Karsten Olsen

Optimally interacting minds.

Two Heads Are Better Than One When two people peer into the distance and try to figure out if a faint number is a three or an eight, classical signal detection theory states that the joint decision can only be as good as that of the person with higher visual acuity. Bahrami et al. (p. 1081; see the Perspective by Ernst) propose that a discussion not only of what each person perceives but also of the degree of confidence in those assignments can improve the overall sensitivity of the decision. Using a traditional contrast-detection task, they showed that, when the individuals did not differ too much in their powers of visual discrimination, collective decision-making significantly improved sensitivity. The model offered here formalizes debates held since the Enlightenment about whether collective thinking can outperform that of elite individuals. Sharing choices and confidence in those choices can be an empowering experience. In everyday life, many people believe that two heads are better than one. Our ability to solve problems together appears to be fundamental to the current dominance and future survival of the human species. But are two heads really better than one? We addressed this question in the context of a collective low-level perceptual decision-making task. For two observers of nearly equal visual sensitivity, two heads were definitely better than one, provided they were given the opportunity to communicate freely, even in the absence of any feedback about decision outcomes. But for observers with very different visual sensitivities, two heads were actually worse than the better one. These seemingly discrepant patterns of group behavior can be explained by a model in which two heads are Bayes optimal under the assumption that individuals accurately communicate their level of confidence on every trial.

Coming to Terms Quantifying the Benefits of Linguistic Coordination

Sharing a public language facilitates particularly efficient forms of joint perception and action by giving interlocutors refined tools for directing attention and aligning conceptual models and action. We hypothesized that interlocutors who flexibly align their linguistic practices and converge on a shared language will improve their cooperative performance on joint tasks. To test this prediction, we employed a novel experimental design, in which pairs of participants cooperated linguistically to solve a perceptual task. We found that dyad members generally showed a high propensity to adapt to each other’s linguistic practices. However, although general linguistic alignment did not have a positive effect on performance, the alignment of particular task-relevant vocabularies strongly correlated with collective performance. In other words, the more dyad members selectively aligned linguistic tools fit for the task, the better they performed. Our work thus uncovers the interplay between social dynamics and sensitivity to task affordances in successful cooperation.

What failure in collective decision-making tells us about metacognition

Condorcet (1785) proposed that a majority vote drawn from individual, independent and fallible (but not totally uninformed) opinions provides near-perfect accuracy if the number of voters is adequately large. Research in social psychology has since then repeatedly demonstrated that collectives can and do fail more often than expected by Condorcet. Since human collective decisions often follow from exchange of opinions, these failures provide an exquisite opportunity to understand human communication of metacognitive confidence. This question can be addressed by recasting collective decision-making as an information-integration problem similar to multisensory (cross-modal) perception. Previous research in systems neuroscience shows that one brain can integrate information from multiple senses nearly optimally. Inverting the question, we ask: under what conditions can two brains integrate information about one sensory modality optimally? We review recent work that has taken this approach and report discoveries about the quantitative limits of collective perceptual decision-making, and the role of the mode of communication and feedback in collective decision-making. We propose that shared metacognitive confidence conveys the strength of an individuals opinion and its reliability inseparably. We further suggest that a functional role of shared metacognition is to provide substitute signals in situations where outcome is necessary for learning but unavailable or impossible to establish.

Does interaction matter? Testing whether a confidence heuristic can replace interaction in collective decision-making

Highlights • We tested whether a confidence heuristic could replace interaction in a collective perceptual decision-making task.• For individuals of nearly equal reliability, the confidence heuristic is just as accurate as interaction.• For individuals with different reliabilities, the confidence heuristic is less accurate than interaction.• Interacting individuals use the credibility of each other’s confidence estimates to guide their joint decisions.• Interacting individuals face a problem of how to map ‘internal’ variables onto ‘external’ (shareable) variables.

Together, Slowly but Surely: The Role of Social Interaction and Feedback on the Build-Up of Benefit in Collective Decision-Making.

That objective reference is necessary for formation of reliable beliefs about the external world is almost axiomatic. However, Condorcet (1785) suggested that purely subjective information—if shared and combined via social interaction—is enough for accurate understanding of the external world. We asked if social interaction and objective reference contribute differently to the formation and build-up of collective perceptual beliefs. In three experiments, dyads made individual and collective perceptual decisions in a two-interval, forced-choice, visual search task. In Experiment 1, participants negotiated their collective decisions with each other verbally and received feedback about accuracy at the end of each trial. In Experiment 2, feedback was not given. In Experiment 3, communication was not allowed but feedback was provided. Social interaction (Experiments 1 and 2 vs. 3) resulted in a significant collective benefit in perceptual decisions. When feedback was not available a collective benefit was not initially obtained but emerged through practice to the extent that in the second half of the experiments, collective benefits obtained with (Experiment 1) and without (Experiment 2) feedback were robust and statistically indistinguishable. Taken together, this work demonstrates that social interaction was necessary for build-up of reliable collaborative benefit, whereas objective reference only accelerated the process but—given enough opportunity for practice—was not necessary for building up successful cooperation.

Equality bias impairs collective decision-making across cultures

Significance When making decisions together, we tend to give everyone an equal chance to voice their opinion. To make the best decisions, however, each opinion must be scaled according to its reliability. Using behavioral experiments and computational modelling, we tested (in Denmark, Iran, and China) the extent to which people follow this latter, normative strategy. We found that people show a strong equality bias: they weight each other’s opinion equally regardless of differences in their reliability, even when this strategy was at odds with explicit feedback or monetary incentives. We tend to think that everyone deserves an equal say in a debate. This seemingly innocuous assumption can be damaging when we make decisions together as part of a group. To make optimal decisions, group members should weight their differing opinions according to how competent they are relative to one another; whenever they differ in competence, an equal weighting is suboptimal. Here, we asked how people deal with individual differences in competence in the context of a collective perceptual decision-making task. We developed a metric for estimating how participants weight their partner’s opinion relative to their own and compared this weighting to an optimal benchmark. Replicated across three countries (Denmark, Iran, and China), we show that participants assigned nearly equal weights to each other’s opinions regardless of true differences in their competence—even when informed by explicit feedback about their competence gap or under monetary incentives to maximize collective accuracy. This equality bias, whereby people behave as if they are as good or as bad as their partner, is particularly costly for a group when a competence gap separates its members.