Kazunori Miyazawa

Security architecture for control networks using IPsec and KINK

There are many kinds of control networks which have been used in various nonIP network areas, such as BA (building automation), FA (factory automation) and PA (process automation). These do not incorporate reasonable security mechanisms as they have been mainly used for closed networks. Recently the security of control networks is becoming important because of the popularization of the Internet, the deployment of wireless technologies and the security requirements of such infrastructures. Control networks require security mechanisms which 1) enable end-to-end security that do not depend upon specific network topology, 2) work with multiple control network technologies, and 3) are suited to small embedded devices commonly used in control networks. This paper shows security mechanisms which can meet the above requirements, assuming that IP is applied to the control networks.

Network Simulation for Control Systems

Maintaining the quality of network traffic of a control system is crucial; however, this is becoming much more challenging with the emerging IP-based technologies. Operators must constantly monitor the state of traffic flow in the control system and decide whether the system is functioning properly. To achieve this, we must know the characteristics of normal traffic and extract boundary conditions, i.e., thresholds, at which the quality of services begins to deteriorate to intolerable levels; this helps distinguish safe traffic from an undesirable one. The authors propose to use a network simulation technique to analyze the traffic behavior of IP-based control systems and construct flexible simulation architecture. We also evaluate the architecture model by implementing an example scenario that estimates the necessary network capacity for the experimental control system

USAGI IPv6 IPsec development for Linux

USAGI project was founded to improve and develop Linux IPv6 stack. We also developed (IPv6) IPsec stack for Linux kernel 2.4 and 2.6 series. We present our (IPv6) IPsec implementation (PE KEY, IPsec security association, security policy, output processing, and input processing) for both 2.4 and 2.6.

Implementing a Secure Autonomous Bootstrap Mechanism for Control Networks*This research is supported/funded by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications of Japan.

There are many kinds of control networks, which have been used in various non-IP network areas, such as BA (Building Automation), FA (Factory Automation) and PA (Process Automation). They are now introducing IP and face the issues of security and configuration complexity. The authors have proposed a model which intends to solve these issues while satisfying restrictions, i.e. small embedded devices, isolated networks and private naming system/name space, which are required when introducing new functionality into existing control networks. Secure bootstrap sequence and device-to-device communication using the chain of trust are the points of the model. This paper shows the practicability of the model through implementing the model experimentally.

The analysis of IPv6 adaptation to the industrial network protocol

Due to the deployment of the Internet throughout the world, the IPv4 addresses, which are supporting the Internet, are predicted to run out around 2011. The industrial world has been preparing to the transition to IPv6. Recently, IP is being introduced to the fieldbus protocols, which is used in the industrial network. Due to its enormous amount of addresses, IPv6 can provide seamless end-to-end communications between devices. Therefore IPv6 is considered to be a more suitable protocol than IPv4 for the fieldbus protocols. However, many kinds of fieldbus protocols are designed to work on IPv4, because most of them were designed before 2000. This paper introduces the requirements and issues to adapt the fieldbus protocols to IPv6 by investigating FOUNDATION Fieldbus HSE as the representative of IP based fieldbus protocols.

Extending a Secure Autonomous Bootstrap Mechanism to Multicast Security

There are many kinds of control systems, which have been used in industry area, such as process automation (PA) and factory automation (FA). They have numerous sensors and actuators called field devices in their networks, and are introducing Internet protocol (IP) as network technology. Network security is necessary to make the most of IPs capability. The authors have previously studied a security mechanism which can satisfy the restrictions required by control systems and a secure autonomous bootstrap mechanism which is based on the security mechanism. This paper shows an extension of the bootstrap mechanism to support multicast security. The discussion in this paper excludes security of multicast routing protocols and admission control protocols, e.g. IGMP and MLD, because the subject of this paper and those protocols are orthogonal

Design and evaluation of a client-friendly cross-realm framework for Kerberos 5

One problem with the cross-realm operation of Kerberos 5 is that clients need to traverse the authentication paths between realms. Traversal is a burden for clients with limited resources. In this paper, the authors constructed a cross-realm framework, called the client-friendly cross-realm framework, which releases clients from traversal of realms. This framework enables a client to obtain a service ticket in one message exchange with its local key distribution center (KDC). On the other hand, the framework introduces overhead on KDCs. The authors implemented PKCROSS as a component of the framework and showed that the overhead is insignificant.

Design and implementation of Kerberos version 5 for embedded devices

The paper describes design and implementation of a Kerberos [1] library for low-end embedded devices. We introduce table representation with stack structure to represent ASN.1 DER [2][3] (Abstract Syntax Notation One Distinguished Encoding Rules) codec. The resulting code occupies 23KB on Renesas H8 architecture and it eliminates the heap memory operation. The library is used to implement KINK [4] (Kerberized Internet Negotiation of Keys) and user authentication functionality to small footprint embedded devices.