Kareem Khalifa

Inaugurating Understanding or Repackaging Explanation

Recently, several authors have argued that scientific understanding should be a new topic of philosophical research. In this article, I argue that the three most developed accounts of understanding—Grimm’s, de Regt’s, and de Regt and Dieks’s—can be replaced by earlier ideas about scientific explanation without loss. Indeed, in some cases, such replacements have clear benefits.

The Role of Explanation in Understanding

Peter Lipton has argued that understanding can exist in the absence of explanation. We argue that this does not denigrate explanations importance to understanding. Specifically, we show that all of Liptons examples are consistent with the idea that explanation is the ideal of understanding, i.e. other modes of understanding ought to be assessed by how well they replicate the understanding provided by a good and correct explanation. We defend this idea by showing that for all of Liptons examples of non-explanatory understanding of why p, there exists a correct and reasonably good explanation that would provide greater understanding of p. 1 Liptons Framework 2 Clarifying Liptons Framework 3 Explanatory Idealism   3.1 Misunderstanding without explanation   3.2 How to interpret Liptons examples 4 Examples of Modal Understanding 5 Critical Information and the Galileo Example 6 Unification via Tacit Analogy   6.1 Explanatory unification   6.2 Unification and explanatory idealism 7 Tacit Understanding of Causes   7.1 Semantic knowledge   7.2 Tacit explanations 8 Conclusion 1 Liptons Framework 2 Clarifying Liptons Framework 3 Explanatory Idealism   3.1 Misunderstanding without explanation   3.2 How to interpret Liptons examples   3.1 Misunderstanding without explanation   3.2 How to interpret Liptons examples 4 Examples of Modal Understanding 5 Critical Information and the Galileo Example 6 Unification via Tacit Analogy   6.1 Explanatory unification   6.2 Unification and explanatory idealism   6.1 Explanatory unification   6.2 Unification and explanatory idealism 7 Tacit Understanding of Causes   7.1 Semantic knowledge   7.2 Tacit explanations   7.1 Semantic knowledge   7.2 Tacit explanations 8 Conclusion

Is understanding explanatory or objectual

Jonathan Kvanvig has argued that “objectual” understanding, i.e. the understanding we have of a large body of information, cannot be reduced to explanatory concepts. In this paper, I show that Kvanvig fails to establish this point, and then propose a framework for reducing objectual understanding to explanatory understanding.

Social Constructivism and the Aims of Science

In this essay, I provide normative guidelines for developing a philosophically interesting and plausible version of social constructivism as a philosophy of science, wherein science aims for social‐epistemic values rather than for truth or empirical adequacy. This view is more plausible than the more radical constructivist claim that scientific facts are constructed. It is also more interesting than the modest constructivist claim that representations of such facts emerge in social contexts, as it provides a genuine rival to the scientific axiologies of scientific realists and constructive empiricists. I further contrast my view with positions holding that the aims of science are context dependent, that the unit of normative analysis is the scientific community, and that the aims of science are non‐epistemic social values.

Default Privilege and Bad Lots: Underconsideration and Explanatory Inference

The underconsideration argument against inference to the best explanation and scientific realism holds that scientists are not warranted in inferring that the best theory is true, because scientists only ever conceive of a small handful of theories at one time, and as a result, they may not have considered a true theory. However, antirealists have not developed a detailed alternative account of why explanatory inference nevertheless appears so central to scientific practice. In this paper, I provide new defences against some recent objections to the underconsideration argument, while also developing an account of explanatory inference that both survives these criticisms and does not entail realism.

Erotetic Contextualism, Data-Generating Procedures, and Sociological Explanations of Social Mobility

Critics of the erotetic model of explanation question its ability to discriminate significant from spurious explanations. One response to these criticisms has been to impose contextual restrictions on a case-by-case basis. In this article, the author argues that these approaches have overestimated the role of interests at the expense of other contextual aspects characteristic of social-scientific explanation. For this reason, he shows how procedures of measuring occupational status and social mobility affected different aspects of one explanation that Peter Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan offered in their sociological classic, The American Occupational Structure. He uses the findings from this case study to meet objections to the erotetic model.

General theories of explanation: buyer beware

We argue that there is no general theory of explanation that spans the sciences, mathematics, and ethics, etc. More specifically, there is no good reason to believe that substantive and domain-invariant constraints on explanatory information exist. Using Nickel (Noûs 44(2):305–328, 2010) as an exemplar of the contrary, generalist position, we first show that Nickel’s arguments rest on several ambiguities, and then show that even when these ambiguities are charitably corrected, Nickel’s defense of general theories of explanation is inadequate along several different dimensions. Specifically, we argue that Nickel’s argument has three fatal flaws. First, he has not provided any compelling illustrations of domain-invariant constraints on explanation. Second, in order to fend off the most vehement skeptics of domain-invariant theories of explanation, Nickel must beg all of the important questions. Third, Nickel’s examples of explanations from different domains with common explanatory structure rely on incorrect formulations of the explanations under consideration, circular justifications, and/or a mischaracterization of the position Nickel intends to critique. Given that the best and most elaborate defense of the generalist position fails in so many ways, we conclude that the standard practice in philosophy (and in philosophy of science in particular), which is to develop theories of explanation that are tailored to specific domains, still is justified. For those who want to buy into a more ambitious project: beware of the costs!

Contrastive Explanations as Social Accounts

Explanatory contrastivists hold that we often explain phenomena of the form p rather than q. In this paper, I present a new, social‐epistemological model of contrastive explanation—accountabilism. Specifically, my view is inspired by social‐scientific research that treats explanations fundamentally as accounts; that is, communicative actions that restore ones social status when charged with questionable behaviour. After developing this model, I show how accountabilism provides a more comprehensive model of contrastive explanation than the causal models of contrastive explanation that are currently en vogue.

What are stylized facts

Economists use the term ‘stylized fact’ in many contexts, though the meaning of this phrase and the motivation for using such a concept is unclear. In this paper, we provide a philosophical analysis of stylized facts, which aims to be methodologically interesting and useful. While our framework applies to all principled uses of stylized facts, we illustrate its core features by applying it to Nicholas Kaldors initial and exemplary use of stylized facts in growth economics.

Counterfactuals and Explanatory Pluralism

Recent literature on non-causal explanation raises the question as to whether explanatory monism, the thesis that all explanations submit to the same analysis, is true. The leading monist proposal holds that all explanations support change-relating counterfactuals. We provide several objections to this monist position. 1. Introduction2. Change-Relating Monisms Three Problems3. Dependency and Monism: Unhappy Together4. Another Challenge: Counterfactual Incidentalism4.1. High-grade necessity4.2. Unity in diversity5. Conclusion Introduction Change-Relating Monisms Three Problems Dependency and Monism: Unhappy Together Another Challenge: Counterfactual Incidentalism High-grade necessity Unity in diversity Conclusion