Kazuhito Ogawa

An Experimental Investigation of a Third Person Enforcement in a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

We experimentally study the effect of a third-person enforcement on a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game played by two persons, with whom the third person plays repeated prisoner’s dilemma games. We find that when the third person can observe these two persons’ play, the possibility of the third person’s future punishment causes them to cooperate in the one-shot game.

Inequality aversion, social discount, and time discount rates

Purpose - We conduct a hypothetical dictator game with social distance and time delays using conjoint analysis. Design / methodology / approach - Responses from 1,347 Japanese adults are collected through an online survey, and their responses are analyzed using a random parameter logit model. Findings - Social preference for the present income of a stranger equals social preference for the income of an acquaintance 140 days later, of a close friend 224 days later, and of a family member 255 days later. Originality / value- We simultaneously estimate social preference parameters including the inequality aversion rate, the social discount rate, and the time discount rate Headings - Inequality aversion, social discount, and time discount Keywords - dictator game, inequality aversion, social discounting, time discounting Paper type – Research paper

Reinforcement Learning on Monopolistic Intermediary Games: Subject Experiments and Simulation

Decision making processes of consumers and firms have emerged as a prominent field in multi-agent systems. This approach relaxes the strict assumptions in traditional economic theory. However, little attention has been paid to the validation of the simulation itself, because of the difficulty of acquiring field data which is compared with simulated markets.

Experimental Multimarket Contact Inhibits Cooperation

We experimentally examine the effect of multimarket contact utilizing 2 × 2 Prisoners Dilemma games and a strict discount factor control. We find that cooperation rates when participants play both games simultaneously are lower than or equal to when they play each game separately. This finding suggests that experimental multimarket contact may inhibit cooperation.

Investigating Donating Behavior Using Hypothetical Dictator Game Experiments

We conduct dictator game experiments to investigate donating behavior by simultaneously examining the time delay when the donee receives the donation and the individual characteristics of the donor. We show that donations decrease as the time delay rises and that gender, education level, neuroticism, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and utilitarianism affect donations independent of the time delay.

Reconsidering Whether Women are Less Selfish than Men: Group Gender Composition Matters in Dictator Games

This paper investigates gender differences in donating behavior in double-anonymous dictator game experiments. To do so, we developed a new treatment where researchers can connect the gender of a dictator to her/his donation amount despite both female and male dictators being gathered in a room (the mixed-sex treatment). The gender priming effect is induced by comparing female dictators in the mixed-sex treatment with those in the single-sex treatment, where only female dictators are collected. Our findings are that: (1) Women donated more in the single-sex treatment than in the mixed-sex treatment, although the donation rates of men are not significantly different between the two treatments. (2)Women donated more than men in the single-sex treatment, although the donation rates between men and women are not significantly different in the mixed-sex treatment. These results indicate that women are less selfish than men when there are only women in a room.

Cognitive Ability and Human Behavior in Experimental Ultimatum Games

Recent research has shed light on the effect of cognitive ability on economic decision-making. By measuring cognitive ability using Raven’s progressive matrix test, we investigate this effect on human behavior in two types of experimental ultimatum games. We obtain two significant results. First, the higher the cognitive ability, the larger the amount a sender offers when the offer is equal to or smaller than the half split. Second, when responders choose whether to accept the offer or not with the strategy method, the higher the cognitive ability, the smaller the offer they accept. This study not only finds new factors that affect human behavior in experimental ultimatum games, but also provides more evidence that cognitive ability explains economic behavior.

Contagion of Self‐Interested Behavior: Evidence from Group Dictator Game Experiments

Abstract We examine how group decision-making affects other-regarding behavior in experimental dictator games. In particular, we assess whether the effects of iterated games differ for group and individual decision-making and whether the difference in decision-making style (individual or group) changes the perception of social identity. We make two findings on group decision-making. First, group decisions become more selfish when repeating the game after changing group members. Second, a dictator group donates more to a recipient group at the same university than to a recipient group at a different university. These findings are not true for individual decision-making.

A Choreographer Leads the Pareto Efficient Equilibrium in the Three-Person Network Externality Games: Experimental Evidence

We examine the condition that brings the most efficient outcome under the three-person network externality game. examine three conditions: (1) a role 1 player decides one of the payoff structures (one is the stag-hunt game and the other has the same payoff regardless of player’s choice for role 1 player and the dominant strategy for role 0 players) in the first stage and in the second stage role 0 players play the game given by the first stage decision, (2) in the first stage role 0 players play although they do not know the payoff structure, and in the second staeg, a role 1 player observes the first stage decision and decides the payoff structure, (3) cheap talk between role 0 players is introduced into the condition (2). The condition that brings the most efficient outcome is the condition (1): deciding the payoff structure first promotes the probability of realization of the efficient outcome.

A Price Competition Experiment Between Middlemen: Linear Function Case

A middleman is important; he/she purchases goods from suppliers for resale, creates and manages markets, seeks out suppliers, finds and encourages buyers, selects bid and ask prices, and holds inventories to provide liquidity or make services and goods available. However, economic theories such as the general equilibrium theory have not examined the role of a middleman.