Tapio Raunio

Holding governments accountable in European affairs: Explaining cross-national variation*

What factors explain cross-national variation in the level of parliamentary scrutiny of governments in European affairs? Using the fuzzy-set method developed by Charles C. Ragin, this article investigates the impact of five variables – the power of parliament independent of integration, public opinion on membership, party positions on integration, frequency of minority governments and political culture – identified in previous literature as relevant in explaining variation in the level of control. The strength of the parliament emerges as the only necessary cause in producing tighter scrutiny, while the combination of a powerful legislature and a more Euro-sceptical public opinion is sufficient in bringing about higher levels of control over the government. The final section summarises the main findings and concludes with a critical discussion on both the data and the validity of cross-national explanations, particularly in light of the recent enlargement of the Union. *An earlier version of this article was presented at the Conference Europeanisation of Parliamentary Democracy in Hagen, 8–10 May 2003.

National Parliaments and European Integration: What We Know and Agenda for Future Research

The role of national legislatures in European integration first received serious attention in the mid-1990s in connection with debates on the EUs democratic deficit. Since then, both academics and politicians have entered a lively debate on how best to involve national parliaments in EU affairs. The purpose of this article is to examine critically the state of research on the role of national parliaments in European integration and to use that existing knowledge to suggest avenues for further research. The main argument is that through focusing almost exclusively on scrutiny of European affairs, the literature has failed to acknowledge the multiple constraints that impact on legislatures. There is a demand for more theory-driven analyses of actual behaviour that extend beyond describing formal procedures and organisational choices. Future research should also pay more attention to the strategies of political parties and to the incentives of individual MPs to become involved in European affairs.

The Committee System: Powers, Appointments and Report Allocation

The committee system: powers, appointments and report allocation Skutecznie funkcjonujące komisje są dla Parlamentu Europejskiego niezbedne zarowno ze wzgledu na ich wplyw legislacyjny, jak i na kontrolowanie organow wykonawczych. Wraz ze wzrostem wplywow Parlamentu wzrosla rola komisji w ksztaltowaniu ustawodawstwa Unii Europejskiej (UE) i kontrolowaniu pracy Komisji Europejskiej.

Cautious Voters -Supportive Parties

This article analyses party-voter congruence on European integration matters in the EU member states. Drawing on existing research, we put forward eight hypotheses which are tested with data from the EES2004 survey. We show that parties are closer to their voters on the left/right dimension than on the EU dimension. Parties are also more supportive of European integration than are their voters. Party system characteristics (number of parties, ideological range) did not affect opinion congruence. The responsiveness analysis at the party level shows that government parties were less responsive than opposition parties; party size was related to responsiveness, with opinion congruence higher in smaller parties; and responsiveness was lower among centrist parties. Voters are also better represented on the EU dimension by their parties in the new than in the older EU member states. This difference may result from the EU occupying a more central place on the political agendas of the new member states.

Codecision since Amsterdam: a laboratory for institutional innovation and change

Codecision has dramatically increased the level of interaction and interdependence between the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. Under Maastricht the two institutions were able to agree on a set of shared norms and rules to manage the interdependence arising from the conciliation procedure. The expansion and simplification of codecision under Amsterdam since May 1999 has started to generate significant strains on the further development of those norms and rules. In particular, it has provoked tension between the competing claims of efficiency and democracy in the framing of legislation. The way in which this is resolved will contribute substantially to the future institutional architecture of the EU.

Losing Independence or Finally Gaining Recognition?: Contacts Between MEPs and National Parties

Based on a survey of national parties represented in the European Parliament carried out in spring 1998, this article presents the results of the first comparative study on the relations between MEPs and their national parties. Due to the increased powers of the European Union, parties have an incentive to control their MEPs and to benefit from their expertise on European matters. The findings show that MEPs are still rather independent of their parties. Scrutiny of MEP behaviour is based on consultation rather than on voting instructions. MEPs have gained more political weight and their policy influence is particularly large in small parties.

Fifty Years on: Research on the European Parliament*

This introductory article reviews our current state of knowledge about the European Parliament (EP). First, we review the major accomplishments of previous studies of the EP, highlighting four principal areas of work: general studies of the chamber, work on EP elections, studies of the internal politics of the Parliament, and research on the EPs institutional relations with the Council and Commission. Second, we consider what has yet to be learnt: what are the major unanswered questions about the EP, and how do the articles in this special issue respond to this agenda?

Why European Integration Increases Leadership Autonomy within Political Parties

Party scholars have been arguing, at least since the 1960s, that party leaders are becoming more autonomous of their parties in respect of decision-making. This article analyses the impact of European integration on the balance of power in the national parties of EU member states. A theoretical model explaining why European integration increases the autonomy of party leadership is presented together with preliminary evidence. The main argument is that European integration consolidates centralization of decision-making through strengthening the agenda-setting powers of party leaders. Centralization and leadership autonomy should be greater in countries with weak parliamentary scrutiny over EU affairs. The level of control by national legislatures is in turn explained by party cohesion on integration. The concluding section presents questions for future research and discusses some of the main challenges national parties face in adapting to European integration.

Partisan responses to Europe: Comparing Finnish and Swedish political parties

This article analyzes party responses to European integration in Finland and Sweden. We argue that such responses are shaped by seven explanatory factors: basic ideology, public opinion, factionalism, leadership influence, party competition, transnational links, and the development of integration. Each factor can lead to a positive or a negative evaluation of the European Union. In the empirical analysis, the sample includes all parties represented in the respective national parliaments, and the research material consists of party documents, parliamentary votes, statements by leading party figures, public opinion surveys, direct observation and interviews. Party competition and leadership influence are the strongest factors in the Finnish case, while public opinion and factionalism are the strongest factors in Sweden. Issue avoidance combined with the secondary importance of the EU in party politics explain why parties have been relatively successful in containing internal factionalism and discord, especially in Finland.

The Gatekeepers of European Integration? The Functions of National Parliaments in the EU Political System

Abstract Parliaments have several functions that can be divided into two categories: functions related to governance and functions that focus on linking with citizens. Analysis of European Convention and COSAC documents shows that when defining a role for the national parliaments in the EU’s political system, domestic MPs emphasize the function of government oversight, with functions relating to citizens receiving little attention. This choice of emphasis is arguably explained by the incentives of political parties and the institutional set‐up of European political architecture. National parliaments are increasingly seen as gatekeepers between national and EU politics, with the ‘early warning system’ included in the Lisbon Treaty reinforcing this perception of domestic MPs acting as gatekeepers of European integration. In terms of transparency, the main difference between domestic and EU politics concerns the role of the plenary, with European matters only seldom debated by the whole chamber.