Kathleen McCulloch

Similarity and inhibition in long-term memory: Evidence for a two-factor theory

Recalling a past experience often requires the suppression of related memories that compete with the retrieval target, causing memory impairment known as retrieval-induced forgetting. Two experiments examined how retrieval-induced forgetting varies with the similarity of the competitor and the target item (target-competitor similarity) and with the similarity between the competitors themselves (competitor-competitor similarity). According to the pattern-suppression model (M. C. Anderson & B. A. Spellman, 1995), high target-competitor similarity should reduce impairment, whereas high competitor-competitor similarity should increase it. Both predictions were supported: Encoding target-competitor similarities not only eliminated retrieval-induced forgetting but also reversed it, whereas encoding competitor-competitor similarities increased impairment. The differing effects of target-competitor and competitor-competitor similarity may resolve conflicting results concerning the effects of similarity on inhibition.

Strategic Automation of Emotion Regulation

As implementation intentions are a powerful self-regulation tool for thought and action (meta-analysis by P. M. Gollwitzer & P. Sheeran, 2006), the present studies were conducted to address their effectiveness in regulating emotional reactivity. Disgust- (Study 1) and fear- (Study 2) eliciting stimuli were viewed under 3 different self-regulation instructions: the goal intention to not get disgusted or frightened, respectively, this goal intention furnished with an implementation intention (i.e., an if-then plan), and a no-self-regulation control group. Only implementation-intention participants succeeded in reducing their disgust and fear reactions as compared to goal-intention and control participants. In Study 3, electrocortical correlates (using dense-array electroencephalography) revealed differential early visual activity in response to spider slides in ignore implementation-intention participants, as reflected in a smaller P1. Theoretical and applied implications of the present findings for emotion regulation via implementation intentions are discussed.

Implicit working memory.

Working Memory (WM) plays a crucial role in many high-level cognitive processes (e.g., reasoning, decision making, goal pursuit and cognitive control). The prevalent view holds that active components of WM are predominantly intentional and conscious. This conception is oftentimes expressed explicitly, but it is best reflected in the nature of major WM tasks: All of them are blatantly explicit. We developed two new WM paradigms that allow for an examination of the role of conscious awareness in WM. Results from five studies show that WM can operate unintentionally and outside of conscious awareness, thus suggesting that the current view should be expanded to include implicit WM.

The perceptual homunculus: the perception of the relative proportions of the human body

Given that observing ones body is ubiquitous in experience, it is natural to assume that people accurately perceive the relative sizes of their body parts. This assumption is mistaken. In a series of studies, we show that there are dramatic systematic distortions in the perception of bodily proportions, as assessed by visual estimation tasks, where participants were asked to compare the lengths of two body parts. These distortions are not evident when participants estimate the extent of a body part relative to a noncorporeal object or when asked to estimate noncorporal objects that are the same length as their body parts. Our results reveal a radical asymmetry in the perception of corporeal and noncorporeal relative size estimates. Our findings also suggest that people visually perceive the relative size of their body parts as a function of each parts relative tactile sensitivity and physical size.

Action Dominance: The Performance Effects of Multiple Action Demands and the Benefits of an Inaction Focus

Four experiments uncovered an action dominance error by which people’s natural focus on actions hinders appropriate responses to social and nonsocial stimuli. This surprising error comprises higher rates of both omission (misses) and commission (false alarms) when, in responding to action and inaction demands, people have higher numbers of action targets. The action dominance error was verified over four experiments using an analog that required responses to words and to target individuals. Experiments 1 and 2 tested our hypotheses and distinguished the action error effect from the effects of practicing action or inaction responses. Experiment 3 linked the error to the greater cognitive load imposed by the higher proportion of action over inaction targets. Furthermore, Experiment 4 demonstrated that (a) there is a default tendency to pay more attention to action (vs. inaction) targets and (b) shifting focus to inaction targets reduces the action dominance error.