Kathleen Bailey

North Korea: Enough carrots, time for the stick

The policy of appeasement toward North Korea, which has consistently violated its international treaty obligations, must stop. The United States should present Pyongyang with an ultimatum either to open up its nuclear facilities to special inspections or to face US. determination to inflict punishment with every means available short of war. By using its secret nuclear program for what amounts to extortion. North Korea is making a mockery of the nonproliferation regime, sending the message that a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) can violate the treaty with few or no repercussions.

Iraq's Asymmetric Threat to the United States and U.S. Allies

Iraq poses an extremely serious threat to the United States and to U.S. allies not only because of its continued possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), but also the increased likelihood that it will use such weapons in any future military conflict. This study examines Iraqi WMD capabilities as well as the Iraqi leaderships values and perceptions that will influence potential use of those weapons. Additionally, the possible impact of Iraqs WMD capabilities on U.S. behavior is addressed.

The Biological &Toxin Weapons Convention: Recapping Events of 2002

The Fifth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention met in November 2001 to consider whether to adopt a highly contentious Chairmans draft of a Protocol that would add an inspections regime to the treaty and establish a permanent international organization to oversee implementation. The United States had rejected the draft prior to the Conference and its opposition led to suspension of the 2001 meeting, which was reconvened in November 2002. This article describes the reasons for US rejection of the draft Protocol as well as what occurred at the November 2002 meetings.

Why the United States Should Unsign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Resume Nuclear Testing

Technologies exist that would make U.S. nuclear weapons safer against accidents and more secure against terrorist threats and unauthorized use. Yet these measures cannot be incorporated without nuclear testing. Nuclear testing would also enable us to determine whether our aging warheads are reliable. Testing is also necessary for designing new, modern warheads to meet emerging needs. The first step toward resumption of nuclear testing is to unsign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This treaty has already been rejected by the U.S. Senate for several reasons, including the facts that it is unverifiable and does little or nothing to promote nuclear nonproliferation.

The nuclear deal with North Korea: Is the glass half empty or half full?

North Koreas record on the nuclear question gives no reason to trust in its compliance with the October 1994 agreement with the United States. This article traces the development of the North Korean nuclear program and the negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United States, as well as Pyongyangs clandestine chemical‐biological weapons production and missile programs. In sum, North Korea poses a real military threat to East Asia, and its clear violations and flaunting of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty endanger the nonproliferation regime. If Pyongyang continues with its noncompliant behavior, the United States must bolster its nuclear and conventional deterrents in East Asia and apply pressure for a real termination of North Koreas nuclear program.

De-alerting of U.S. nuclear forces: a critical appraisal

Since the end of the Cold War, there have been pressures by disarmament advocates to move more quickly to draw down, toward zero, the number of nuclear weapons in U.S. and Russian arsenals. They criticize the process of negotiating arms control agreements as being too slow, and point out that treaty implementation is hampered by the necessity of ratification by the U.S. Senate and Russian Duma. One method of moving more rapidly toward nuclear abolition suggested by some analysts is de-alerting of nuclear-weapon delivery systems. De-alerting is defined as taking steps that increase significantly the time required to launch a given delivery vehicle armed with a nuclear warhead. Although there is little inclination by the U.S. Government to de-alert its nuclear forces at present, some academic literature and press stories continue to advocate such steps. This paper offers a critique of de-alerting proposals together with an assessment of the dangers of accidental, unauthorized, or unintended use of nuclear weapons. It concludes that de-alerting nuclear forces would be extremely de-stabilizing, principally because it would increase the value to an opponent of launching a first strike.

A proposal for a South Asian intermediate nuclear forces treaty

This article proposes that the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty be applied as a model for a missile‐ban treaty between India and Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan are developing and deploying missiles whose use could be devastating on the densely populated subcontinent. Moreover, missile limits are more amenable to verification than are agreements to reduce or eliminate warheads of mass destruction. Key problems for a South Asian INF treaty include the status of China, the mechanics of verification, and the potential for using space‐launch vehicles as offensive weapons. Above all, both India and Pakistan must perceive such a missile agreement as enhancing their national security.