switzerland — will be examined. These three countries were selected because their referendums differ from each other with respect to the agenda-setting and initiation procedures. The aim of the case studies is to analyse how different types of referendums work as a part of the political system, and why and how the use of referendums have been promoted by different political actors.

Referendums and Representative Government

Gordon Smith (1976, 3) argues that the classification of referendums along the subject-matter of the issues may only be descriptive, not analytical. Smith puts forward a threefold division: decisions on constitutional matters and others concerning the basic nature of the state; the determination of important lines in public policy; and the resolution of moral issues which have social rather than political salience. Mockli (1994, 153) distinguishes between those referendums which are about policy issues and those which are more about votes of confidence in political leaders. Mockli argues that when the referendum has the character of a vote of confidence, there are two types of referendums, non-competitive and competitive referendums. Non-competitive referendums are only an acclamation of the leader’s power and there are no real alternatives to giving the support to the leader (for example, Germany in the 1930s). In competitive votes of confidence, support for the leader is really put to a test. As an example of this kind, Mockli cites the referendum in Belgium in 1950 on the return of King Leopold II.