Kei Fukuyama

Human Contacts in Knowledge Society: An Analytical Perspective

Supported by the highly advanced technologies of information/communication and transportation, the new knowledge society has been emerging. Newly developed transportation and communication technologies are diffused in the society, resulting in the rapid increase in the flexibility and the degree of freedom of human communication behaviours. The technological innovation of communications in the society does not only mean more rapid and efficient transmission of information and knowledge, it also expands the possibility of interactions of various types of activities in the spatially distant areas. The increased opportunity of communications in the society, greatly affecting the communication behaviours, brings about the structural evolution of social systems themselves.

Analyses on duopoly vendors in a small-open city

The duopoly model of vendors on a linear open city is developed in order to analyze equilibrium location of vendors and city residents. It is shown that at the equilibrium vendors locate at either the city edge or city center, with positive distance each other. It is also shown that the equilibrium vendor location is too far from the city center and the city size is too large comparing to the total land rent maximization situation. It is also shown that the location regulation with land rent subsidy for vendors are effective in order to improve the city welfare.

Effectiveness of social systems sustained by residents' participation: a collection system of classified garbage and rubbish

Models the decision mechanism by residents on their contribution to garbage and rubbish classification, and clarifies how they decide to (or not to) cooperate with the system. Moreover, based on the model and survey results, effective management policies for the system for better classification are examined. More precisely, the decision by residents to cooperate with garbage classification is modeled as a game between each resident and his/her society, consisting of the residents in the region. A mailing survey for residents in the eastern Tottori area and an interview visit to the garbage disposal facility of the Tottori Eastern Local Government Association are provided in order to collect actual data on the garbage classification level of the residents. From this study, it is clarified that the three policies of (1) public announcements, (2) education, and (3) incentive systems (punishment and subsidy) have different effects on the cooperation of households. An appropriate policy mix is necessary in order to effectively achieve the cooperation of the majority. In particular, policies (1) and (3) have different effects on cooperation, depending on how they are mixed. The model developed in this study can be used to examine policies for a more effective garbage classification system.

The Knowledge-Intensive Nature of Japan’s Urban Development

Small variations in events in history could have created a pattern of urban centres very different from that which exists today. In particular, the locational patterns of knowledge-intensive agents, such as research laboratories, seem to follow paths that depend upon history (Kobayashi et al 1991). When agents and firms wish to congregate in places where others are already located, one or a few locations may end up with the entire industry. Agglomeration economies therefore introduce an indeterminacy. If we bypass this indeterminacy by arguing that historical accident is responsible for the dominant locations, we must then define historical accident and explain how each winning location is selected.

Supplementing review strategies with penalties in environmental enforcement

A framework for more effective and efficient enforcement of environmental regulations is proposed. An operators comply-violate decision is analysed in the context of the operators continuing relationship with an environmental agency, permitting an effective enforcement policy to be developed using the theory of repeated games. More specifically, enforcement conflicts between an operator and an agency are modelled using a noncooperative game called the enforcement dilemma that clarifies the causes of enforcement inefficiency. Then a systematic long-term enforcement policy, the review strategy, is introduced and shown to effect substantial improvements in enforcement efficiency. However, as some numerical examples illustrate, the review strategy alone cannot always give the operator the incentive to comply fully, because of exogenous uncertainty in monitoring procedures. A supplementary penalty, which may be quite small, is then introduced into the enforcement framework to strengthen the review strategys ability to deter violation. In combination with a suitable penalty system, the review strategy can be an effective means for an agency to enforce environmental regulations despite limited resources.

Analyses on continuance of unpopular international airline by local government

The bargaining between Asiana Airlines and Tottori Prefecture in Japan on continuation of international flight between Seoul in Korea and Yonago of Tottori in Japan in 2007 is analyzed. Nash bargaining model is employed to validate the bargaining power of both parties. Moreover, Regression Analyses are executed to find significant factors that have effects on flight users. Among others, the study finds that Tottori Prefecture had reasonable bargaining power at the bargaining process, and the two Tottori policies of User Promotion for Korean Travelers and Attraction Projects for Foreigners have been positively affected the number of users of the flights.

Timing games of development of environmental technology by firms under the environmental regulations

By focusing on regulating the oligopoly firms that discharge pollution directly into the environment and the relationships between the level of enforcement by the regulations of the government and the incentive to introduce new technology by the regulated firms are analyzed. This research clarifies the monotonicity of relationships between the level of strictness of regulations and the market incentive to develop new technology. When the cost of introducing new technology is relatively high, the environmental tax does not work as an effective regulation. In this case, using the patent system as a supplement for the stricter regulation can maintain incentives of technological development of the regulated firms. Obviously, there are many research problems surrounding this matter. Firstly, new environmental technology is not necessarily represented by a decrease in the marginal cost: a study on the various types of technologies may be beneficial. Secondly, the market externalities of technological diffusion and standardization should be considered. Finally, explicit modeling of an environmental subsidy system is necessary.

Effectiveness of enforcement systems for environmental regulations: comparison of Japanese and North American systems

Many theoretical and empirical studies have focused on the effectiveness of environmental regulations, especially for direct discharges by firms. While most of the study focus on the enforcement systems in United States and Canada, there is very little theoretical study on effectiveness of enforcement of environmental regulations in Japan. It is, however, also recognized that Japan had been so successful in its policies to reduce its pollution level dramatically in short term during the second half of its industrializing era. In this study, the Japanese enforcement system of environmental regulations is modeled and analyzed theoretically in the light of comparison with the North American system. The study clarifies how the Japanese enforcement system leads to the incentives of regulatory compliance by firms. The results are compared with the enforcement mechanism and its effectiveness obtained in Kilgour et al. (1992) for the North American systems.