Kathleen Akins

Cognition and the brain : the philosophy and neuroscience movement

Part I. Date and Theory in Neuroscience: 1. Localization in the brain and other illusions Valerie Gray Hardcastle and C. Matthew Stewart 2. Neurophenomenology Evan Thompson, Antoine Lutz and Diego Cosmelli 3. Out of the mouth of autistics Victoria McGeer Part II. Neural Representation: 4. Moving beyond the metaphors Chris Eliasmith 5. Brain time and phenomenological time Rick Crush 6. The puzzle of temporal experience Sean Kelly Part III. Visuomotor Transformation: 7. Grasping and perceiving objects Pierre Jacob 8. Action-oriented representation Pete Mandik Part IV. Colour Vision: 9 Chimerical colours Paul Churchland 10. Opponent processing, linear models, and the verticality of colour perception Zoltan Jakob Part V. Consciousness: 11. A neurofunctional theory of consciousness Jesse Prinz 12. Making consciousness safe for neuroscience Andrew Brook.

Second-order mappings in grapheme–color synesthesia

Typically, the search for order in grapheme–color synesthesia has been conducted by looking at the frequency of certain letter–color associations. Here, we report stronger associations when second-order similarity mappings are examined—specifically, mappings between the synesthetic colors of letters and letter shape, frequency, and position in the alphabet. The analyses demonstrate that these relations are independent of one other. More strikingly, our analyses show that each of the letter–color mappings is restricted to one dimension of color, with letter shape and ordinality linked to hue, and letter frequency linked to luminance. These results imply that synesthetic associations are acquired as the alphabet is learned, with associations involving letter shape, ordinality, and frequency being made independently and idiosyncratically. Because these mappings of similarity structure between domains (letters and colors) are similar to those found in numerous other cognitive and perceptual domains, they imply that synesthetic associations operate on principles common to many aspects of human cognition.

Synesthesia and learning: a critical review and novel theory

Learning and synesthesia are profoundly interconnected. On the one hand, the development of synesthesia is clearly influenced by learning. Synesthetic inducers – the stimuli that evoke these unusual experiences – often involve the perception of complex properties learned in early childhood, e.g., letters, musical notes, numbers, months of the year, and even swimming strokes. Further, recent research has shown that the associations individual synesthetes make with these learned inducers are not arbitrary, but are strongly influenced by the structure of the learned domain. For instance, the synesthetic colors of letters are partially determined by letter frequency and the relative positions of letters in the alphabet. On the other hand, there is also a small, but growing, body of literature which shows that synesthesia can influence or be helpful in learning. For instance, synesthetes appear to be able to use their unusual experiences as mnemonic devices and can even exploit them while learning novel abstract categories. Here we review these two directions of influence and argue that they are interconnected. We propose that synesthesia arises, at least in part, because of the cognitive demands of learning in childhood, and that it is used to aid perception and understanding of a variety of learned categories. Our thesis is that the structural similarities between synesthetic triggering stimuli and synesthetic experiences are the remnants, the fossilized traces, of past learning challenges for which synsethesia was helpful.

Grapheme-color synaesthesia benefits rule-based Category learning

Researchers have long suspected that grapheme-color synaesthesia is useful, but research on its utility has so far focused primarily on episodic memory and perceptual discrimination. Here we ask whether it can be harnessed during rule-based Category learning. Participants learned through trial and error to classify grapheme pairs that were organized into categories on the basis of their associated synaesthetic colors. The performance of synaesthetes was similar to non-synaesthetes viewing graphemes that were physically colored in the same way. Specifically, synaesthetes learned to categorize stimuli effectively, they were able to transfer this learning to novel stimuli, and they falsely recognized grapheme-pair foils, all like non-synaesthetes viewing colored graphemes. These findings demonstrate that synaesthesia can be exploited when learning the kind of material taught in many classroom settings.

The prevalence of synaesthesia depends on early language learning

According to one theory, synaesthesia develops, or is preserved, because it helps children learn. If so, it should be more common among adults who faced greater childhood learning challenges. In the largest survey of synaesthesia to date, the incidence of synaesthesia was compared among native speakers of languages with transparent (easier) and opaque (more difficult) orthographies. Contrary to our prediction, native speakers of Czech (transparent) were more likely to be synaesthetes than native speakers of English (opaque). However, exploratory analyses suggested that this was because more Czechs learned non-native second languages, which was strongly associated with synaesthesia, consistent with the learning hypothesis. Furthermore, the incidence of synaesthesia among speakers of opaque languages was double that among speakers of transparent languages other than Czech, also consistent with the learning hypothesis. These findings contribute to an emerging understanding of synaesthetic development as a complex and lengthy process with multiple causal influences.

More than Mere Colouring: The Role of Spectral Information in Human Vision

A common view in both philosophy and the vision sciences is that, in human vision, wavelength information is primarily ‘for’ colouring: for seeing surfaces and various media as having colours. In this article we examine this assumption of ‘colour-for-colouring’. To motivate the need for an alternative theory, we begin with three major puzzles from neurophysiology, puzzles that are not explained by the standard theory. We then ask about the role of wavelength information in vision writ large. How might wavelength information be used by any monochromat or dichromat and, finally, by a trichromatic primate with object vision? We suggest that there is no single ‘advantage’ to trichromaticity but a multiplicity, only one of which is the ability to see surfaces and so on as having categorical colours. Instead, the human trichromatic retina exemplifies a scheme for a general encoding of wavelength information given the constraints imposed by high spatial resolution object vision. Chromatic vision, like its partner, luminance vision, is primarily for seeing. Viewed this way, the ‘puzzles’ presented at the outset make perfect sense. 1 Reframing the Problem   1.1 Introduction   1.2 Three puzzles    1.2.1 Why is trichromatic vision an anomaly in diurnal mammals?    1.2.2 Why does the colour system occupy such a large and central part in human vision?    1.2.3 Why are the blue cones so rare?   1.3 Recasting the question 2 The Costs and Benefits of Spectral Vision   2.1 Spectral information and object vision   2.2 Encoding the spectral dimension of light    2.2.1 ‘General’ versus ‘specific’ encoding    2.2.2 Spectral encoding and the monochromat    2.2.3 Spectral encoding and the dichromat    2.2.4 Spectral encoding and the human trichromat   2.3 Three puzzles revisited    2.3.1 Why is trichromatic vision an anomaly in diurnal mammals?    2.3.2 Why does the colour system occupy such a large and central part in human vision?    2.3.3 Why are the blue cones so rare 3 Conclusion 1 Reframing the Problem   1.1 Introduction   1.2 Three puzzles    1.2.1 Why is trichromatic vision an anomaly in diurnal mammals?    1.2.2 Why does the colour system occupy such a large and central part in human vision?    1.2.3 Why are the blue cones so rare?   1.3 Recasting the question   1.1 Introduction   1.2 Three puzzles    1.2.1 Why is trichromatic vision an anomaly in diurnal mammals?    1.2.2 Why does the colour system occupy such a large and central part in human vision?    1.2.3 Why are the blue cones so rare?    1.2.1 Why is trichromatic vision an anomaly in diurnal mammals?    1.2.2 Why does the colour system occupy such a large and central part in human vision?    1.2.3 Why are the blue cones so rare?   1.3 Recasting the question 2 The Costs and Benefits of Spectral Vision   2.1 Spectral information and object vision   2.2 Encoding the spectral dimension of light    2.2.1 ‘General’ versus ‘specific’ encoding    2.2.2 Spectral encoding and the monochromat    2.2.3 Spectral encoding and the dichromat    2.2.4 Spectral encoding and the human trichromat   2.3 Three puzzles revisited    2.3.1 Why is trichromatic vision an anomaly in diurnal mammals?    2.3.2 Why does the colour system occupy such a large and central part in human vision?    2.3.3 Why are the blue cones so rare   2.1 Spectral information and object vision   2.2 Encoding the spectral dimension of light    2.2.1 ‘General’ versus ‘specific’ encoding    2.2.2 Spectral encoding and the monochromat    2.2.3 Spectral encoding and the dichromat    2.2.4 Spectral encoding and the human trichromat    2.2.1 ‘General’ versus ‘specific’ encoding    2.2.2 Spectral encoding and the monochromat    2.2.3 Spectral encoding and the dichromat    2.2.4 Spectral encoding and the human trichromat   2.3 Three puzzles revisited    2.3.1 Why is trichromatic vision an anomaly in diurnal mammals?    2.3.2 Why does the colour system occupy such a large and central part in human vision?    2.3.3 Why are the blue cones so rare    2.3.1 Why is trichromatic vision an anomaly in diurnal mammals?    2.3.2 Why does the colour system occupy such a large and central part in human vision?    2.3.3 Why are the blue cones so rare 3 Conclusion

Cognition and the Brain: Contents

Part I. Date and Theory in Neuroscience: 1. Localization in the brain and other illusions Valerie Gray Hardcastle and C. Matthew Stewart 2. Neurophenomenology Evan Thompson, Antoine Lutz and Diego Cosmelli 3. Out of the mouth of autistics Victoria McGeer Part II. Neural Representation: 4. Moving beyond the metaphors Chris Eliasmith 5. Brain time and phenomenological time Rick Crush 6. The puzzle of temporal experience Sean Kelly Part III. Visuomotor Transformation: 7. Grasping and perceiving objects Pierre Jacob 8. Action-oriented representation Pete Mandik Part IV. Colour Vision: 9 Chimerical colours Paul Churchland 10. Opponent processing, linear models, and the verticality of colour perception Zoltan Jakob Part V. Consciousness: 11. A neurofunctional theory of consciousness Jesse Prinz 12. Making consciousness safe for neuroscience Andrew Brook.

Cognition and the Brain: CONSCIOUSNESS

Part I. Date and Theory in Neuroscience: 1. Localization in the brain and other illusions Valerie Gray Hardcastle and C. Matthew Stewart 2. Neurophenomenology Evan Thompson, Antoine Lutz and Diego Cosmelli 3. Out of the mouth of autistics Victoria McGeer Part II. Neural Representation: 4. Moving beyond the metaphors Chris Eliasmith 5. Brain time and phenomenological time Rick Crush 6. The puzzle of temporal experience Sean Kelly Part III. Visuomotor Transformation: 7. Grasping and perceiving objects Pierre Jacob 8. Action-oriented representation Pete Mandik Part IV. Colour Vision: 9 Chimerical colours Paul Churchland 10. Opponent processing, linear models, and the verticality of colour perception Zoltan Jakob Part V. Consciousness: 11. A neurofunctional theory of consciousness Jesse Prinz 12. Making consciousness safe for neuroscience Andrew Brook.

Cognition and the Brain: DATA AND THEORY IN NEUROSCIENCE

Part I. Date and Theory in Neuroscience: 1. Localization in the brain and other illusions Valerie Gray Hardcastle and C. Matthew Stewart 2. Neurophenomenology Evan Thompson, Antoine Lutz and Diego Cosmelli 3. Out of the mouth of autistics Victoria McGeer Part II. Neural Representation: 4. Moving beyond the metaphors Chris Eliasmith 5. Brain time and phenomenological time Rick Crush 6. The puzzle of temporal experience Sean Kelly Part III. Visuomotor Transformation: 7. Grasping and perceiving objects Pierre Jacob 8. Action-oriented representation Pete Mandik Part IV. Colour Vision: 9 Chimerical colours Paul Churchland 10. Opponent processing, linear models, and the verticality of colour perception Zoltan Jakob Part V. Consciousness: 11. A neurofunctional theory of consciousness Jesse Prinz 12. Making consciousness safe for neuroscience Andrew Brook.

Cognition and the Brain: Index

Part I. Date and Theory in Neuroscience: 1. Localization in the brain and other illusions Valerie Gray Hardcastle and C. Matthew Stewart 2. Neurophenomenology Evan Thompson, Antoine Lutz and Diego Cosmelli 3. Out of the mouth of autistics Victoria McGeer Part II. Neural Representation: 4. Moving beyond the metaphors Chris Eliasmith 5. Brain time and phenomenological time Rick Crush 6. The puzzle of temporal experience Sean Kelly Part III. Visuomotor Transformation: 7. Grasping and perceiving objects Pierre Jacob 8. Action-oriented representation Pete Mandik Part IV. Colour Vision: 9 Chimerical colours Paul Churchland 10. Opponent processing, linear models, and the verticality of colour perception Zoltan Jakob Part V. Consciousness: 11. A neurofunctional theory of consciousness Jesse Prinz 12. Making consciousness safe for neuroscience Andrew Brook.