Katrin Auel

The politics of adaptation: The Europeanisation of national parliamentary systems

Parliamentary systems can be characterised by particular patterns of interaction between the executive, the majority parties and the opposition parties in parliament. The basic argument outlined in this paper is that in order to understand the impact of European integration on national parliamentary democracies we have to find out how these patterns are adjusted. The article starts by identifying the basic social mechanisms that drive the interaction of the mentioned groups of actors and by describing how they are modified in European multi-level governance. In this context, members of national parliaments are faced with a dilemma: Successful scrutiny can undermine the effectiveness of European governance whereas a permissive parliament causes a legitimacy deficit. Through case studies on the Europeanisation of the parliamentary systems in the UK, in Denmark and in Germany, the authors show how members of parliaments cope with this challenge and which strategies they apply to avoid the dilemma.

Debating the State of the Union? Comparing Parliamentary Debates on EU Issues in Finland, France, Germany and the United Kingdom

Over the last 20 years, the role of national parliaments in European Union (EU) affairs has gained considerable academic attention. Much of the literature has focused on the parliamentary control function and shown that national parliaments are no longer docile lambs willing to be led to the European slaughtering block, but exercise tighter scrutiny of their governments in EU affairs. What tends to be overlooked, however, is that the parliamentary communication function is at least as important in EU politics. Yet while the literature has discussed reasons why members of parliament or political parties may prefer to ‘depoliticise’ European issues by conducting their EU business away from the prying eye of the public, so far we have little empirical data on how parliaments communicate EU politics. This study will therefore provide a comparative analysis of parliamentary debates on EU issues in the UK, Finland, Germany and France.

To Scrutinise or Not to Scrutinise? Explaining Variation in EU-Related Activities in National Parliaments

There is an on-going debate in the literature as to whether national parliaments can and do play an active role in EU policy-making. The main reason for persistent disagreement is the lack of comparative empirical data on parliamentary behaviour in EU affairs. The article aims to contribute to this debate by presenting the first comparative quantitative data on European affairs activities of national parliaments and by explaining the empirical variation. The development of a unique dataset including all 27 national parliaments allows a series of explanatory variables to be tested for the level of parliamentary activity at both the committee and the plenary levels. The analysis shows that institutional strength in EU affairs plays an important role. Overall, however, EU activities can be better explained with a mix of institutional capacities and motivational incentives. The specific combinations vary for different types of activities.

Introduction: The Europeanisation of Parliamentary Democracy

The intensified debate on the democratic legitimacy of the European Union, which started with the ratification debacle of the Maastricht Treaty and has since become ever more prominent, has pushed national parliaments to the centre-stage of public as well as academic interest. At the same time we are witnessing a fast growing interest in the question of how the European integration process impacts on the domestic policies, politics and polities of the Member States. Although numerous studies focused on the question of how, to what degree, in what direction, at what pace and at what point of time Europe matters, the Europeanisation of one particular structural determinant of the Member States, namely the system of parliamentary democracy, is still under-researched.1 A number of excellent empirical studies2 inform us about the institutional reforms that were implemented in national parliaments as a reaction to European integration, but we still know very little about both the mechanisms and dynamics of this adaptation and about the impact on the workings of parliamentary systems. So far, the debates on Europeanisation on the one hand, and on the role of national parliaments in the EU on the other hand, have very rarely been linked.3 Herbert Dörings statement that – with regard to contemporary parliaments – ‘there are still only a few truly cross-national accounts documenting the empirical pattern’4 is all the more true for the Europeanisation of parliamentary democracy. This collection of essays aims to contribute to the ongoing debate on the parliamentary dimension of the European Union. The main objective is to bring together different strands of discussion stemming from research on the impact of European Integration on national parliamentary systems. It therefore comprises theoretical concepts as well as empirical research on the Europeanisation of different elements of parliamentary systems of European states. In this section we seek to clarify how the term Europeanisation is conceptualised throughout the volume and how it will be applied to parliamentary systems.

National Parliaments and the Eurozone Crisis: Taking Ownership in Difficult Times?

The eurozone crisis suggests a significant reinforcement of executive dominance in EU policy-making. Opaque emergency decisions taken at European summits as well as treaties established outside of the EU legal framework facilitate the side-lining of democratically elected chambers. This development entails the risk of a new wave of de-parliamentarisation in EU policy-making. An effective scrutiny of crisis management by national parliaments is, however, indispensable for taking national ownership of the reforms in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). This paper investigates national parliaments’ involvement in the development of instruments to combat the crisis. Based on a quantitative dataset of crisis-related parliamentary activities in 2010–2012, the article observes a very uneven engagement in the scrutiny of crisis management. Institutional prerogatives in EU affairs as well as macro-economic factors can partly explain the observed variation. Surprisingly, however, crisis-related parliamentary activity is not a reaction to Eurosceptic attitudes either in parliament or among the public.

Introduction: Connecting with the Electorate? Parliamentary Communication in EU Affairs

National parliaments have often been described as latecomers to European integration, but there is little doubt that they have developed the institutional means to become more involved over the last few years – and especially since the Lisbon Treaty. Accordingly, the main focus of the literature has been on this institutional adaptation and thus on the relationship between the parliament and the government in European Union (EU) affairs. Other parliamentary functions, and in particular those that relate to their citizens such as the communication function, by contrast, have been largely neglected. Yet democracy depends on a viable public debate on policy choices and political alternatives to allow citizens to make informed political (electoral) choices and to exercise democratic control. This collection therefore investigates whether, and how, individual members of parliament, political parties, or legislatures as institutions ‘link’ with their electorates in EU politics. This introduction discusses why engaging with the public in EU affairs is – or at least should be – an important aspect of parliamentary work, introduces parliamentary means of communication and assesses parliamentary incentives and disincentives ‘to go public’ in EU politics.

The Europeanisation of the German Bundestag: Institutional change and informal adaptation

At first glance, the Europeanisation of the German Bundestag seems quite straightforward: in reaction to the process of European integration the Bundestag acquired a set of comparatively strong participation and scrutiny rights in EU politics. It therefore seems rather astonishing that German members of parliament make only very little use of these rights. Different explanations have been put forward in the literature, such as the complicated decision-making system of the EU and the governments gate-keeper position within it, institutional flaws of the German scrutiny system as well as the overall consensus on European integration and the low electoral salience of EU issues. The paper contributes to this discussion in two respects: On the one hand, it offers an additional explanation for the infrequent use of formal instruments. The main argument is that the formal instruments of scrutiny in EU affairs are incompatible with both the overall logic of a parliamentary system as well as the challenges of policy-making in the EU multilevel system. On the other hand, the paper argues that the exclusive focus on the use of formal parliamentary scrutiny rights leads us to overlook more informal means of parliamentary influence and therefore to underestimate the involvement of German parliamentarians in EU affairs. Thus, in order to fully assess processes of parliamentary Europeanisation, we need to take forms of informal or strategic Europeanisation into account.

Still No Exit from the Joint Decision Trap: The German Federal Reform(s)

One of the central projects on the Grand Coalitions agenda 2005 was a reform of the German federal system. And while an earlier Reform Commission had failed, the Grand Coalition was indeed more successful: the first stage of the reform came into force in September 2006. Does that mean Germany will finally escape the ‘joint decision trap’ and the well-known Reformstau? The paper will argue that the outcome is a result of the same strategies to avoid deadlock that have been observed in the past. Instead of opening the ‘joint decision trap’, Bund and Länder were at best able to adjust it slightly. And a first outlook on the ongoing second stage of the reform suggests that a very similar outcome can be expected.

Fighting Back? And, If So, How? Measuring Parliamentary Strength and Activity in EU Affairs

In recent decades, national parliaments — formerly the ‘poor losers’ of European integration — have learned ‘to fight back’ and obtained greater participation rights in domestic European policymaking.1 Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, national parliaments even have an explicit role in the European Union’s (EU) legislative process, in particular as the new guardians of the subsidiarity principle. However, despite these institutional changes — and a growing body of academic literature on the subject — the debate over whether national parliaments can and do play an effective role in EU policymaking continues. On the one hand, their expanded participation rights have provided national parliaments with greater institutional opportunities to control their governments in EU affairs. In addition, they can try to exert at least some, albeit mainly collective, influence at the EU level. On the other hand, the literature has consistently highlighted the challenges faced by national parliaments in making use of their participation rights, such as the highly technical character and complexity of EU issues, the lack of transparency in EU negotiations or the lack of electoral and party strategic incentives to get involved.

Between Reformstau and Länder Strangulation? German Co-operative Federalism Re-considered

Two features of German federalism have been the subject of much criticism in recent years, the veto power of the Bundesrat and the centralization of legislative competences. The former is made responsible for the (in)famous German ‘Reformstau’, the latter for severely limiting autonomous policy making at the Länder level. The paper argues that both complaints about the federal system are exaggerated. Neither does the bicameral structure completely block reforms, nor are the Länder immobilized by the corset of centralized legislation. Instead it will be argued that public opinion and electoral dynamics constrain political actors and provide them with few incentives to pursue a radical reform course or to embrace policy competition at the Länder level.