Karolina M. Lempert

Emotion and Decision Making: Multiple Modulatory Neural Circuits

Although the prevalent view of emotion and decision making is derived from the notion that there are dual systems of emotion and reason, a modulatory relationship more accurately reflects the current research in affective neuroscience and neuroeconomics. Studies show two potential mechanisms for affects modulation of the computation of subjective value and decisions. Incidental affective states may carry over to the assessment of subjective value and the decision, and emotional reactions to the choice may be incorporated into the value calculation. In addition, this modulatory relationship is reciprocal: Changing emotion can change choices. This research suggests that the neural mechanisms mediating the relation between affect and choice vary depending on which affective component is engaged and which decision variables are assessed. We suggest that a detailed and nuanced understanding of emotion and decision making requires characterizing the multiple modulatory neural circuits underlying the different means by which emotion and affect can influence choices.

Delay discounting and future-directed thinking in anhedonic individuals

Anhedonia (lack of reactivity to pleasurable stimuli) and a negatively skewed view of the future are important components of depression that could affect economic decisions in depressed individuals. Delay discounting paradigms might be useful for probing putative affective and cognitive underpinnings of such decisions. As a first step to evaluate whether difficulties experiencing pleasure might affect delay discounting, 36 undergraduate students with varying levels of anhedonia performed a delay discounting task in which they made choices between a small immediate and larger future monetary reward. Increasing levels of anhedonia (Snaith-Hamilton Pleasure Scale) were negatively associated with delay discounting rate, indicating that anhedonic individuals tended to choose the larger, albeit delayed reward. These correlations remained after controlling for variables previously linked to delay discounting (working memory capacity and impulsivity) and pessimistic future-directed thinking. The current findings provide preliminary evidence indicating that anhedonic individuals make less myopic decisions about their future, possibly due to their decreased responsiveness to immediate rewards.

Individual differences in delay discounting under acute stress: the role of trait perceived stress.

Delay discounting refers to the reduction of the value of a future reward as the delay to that reward increases. The rate at which individuals discount future rewards varies as a function of both individual and contextual differences, and high delay discounting rates have been linked with problematic behaviors, including drug abuse and gambling. The current study investigated the effects of acute anticipatory stress on delay discounting, while considering two important factors: individual perceptions of stress and whether the stressful situation is future-focused or present-focused. Half of the participants experienced acute stress by anticipating giving a videotaped speech. This stress was either future-oriented (speech about future job) or present-oriented (speech about physical appearance). They then performed a delay discounting task, in which they chose between smaller, immediate rewards, and larger, delayed rewards. Their scores on the Perceived Stress Scale were also collected. The way in which one appraises stressful situations interacts with acute stress to influence choices; under stressful conditions, delay discounting rate was highest in individuals with low trait perceived stress and lowest for individuals with high trait perceived stress. This result might be related to individual variation in reward responsiveness under stress. Furthermore, the time orientation of the task interacted with its stressfulness to affect the individual’s propensity to choose immediate rewards. These findings add to our understanding of the intermediary factors between stress and decision-making.

The Malleability of Intertemporal Choice

Intertemporal choices are ubiquitous: people often have to choose between outcomes realized at different times. Although it is generally believed that people have stable tendencies toward being impulsive or patient, an emerging body of evidence indicates that intertemporal choice is malleable and can be profoundly influenced by context. How the choice is framed, or the state of the decision-maker at the time of choice, can induce a shift in preference. Framing effects are underpinned by allocation of attention to choice attributes, reference dependence, and time construal. Incidental affective states and prospection also influence intertemporal choice. We advocate that intertemporal choice models account for these context effects, and encourage the use of this knowledge to nudge people toward making more advantageous choices.

Modulation of Saccade Vigor during Value-Based Decision Making

During value-based decision-making, individuals consider the various options and select the one that provides the maximum subjective value. Although the brain integrates abstract information to compute and compare these values, the only behavioral outcome is often the decision itself. However, if the options are visual stimuli, during deliberation the brain moves the eyes from one stimulus to the other. Previous work suggests that saccade vigor, i.e., peak velocity as a function of amplitude, is greater if reward is associated with the visual stimulus. This raises the possibility that vigor during the free viewing of options may be influenced by the valuation of each option. Here, humans chose between a small, immediate monetary reward and a larger but delayed reward. As the deliberation began, vigor was similar for the saccades made to the two options but diverged 0.5 s before decision time, becoming greater for the preferred option. This difference in vigor increased as a function of the difference in the subjective values that the participant assigned to the delayed and immediate options. After the decision was made, participants continued to gaze at the options, but with reduced vigor, making it possible to infer timing of the decision from the sudden drop in vigor. Therefore, the subjective value that the brain assigned to a stimulus during decision-making affected the motor system via the vigor with which the eyes moved toward that stimulus. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT We find that, as individuals deliberate between two rewarding options and arrive at a decision, the vigor with which they make saccades to each option reflects a real-time evaluation of that option. With deliberation, saccade vigor diverges between the two options, becoming greater for the option that the individual will eventually choose. The results suggest a shared element between the network that assigns value to a stimulus during the process of decision-making and the network that controls vigor of movements toward that stimulus.

Relating Pupil Dilation and Metacognitive Confidence during Auditory Decision-Making

The sources of evidence contributing to metacognitive assessments of confidence in decision-making remain unclear. Previous research has shown that pupil dilation is related to the signaling of uncertainty in a variety of decision tasks. Here we ask whether pupil dilation is also related to metacognitive estimates of confidence. Specifically, we measure the relationship between pupil dilation and confidence during an auditory decision task using a general linear model approach to take into account delays in the pupillary response. We found that pupil dilation responses track the inverse of confidence before but not after a decision is made, even when controlling for stimulus difficulty. In support of an additional post-decisional contribution to the accuracy of confidence judgments, we found that participants with better metacognitive ability – that is, more accurate appraisal of their own decisions – showed a tighter relationship between post-decisional pupil dilation and confidence. Together our findings show that a physiological index of uncertainty, pupil dilation, predicts both confidence and metacognitive accuracy for auditory decisions.

Value and probability coding in a feedback-based learning task utilizing food rewards

For the consequences of our actions to guide behavior, the brain must represent different types of outcome-related information. For example, an outcome can be construed as negative because an expected reward was not delivered or because an outcome of low value was delivered. Thus behavioral consequences can differ in terms of the information they provide about outcome probability and value. We investigated the role of the striatum in processing probability-based and value-based negative feedback by training participants to associate cues with food rewards and then employing a selective satiety procedure to devalue one food outcome. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we examined brain activity related to receipt of expected rewards, receipt of devalued outcomes, omission of expected rewards, omission of devalued outcomes, and expected omissions of an outcome. Nucleus accumbens activation was greater for rewarding outcomes than devalued outcomes, but activity in this region did not correlate with the probability of reward receipt. Activation of the right caudate and putamen, however, was largest in response to rewarding outcomes relative to expected omissions of reward. The dorsal striatum (caudate and putamen) at the time of feedback also showed a parametric increase correlating with the trialwise probability of reward receipt. Our results suggest that the ventral striatum is sensitive to the motivational relevance, or subjective value, of the outcome, while the dorsal striatum codes for a more complex signal that incorporates reward probability. Value and probability information may be integrated in the dorsal striatum, to facilitate action planning and allocation of effort.

Emotional arousal and discount rate in intertemporal choice are reference dependent.

Many decisions involve weighing immediate gratification against future consequences. In such intertemporal choices, people often choose smaller, immediate rewards over larger delayed rewards. It has been proposed that emotional responses to immediate rewards lead us to choose them at our long-term expense. Here we utilize an objective measure of emotional arousal-pupil dilation-to examine the role of emotion in these decisions. We show that emotional arousal responses, as well as choices, in intertemporal choice tasks are reference-dependent and reflect the decision-makers recent history of offers. Arousal increases when less predictable rewards are better than expected, whether those rewards are immediate or delayed. Furthermore, when immediate rewards are less predictable than delayed rewards, participants tend to be patient. When delayed rewards are less predictable, immediate rewards are preferred. Our findings suggest that we can encourage people to be more patient by changing the context in which intertemporal choices are made.

Temporal discounting across three psychiatric disorders: Anorexia nervosa, obsessive compulsive disorder, and social anxiety disorder

Temporal discounting refers to the tendency for rewards to lose value as the expected delay to receipt increases. Individuals with anorexia nervosa (AN) have been found to show reduced temporal discounting rates, indicating a greater preference for delayed rewards compared to healthy peers. Obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD) and social anxiety disorder (SAD) commonly co‐occur with AN, and anxiety has been related to development and prognosis of AN. We examined whether reduced temporal discounting is present across these potentially related disorders, and explored the relationship between temporal discounting and anxiety transdiagnostically.

The value of being wrong: Intermittent feedback delivery alters the striatal response to negative feedback

Whereas positive feedback is both rewarding and informative, negative feedback can be construed as either punishing (because it is indicative of poor performance) or informative (because it may lead to goal attainment). In this neuroimaging experiment, we highlighted the informational value of negative feedback by intermixing trials with and without feedback. When performance feedback is expected, positive feedback triggers an increase in striatal activity, whereas negative feedback elicits a decrease in striatal activity. We predicted that, in contrast, when feedback receipt is unpredictable, the striatal response to negative feedback would increase. Participants performed a paired-associate learning task during fMRI scanning. In one condition (“blocked feedback”), the receipt of feedback was predictable—participants knew whether or not they would receive feedback for their responses. In another condition (“mixed feedback”), the receipt of feedback was unpredictable—on a random 50% of trials, participants received feedback, and they otherwise received no feedback. Negative feedback in the mixed feedback condition elicited more striatal activity than negative feedback in the blocked feedback condition. In contrast, feedback omission evoked more striatal activity when feedback delivery was expected, compared to when it was unpredictable. This pattern emerged from an increase in caudate activity in response to negative feedback in the mixed feedback condition and a decrease in ventral striatal activity in response to no feedback in this condition. These results suggest that, by emphasizing the informational value of negative feedback, an unpredictable feedback context alters the striatal response to negative feedback and to the omission of feedback.