Kaz Miyagiwa

Uncertainty, spillovers, and cooperative R&D

Abstract This paper extends the literature on cooperative R&D in an oligopoly with spillovers. The model has three new features. It introduces uncertainty, focuses on spillover of innovation instead of effort spillover, and offers a new definition of the research joint venture (RJV). The RJV is an arrangement to coordinate R&D efforts and also to share the innovation. Firms form an RJV only if the innovation raises flow industry profit, but independently of the speed of spillovers and the degree of uncertainty. The model is robust when we allow for licensing, the single lab, endogenous spillovers and R&D effort spillovers.

Multinationals, Tax Holidays, and Technology Transfer

Host country governments often grant investment incentives to foreign firms locating in their territories. We show that such preferential treatment of foreign firms can facilitate transfer of foreign technology, induce entry by the local firm, and increase host country welfare. However, this pro-competitive result occurs when preferential treatment is granted for a limited time; i.e., it takes the form of tax holidays, and is absent under permanent tax concessions.

International transfer of localized technology and factor income in the Ricardo-Viner trade model

The implications of transferring a superior technology, localized a t foreign factor proportions, are examined within the context of the Ricardo-Viner model. The author shows that such a technology transfer decreases the wage rate and labor demand in the recipient country, a s well as affecting significantly other properties of the Ricardo-Viner model. For instance, the neoclassical ambiguity concerning the effec t on the real wage of a change in the relative commodity price disappears, and an increase i n a factor endowment need no longer depress the price of the expanding factor.

SAVING DOLPHINS: BOYCOTTS, TRADE SANCTIONS, AND UNOBSERVABLE TECHNOLOGY*

Consumers boycott some goods because they do not approve the ways they are manufactured. I examine the efficacy of boycotts and the role of trade policy in influencing the foreign exporters technology choice. Even when its technology choice is unobservable, boycott threats can prompt the foreign firm to adopt the technology consumers prefer. Import policy can augment this effect, but when boycotts can have a substantial impact on demand, a use of ad valorem tariffs yields the unintended result. Specific tariffs and quotas are free of this defect, but specific tariffs are more effective than quotas in addressing consumers concern.

First-to-Invent Versus First-to-File: International Patent Law Harmonization and Innovation

The U.S. has been under pressure to abandon the unique first-to-invent feature of its patent law for awarding patents. The opposition to reform however argues that switch to a first-to-file rule, the international norm, will undermine innovation. We evaluate this argument in a dynamic stochastic model of a patent race. The result generally supports the oppositions argument.