Kala Krishna

Trade restrictions as facilitating practices

This paper deals with the effect of trade restrictions on competition in oligopolistic markets. Quantitative restrictions, such as VERs (Voluntary Export Restrictions) are shown to affect the extent to which foreign firms can compete in the domestic market, and hence to raise the equilibrium prices and profits of both domestic and foreign firms --when such restrictions are not too severe. This increase in prices and profits is shown to make it unlikely for VERs to raise National Welfare. In addition, I show that domestic output may fall due to the VERs. For these reasons, VERs do not seem to be desirable ways of restricting imports.Tariffs and Quotas are also shown to be non-equivalent in such oligopoly models. A comparison of the effects of tariffs and quotas shows that it would be in the interest of domesti cmanufacturers t lobby for VERs instead of import equivalent tariffs. In addition, it is shown that the foreign firm would prefer VERs to import equivalent tariffs, even if tariff revenues were refunded to them. Thus, the recent VERs on Japanese automobiles may well have been in the interests of both Japanese and American firms, and at the expense of the nation as a whole.

Understanding Rules of Origin

This paper surveys recent work on the economic effects, both theoretical and empirical, of Rules of Origin (RoO) in a Free Trade Area (FTA).

Tariffs versus quotas with endogenous quality

This paper analyzes some aspects of the effects of trade restrictions (such as tariffs, quotas and quality controls) and their desirability when the quantity of the imported good is endogenous, and the foreign producer is a monopolist. It uses a fairly general model based on the work of Spence and Sheshinski. A crucial determinant of the direction of these effects is shown to be the valuation of increments in quality by marginal consumers,relative to that of all consumers on average. A way of comparing infinitesimal equivalent policies is developed and used to compare import equivalent policies. For reasonable characterizations of demand - tariffs are shown to dominate quotas on the basis of their revenue effects alone, while quotas are shown to dominate tariffs on the basis of their quality effects alone. Also, quality controls are shown to dominate both tariffs and quotas on the basis of revenue effects alone for reasonable characterizations of demand. Some special cases are also analyzed, including the case where demand is modelled along the lines of Swan - and only services of the good produced matter to consumers.

Firm Behaviour and Market Access in a Free Trade Area with Rules of Origin

We develop a model to study the behavior of firms in a Free Trade Area with Rules of Origin and the consequences of this behavior on the market equilibrium and outcome. We show that firms will choose to specialize, and that an FTA with strict ROOs on the intermediate good raises imports and hence improves market access in the final good market reduces imports and hence harms market access in the intermediate good market. More restrictive ROOs on the final good first raise and then lower imports of the final good lower than raise imports of the intermediate good. Their turning point is common so that imports of the final good are maximized and imports of the intermediate good are minimized at a common level of restrictiveness of the rules of origin. We show that our model can be reinterpreted to show that more restrictive ROOs on the final good first improves and then harms the fortunes of labor, and to cast light on a particular policy to improve market access. Other problems with a similar structure could also be analyzed using our techniques; we expect similar results.

Protection and the Product Line: Monopoly and Product Quality

The product-line decision of a monopolist is analyzed and used to study the effect of specific and ad valorem taxes on the entire product line. While specific taxes (or quotas) raise average quality, ad valorem taxes may not. The welfare consequences of such policies when the monopolist is a home one and when he/she is a foreign one are discussed. With a home monopolist, both specific and ad valorem subsidies are welfare improving, while with a foreign monopolist their welfare properties depend on the distribution of consumers. Copyright 1990 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

How You Export Matters: Export Mode, Learning and Productivity in China

This paper shows that how firms export (directly or indirectly via intermediaries) matters. We develop and estimate a dynamic discrete choice model that allows learning-by-exporting on the cost and demand side as well as sunk/fixed costs to differ by export mode. We find that demand and productivity evolve more favorably under direct exporting, though the fixed/sunk costs of this option are higher. Our results suggest that had China not liberalized its direct trading rights when it joined the WTO, its exports and export participation would have been 30 and 37 percent lower respectively.

Trade, investment and growth: nexus, analysis and prognosis

This paper looks at the patterns of causation between income, export, import, and investment growth for 25 developing countries. Our approach differs from previous efforts in a number of ways. First, we examine each country individually in order to allow for complete heterogeneity and properly account for the stochastic trending properties of the data. Second, we apply novel model selection techniques which are based on in-sample goodness-of-fit criteria and ex-ante predictive ability criteria to identify the best model for each country. Finally, we propose a rather novel device based on simple contingency tables which allows us to assess whether our models are capable of accurately predicting turning points in GDP growth. We find that countries with high trade exposure fare poorly in this dimension and posit that the GDP growth in such countries is best modeled using an index of global business cycle conditions, in addition to the above variables. Overall, we find that in around two thirds of the countries examined, growth is best explained by exports and/or imports. Further, and in contrast to previous findings of bi-directional causality, around 70% of the countries exhibit uni-directional causality.

Regulations, regime switches and non-monotonicity when non-compliance is an option: an application to content protection and preference

Direct regulations have two regimes. In one, all firms behave in the same manner and in the other they behave differently. Past work assumed all firms were identical, thereby neglecting the non-monotonicity in comparative statics arising from the regime change.

Implementing results-oriented trade policies: The case of the US-Japanese auto parts dispute

Why would the US threaten punitive tariffs on luxury autos to implement a market share target in auto parts? We show that by making threats to a linked market, a market share may be implemented with fairly weak informa- tional and administrative requirements. Moreover, such policies can be both pro-competitive and advatageous to US firms.

Transferable Licenses versus Nontransferable Licenses: What Is the Difference?

This paper questions the presumption that transferable licenses are worth more and result in higher welfare. We show that the price of a transferable license may be lower than that of its nontransferable counterpart if the underlying quota is not very severe. However, transferability is preferable to nontransferability if consumer surplus and license revenue have equal weight in the welfare function. We also examine whether licenses will be monopolized by domestic producers with market power. The models have implications for several issues, including the design of pollution permits and how to maximize revenue from ticket sales. Copyright 1999 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.