Karen K. Nelson

Shareholder Wealth Effects of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995

This paper investigates the reaction ofstock prices to enactment of the Private Securities LitigationReform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). Based on a sample of 489 high-technologyfirms, we find that the PSLRA was wealth-increasing, on average,and that the market reaction is more positive for firms at greatestrisk of being sued in a securities class action. However, wealso show that the PSLRA was less beneficial for firms likelyto be the subject of a meritorious lawsuit. Collectively, ourevidence implies that shareholders generally benefit from restrictionson private securities litigation, although these benefits aremitigated when other mechanisms for curbing fraudulent activityare inadequate.

Are Individual Investors Influenced by the Optimism and Credibility of Stock Spam Recommendations?: INVESTO REACTION TO STOCK SPAM

This study examines attention�?driven investment decisions using a sample of firms essentially unknown to investors prior to becoming the target of a stock spam campaign. We show that the market reaction to spam varies predictably with the content of the spam message. Spam date returns and volume are significantly higher for stocks targeted by spam emails containing optimistic target price projections bundled with ostensibly credible information quoted from a previously issued company press release. There is also some evidence that disclaimers in spam messages reduce, but do not eliminate, the market response. Attention effects also contribute to spammers’ selection of stocks to target and to spam�?related enforcement actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission.