Katrin Uba

The Russian Radical Right Movement and Immigration Policy: Do They Just Make Noise or Have an Impact as Well?

This article examines how, if at all, the mobilisation of the Russian Movement Against Illegal Immigration has had an impact on changes in Russian policies. Little is known about the outcomes of radical right movements in general or the Russian radical right in particular. The Movement Against Illegal Immigration has arguably played a role in shaping negative public attitudes towards immigration. On the other hand, the Russian government has not adopted any clear nationalistic anti-immigration policy frame. We show that disruptive events of Movement Against Illegal Immigrations mobilisation have caused reactions in terms of the elite discourse on immigration and restrictive immigration legislation.

Critical Men? Perceptions of Crisis Without Crisis in Sweden

Although the Great Recession of 2008 did not hit Sweden much, very many people perceived that the Swedish economy was suffering a crisis. This chapter investigates this phenomenon and demonstrates that men perceived the presence of a very serious economic crisis significantly more than women; those with lower income and own experience of crisis perceived the presence of crisis more than others; and supporters of the radical right party (Sweden Democrats) perceived the severe crisis more often than supporters of other parties. While our analysis does not allow making a causal argument, it is suggested that the perceived seriousness of crisis might be more related to the distrust toward authorities than the real experience of economic downturn.

Movement adaptability in dissimilar settings: The far right in Greece and Russia

ABSTRACT This article discusses how two similar far right movements in different political systems – Golden Dawn (GD) in democratic Greece and the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) in authoritarian Russia – adapted their strategies and claims to better fit existing political contexts and how this affected the institutionalization of these movements. GD, a neo-Nazi movement formed in the 1980s, entered mainstream politics during the deep financial crisis of 2010, and since 2012 has consolidated its position as the third major opposition party. DPNI was founded in 2002; it had close connections with governing politicians and mobilized large xenophobic protests until it was banned in 2011. It then entered into a coalition with other far right groups under the banner of Russkie, cooperated with the liberals in the massive anti-fraud protests during 2011–2013, and tried to register as the Party of Nationalists, but failed and has now disbanded. While GD de-radicalized its anti-immigration claims to fit with the dominant discourse and exploited the financial crisis for its grass-root mobilization, DPNI changed its strategies and collaborated with its ideological opponents only after it had become very popular and faced with severe state repression. Our comparative analysis shows that far right movements adapt to their diverse environments in a manner similar to that of other anti-establishment movements regardless of context – whether within a democratic or non-democratic regime.