Katalin Evers

Indicative and Updated Estimates of the Collective Bargaining Premium in Germany

This study provides updated evidence on the union contract differential in Germany using establishment-wide wage data and two estimation strategies. It provides pairwise estimates of the union differential based on separate samples of collective bargaining leavers and joiners vis-a-vis the corresponding counterfactual groups. It is reported that average wages increase by 3 to 3.5 percent after entering into a collective agreement and decrease by 3 to 4 percent after abandoning a collective agreement. Excluding establishments that experience mass layoffs little influences these net findings, although such establishments record wage losses – statistically insignificant for joiners but up to 10 percent in the case of leavers, as compared with the counterfactuals. The backdrop to these new indicative estimates, which are properly conditioned on establishment size and industry affiliation, inter al., is one of wage stagnation and continuing union decline.

Is the Erosion Thesis Overblown? Alignment from Without in Germany

It is sometimes alleged that collective bargaining coverage in Germany is understated because uncovered firms “orient” themselves toward sectoral agreements. In fact, although orientation has grown as sectoral bargaining has declined, their joint frequency has fallen. Further, where orientation occurs at firms that leave a sectoral agreement, it provides only partial compensation. The small deficits involved, in conjunction with some indirect evidence on joiners, suggest some modest attenuation of the undoubted decline in collective bargaining.

Collective Bargaining and Innovation in Germany: A Case of Cooperative Industrial Relations?

At the level of theory, the effect of collective bargaining on innovation is contested. The large proponderance of the U.S. evidence clearly points to adverse effects, but other-country experience suggests that certain industrial-relations systems, or the wider regulatory apparatus, might even tip the balance in favor of unions. Our pooled cross- section and difference-in-differences estimates provide some weak evidence that German collective bargaining inhibits innovation. However, in conjunction with workplace representation, there is the suggestion that it might actually foster innovative activity.

Contract innovation in Germany : an economic evaluation of pacts for employment and competitiveness.

Pacts for employment and competitiveness are an integral component of the ongoing process of decentralization of collective bargaining in Germany, a phenomenon that has been hailed as key to that nations economic resurgence. Yet little is known about the effects of pacts on firm performance. The evidence largely pertains to employment and is decidedly mixed. This article investigates the association between pacts and six outcome indicators using a framework in which the controls comprise establishments that negotiated over pacts but failed to reach agreement on their implementation. An extensive set of robustness checks are run to test the sensitivity of the key findings of the model. There is no suggestion of pacts negatively impacting any of the selected measures of establishment performance. Rather, the evidence points to some positive short- and medium-run effects on firm average wages and possibly employment and innovation as well.