Rachel Smallman

Schizophrenia involves impairment in the activation of intentions by counterfactual thinking

Schizophrenia has been associated with impairment of counterfactual thinking (Hooker et al., 2000), defined as cognitions about alternatives to past outcomes (i.e., what might have been). Counterfactual thinking in healthy individuals is associated with effective problem-solving, behavioral regulation, and performance improvement (Camille et al., 2004; Ursu & Carter, 2005; Roese, 1997). Specifically, counterfactual thinking (e.g., “If only I had studied harder”) contributes to behavior regulation via activation of intentions (e.g., “Next exam I will study harder”), which in turn elicit corresponding behavior (e.g., studying; see Figure 1). All three causal links in Figure 1 have been verified among healthy participants (Smallman & Roese, 2006). In schizophrenia patients, link 1 is impaired (Hooker et al., 2000), whereas link 3 is intact (Brandstatter et al., 2001). The present research examined whether impairment of link 2 (from counterfactuals to intentions) is associated with schizophrenia. Figure 1 We used a sequential priming paradigm to assess the automatic activation of intentions by counterfactual thinking (the same paradigm previously demonstrated link 2 among college students, Smallman & Roese, 2006). In this task, the dependent measure is response latency to make intention judgments. If a preceding counterfactual judgment activates information that facilitates completion of a relevant intention judgment, response latencies will be reduced. Fifteen participants (6 women) who met DSM-IV criteria for schizophrenia and 13 healthy control participants (6 women) completed 45 judgment trials on computer. The prime judgment task was structured around a question about negative everyday life events (e.g., “spilled food on shirt”). After a 2 s delay, a statement appeared (e.g., “eaten more carefully”). The manipulation was whether the stem that randomly preceded this statement focused on a counterfactual (“should have”) vs. control (a word-counting judgment) vs. baseline (no judgment); participants pressed a key to indicate agreement with the statement. The target task was an intention judgment, semantically related to the action contained in the preceding prime judgment. Trial order was randomized across participants. Data were log-transformed to correct for skewed distribution; untransformed means are presented for clarity. We isolated trials in which in which participants responded “yes” both to the prime task as well as intention prime task (46% of the trials), thus holding constant the element of motor repetition. Among healthy participants, counterfactual judgments facilitated intention RTs relative to control judgments (Ms = 1126 ms vs. 1431 ms), t(12) = 3.31, p = .006, d = .92 (baseline RT = 1756 ms); this effect size was similar to that observed among college students in Smallman and Roese (2006). However, schizophrenia patients did not show this facilitation effect: intention RTs did not vary as a function of counterfactual versus control judgment primes (Ms = 1499 ms vs. 1774 ms), t(14) = 1.06, p = .31, d = .27 (baseline RT = 2042 ms). Thus, the cognitive link between counterfactual thinking and formation of behavioral intentions appears to be impaired in schizophrenia. According to the process model depicted in Figure 1, the link between impaired counterfactual thinking and social dysfunction among schizophrenia sufferers might be due to breakdowns in any of three causal links. Our data indicate that link 2 is impaired: counterfactuals do not activate intentions in schizophrenia patients. If this link had been intact, it would suggest the efficacy of a rehabilitation strategy designed to normalize counterfactual thinking, with regular practice improving social functioning. Instead, our results suggest that such a therapy would be ineffective. Even if counterfactual thinking could be activated in schizophrenia patients, the pathway leading from counterfactual thinking to intention formation is blocked. If counterfactual thoughts do not influence intentions, performance improvement is unlikely to result.

Preference Invites Categorization

Past research indicates that positive affect (relative to neutral or negative affect) reduces processing and makes categorization less differentiated. The present experiment demonstrated that preference, even though affectively pleasant, invites finer categorization. Expertise is already known to influence categorization; hence, the present experiment used an associative conditioning task (novel symbols paired with positively or negatively valenced photographs) to create new preferences, thereby demonstrating that preference influences categorization independently of preexisting expertise. These findings cast new light on established theory of affect and cognitive processing and suggest new implications for consumer preference and goal pursuit.

Free Will, Counterfactual Reflection, and the Meaningfulness of Life Events

Research has found that counterfactual reflection, the act of mentally undoing past events, imbues major life experiences with meaning. The current studies examined whether individual differences in free will beliefs moderate this relationship. Participants described a significant event in their lives, were randomly assigned to counterfactual or factual reflection about the event, and completed measures of meaning and free will. Two studies found that counterfactual reflection enhanced the meaningfulness of life events for people with high belief in free will but not for people with low belief in free will. These studies suggest that beliefs in free will are an important factor in meaning-making processes.

Beliefs in moral luck: When and why blame hinges on luck

Belief in moral luck is represented in judgements that offenders should be held accountable for intent to cause harm as well as whether or not harm occurred. Scores on a measure of moral luck beliefs predicted judgements of offenders who varied in intent and the outcomes of their actions, although judgements overall were not consistent with abstract beliefs in moral luck. Prompting participants to consider alternative outcomes, particularly worse outcomes, reduced moral luck beliefs. Findings suggest that some people believe that offenders should be punished based on the outcome of their actions. Furthermore, prompting counterfactuals decreased judgements consistent with moral luck beliefs. The results have implications for theories of moral judgement as well as legal decision making.

Motivated perception of probabilistic information

Desirability bias is the tendency to judge that, all else being equal, positive outcomes are more likely to occur than negative outcomes. The provision of probabilistic information about the likelihood that events will occur is typically viewed as a way to influence judgments by grounding them in objective information. Yet probabilistic information may be perceived differently when people are motivated to arrive at a particular conclusion, enabling the desirability bias. The present investigation explored how probabilistic information is used and perceived when people are motivated. In a game of chance, desirability bias was present for judgments about the likelihood of outcomes occurring to the self but not an unaffiliated other despite equal probabilities (Study 1). Probabilities were perceived as having more variance, both subjectively and in terms of probability spread (Studies 2, 3a, and 5), when participants were motivated to arrive at a particular conclusion (for the self or another person on the same team). Further, desirability bias was greater when probabilities were perceived as having more variance, either due to wide versus narrow probability ranges or subjective uncertainty (Studies 3b and 4). Together, these findings demonstrate that people perceive probabilistic information as having more variance when they are motivated to arrive at a conclusion and that this greater perceived variability contributes to bias in judgment.

The Role of Counterfactual Thinking on Attitudes Toward ADHD Medication Use

ABSTRACT Objective: Despite serious health risks, attitudes toward Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) medication use in college students remain favorable. Given the robust link between attitudes and behavior (e.g., the Theory of Planned Behavior), it is important to understand how these attitudes are developed and maintained. The current study examined the role of counterfactual, or “what if’” thinking as a mechanism for the development of attitudes toward ADHD medications. Method: All participants (n = 190) were asked to read either a positive or negative scenario regarding ADHD medication misuse and rate their attitudes toward the behavior; half of the participants were also asked to generate counterfactuals prior to rating their attitudes. Results: Results suggest that scenario valence influenced the direction of counterfactual statements. Further, through the generation of upward counterfactuals, the negative scenario elicited more positive attitudes toward ADHD medication misuse. Conclusions: Based on limited prior research, it is suggested that upward counterfactuals may allow individuals to explain away the misuse of ADHD medication and avoid negative emotions such as guilt and shame related to current or prior ADHD medication misuse. In sum, additional research is needed to confirm preliminary findings that suggest counterfactual thinking could be a precursor to ADHD medication misuse.

Power and Categorization Power Increases the Number and Abstractness of Categories

Across three experiments, participants formed a larger number of categories when in a state of high, compared to low, psychological power. Moreover, in contrast to prior categorization research, which suggests forming more categories is tantamount to reduced breadth of categorization, high-power participants also formed a larger number of superordinate (i.e., more abstract) categories than low-power participants. The present findings enhance the understanding of power in relation to categorization and simultaneously highlight the distinction between number and abstraction as fundamental aspects of categorization.

Serious Gaming for Design and Systems Engineering Research

In this paper, we investigate the use of serious gaming as a research tool for design and systems engineering research. Design and systems engineering research produces theories and methods aimed at bettering the engineering process and improving the quality of end products. However, the engineering process is largely human-driven and thus the way in which theories and methods are implemented and used depends greatly on the human element. Serious gaming provides a fully controllable environment in which to test and validate theories and methods against human behavior. To evaluate the viability of serious gaming as a research tool, we construct a game to study the sunk cost effect in the context of a manned Mars mission, and compare game results with results from a survey centered on the scenario. We observe a difference in results between the game and survey; those in the game fall victim to the sunk cost effect despite treatment whereas those in the survey do not fall for the sunk cost effect in a control treatment. We hypothesize that this may be caused by a preference for continued gameplay as opposed to the objectives in the narrative. Therefore, we conclude that gaming, at least in our case, induces behavior that may not be representative of real-world engineer behavior and must be mitigated.Copyright

Linking Normative and Descriptive Research with Serious Gaming

Abstract The human element in the design of large, complex systems continues to be a limiting factor for projects to stay on budget and realize their potential. Current systems engineering research produces methods validated against the human element in different ways, but they, on their own, do not necessarily contribute to a fundamental understanding of systems engineering. This paper proposes a research framework that couples normative and descriptive approaches for studying human behavior to search for regularities in engineering decision making and stress claims and methods against scenario perturbations. The framework is built upon serious gaming as a mechanism for experimentation. Serious gaming has a long history in the domain of education and training but has been sparsely used as a research tool; therefore, its effectiveness in this capacity is not readily known. To test the viability of the proposed framework and the quality of data it produces, a game is designed to assess the sunk cost effect in engineers and results are compared to those found in the literature. Preliminary gameplay results from an undergraduate subject pool correlate to survey results found in the literature lending to the credibility of gaming as a mechanism of experimentation.

Motivational Differences in Seeking Out Evaluative Categorization Information

Previous research shows that people draw finer evaluative distinctions when rating liked versus disliked objects (e.g., wanting a 5-point scale to evaluate liked cuisines and a 3-point scale to rate disliked cuisines). Known as the preference-categorization effect, this pattern may exist not only in how individuals form evaluative distinctions but also in how individuals seek out evaluative information. The current research presents three experiments that examine motivational differences in evaluative information seeking (rating scales and attributes). Experiment 1 found that freedom of choice (the ability to avoid undesirable stimuli) and sensitivity to punishment (as measured by the Behavior Inhibition System/Behavioral Approach System [BIS/BAS] scale) influenced preferences for desirable and undesirable evaluative information in a health-related decision. Experiment 2 examined choice optimization, finding that maximizers prefer finer evaluative information for both liked and disliked options in a consumer task. Experiment 3 found that this pattern generalizes to another type of evaluative categorization, attributes.