Kartik B. Athreya

Welfare implications of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999

Abstract In recent years personal bankruptcy has become an important issue to consumers, creditors, and legislators alike. Over 40 billion dollars of unsecured debt were discharged in 1998 by 1.44 million households. These losses have led legislators to propose a variety of changes in bankruptcy law, the most important and recent of which is the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 (BA99). I develop a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium model of personal bankruptcy to investigate the trade-off between the consumption smoothing role of bankruptcy and the interest rate and deadweight costs it imposes. I find that stringent means-tests would reduce filing rates only slightly, and would have only modest welfare consequences. On the other hand, the elimination of bankruptcy altogether is found to have substantial benefits. This result is robust to income shock persistence, and to stringency in the application of means-tests.

Unsecured debt with public insurance: From bad to worse ☆

In U.S. data, income interruptions, the receipt of public insurance, and the incidence of personal bankruptcy are all closely related. The central contribution of this paper is to evaluate both bankruptcy protection and public insurance in a unified setting where each program alters incentives in the other. Specifically, we explicitly allow for distortion created by the default option and public insurance to affect 1) risk-taking, 2) borrowing, and 3) search effort. Our analysis delivers two striking conclusions. First, we find that U.S. personal bankruptcy law is an important barrier to allowing the public insurance system to improve welfare. Second, contrary to popular belief, we find that increases in the generosity of public insurance will lead to more, not less, bankruptcy.

Fresh start or head start? Uniform bankruptcy exemptions and welfare

The 1990s witnessed a historically unprecedented number of personal bankruptcy filings. In response, congressional debate over bankruptcy law has recently led to several proposals aimed at making it more difficult to exempt wealth in bankruptcy. In this paper, I evaluate uniform exemption policy primarily within the context of the recent congressional proposal H.R. 975. I develop an incomplete markets model where secured and unsecured assets coexist and are treated differentially in a bankruptcy proceeding. I find that exemptions are associated positively with filing rates and the amount of equity held at the time of filing. Conversely, exemptions are strongly negatively associated with the availability of unsecured credit. The welfare consequences of exemptions, while small, are positive for high exemptions and negative for low ones. Steady state welfare is maximized under a full exemption, and is worth

Credit and Self-Employment

28.24 annually to the average household. The results are robust, and show that increases in bankruptcy exemptions beyond current state averages are largely a matter of indifference, and do not merit the heated debate they have generated.

Are harsh penalties for default really better

Limited personal liability for debts has long been justified as a tool to promote entrepreneurial risk taking by providing insurance to the borrower in the event of low returns. Nonetheless, such limits erode repayment incentives, and so may increase unsecured borrowing costs. Our paper is the first to evaluate the tradeoff between credit costs and insurance against failure. We build a life-cycle model with risky, and repeated, occupational choice in the presence of defaultable debt contracts. We find that limits to liability can encourage self-employment, and alter the timing, size, and financing of self-employment projects. We also find that the positive relationship between wealth and self-employment rates may not be evidence for credit constraints: We show that such a relationship is present even when limited liability is eliminated.

Does Redistribution Increase Output? The Centrality of Labor Supply

How might society ensure the allocation of credit to those who lack meaningful collateral? Two very different options that have each been pursued by a variety of societies through time and space are (i) relatively harsh penalties for default and, more recently, (ii) loan guarantee programs that allow borrowers to default subject to moderate consequences and use public funds to compensate lenders. The goal of this paper is to provide a quantitative statement about the relative desirability of these responses. Our findings are twofold. First, we show that under a wide array of circumstances, punishments harsh enough to ensure all debt is repaid improve welfare. With respect to loan guarantees, our findings suggest that such efforts are largely useless at best, and substantially harmful at worst. Generous loan guarantees virtually ensure substantially higher taxes — with transfers away from the non-defaulting poor to the defaulting middle-class — and greater deadweight loss from high equilibrium default rates. Taken as a whole, our findings suggest that current policy toward default is likely to be counterproductive, and that guarantees for consumption loans are not the answer.

Loan Guarantees for Consumer Credit Markets

The aftermath of the recent recession has seen numerous calls to use transfers to poorer households as a means to enhance aggregate activity. We show that the key to understanding the direction and size of such interventions lies in labor supply decisions. We study the aggregate impact of short-term redistributive economic policy in a standard incomplete-markets model. We characterize analytically conditions under which redistribution leads to an increase or decrease in effective hours worked, and hence, output. We then show that under the parameterization that matches the wealth distribution in the U.S. economy (Castaneda et al., 2003), wealth redistribution leads to a boom in consumption, but not in output.

The Persistence of Financial Distress

Loan guarantees are arguably the most widely used policy intervention in credit markets, especially for consumers. This may be natural, as they have several features that, a priori, suggest that they might be particularly effective in improving allocations. However, despite this, little is actually known about the size of their effects on prices, allocations, and welfare. ; In this paper, we provide a quantitative assessment of loan guarantees, in the context of unsecured consumption loans. Our work is novel as it studies loan guarantees in a rich dynamic model where credit allocation is allowed to be affected by both limited commitment frictions and private information. ; Our findings suggest that consumer loan guarantees may be a powerful tool to alter allocations that, if carefully arranged, can improve welfare, sometimes significantly. Specifically, our key findings are that (i) under both symmetric and asymmetric information, guaranteeing small consumer loans nontrivially alters allocations, and strikingly, yields welfare improvements even after a key form of uncertainty?ones human capital level?has been realized, (ii) larger guarantees change allocations very significantly, but lower welfare, sometimes for all household-types, and (iii) substantial further gains are available when guarantees are restricted to households hit by large expenditure shocks.

College or the Stock Market, or College and the Stock Market?

Using recently available proprietary panel data, we show that while many (35%) US consumers experience financial distress at some point in the life cycle, most of the events of financial distress are primarily concentrated in a much smaller proportion of consumers in persistent trouble. Roughly 10% of consumers are distressed for more than a quarter of the life cycle, and less than 10% of borrowers account for half of all distress events. These facts can be largely accounted for in a straightforward extension of a workhorse model of defaultable debt that accommodates a simple form of heterogeneity in time preference but not otherwise.

Stock Market Investment: The Role of Human Capital

In this note, we document facts about the relationship between stock market participation and a predominant form of human capital investment -- formal higher education. We examine, using the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), the relationship between stock market participation and college enrollment and completion, with attention to the presence or absence of student loan debt.